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Global Employment Trends 2014: Risk of a Jobless Recovery? 
Abstract 
The global labour market situation remains uneven and fragile. True, there are encouraging signs of 
economic recovery in those advanced economies most affected by the global financial crisis which 
erupted in 2008. Also, a number of emerging and developing countries − including recently in Sub-
Saharan Africa − are enjoying relatively robust economic growth. The world economy may thus be 
growing somewhat faster than over the past three years. 
However, the report finds that those economic improvements will not be sufficient to absorb the major 
labour market imbalances that built up in recent years. First, over the foreseeable future, the world 
economy will probably grow less than was the case before the global crisis. This complicates the task of 
generating the over 42 million jobs that are needed every year in order to meet the growing number of new 
entrants in the labour market. 
Second, and more fundamentally, the root causes of the global crisis have not been properly tackled. The 
financial system remains the Achilles heel of the world economy. The state of many banks is such that 
many sustainable enterprises, notably small ones, have limited access to credit, thereby affecting 
productive investment and job creation. Significant financial bubbles have re-appeared in a number of 
advanced and emerging economies, adding new uncertainties and affecting hiring decisions. Also, global 
labour incomes continue to increase at a slower pace than justified by observed productivity gains, thus 
affecting aggregate demand. 
Third − and this is an important new finding in view of the post-2015 development debate − little progress 
is being made in reducing working poverty and vulnerable forms of employment such as informal jobs 
and undeclared work. If confirmed, this trend would unambiguously delay the achievement of 
development goals. 
To ensure lasting job recovery, the report highlights the role of a strategy that combines short-term 
measures (job-friendly macroeconomic and labour market policies) with further action to tackle long-
standing imbalances. Such a strategy would strengthen the economic recovery and pave the way for 
more and better jobs. 
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isk of a jobless recovery?
Global Employment Trends 2014
The annual Global Employment Trends (GET) reports provide the latest 
global and regional estimates of employment and unemployment, employ-
ment by sector, vulnerable employment, labour productivity, informal em-
ployment and working poverty, while also analysing country-level issues and 
trends in the labour market. 
Based on the most recently available data and taking into account macro-
economic trends and forecasts, the GET reports seek to shed light on cur-
rent labour market trends and challenges. The reports build on the ILO’s 
Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) and include a consistent set 
of tables with regional and global estimates of labour market indicators. 
Each report contains a medium-term labour market outlook, assessing likely 
trends and drivers of labour market developments around the world.
The Global Employment Trends 2014 report highlights the risks of a job-
less recovery. Economic activity is starting to recover in most developed and 
emerging economies. However, labour markets have not yet recovered from 
previous weaknesses and global unemployment remains at 6 per cent or al-
most 202 million jobseekers. As joblessness persists, ever more unemployed 
workers are becoming discouraged and quit the labour market, further widen-
ing the crisis-related jobs gap in comparison to pre-crisis trends. Insufficient 
private and public consumption as well as low investment prevent faster job 
creation and a quicker fall in the unemployment rate. Historically low inter-
est rates, especially in advanced economies, have so far triggered a surge in 
financial rather than in real investment, with little effect on job creation. 
The report argues that policy-makers need to tackle weak aggregate demand 
growth through more pro-active policies that help boost private and public 
consumption. In addition, hiring uncertainty needs to be brought down in 
order to increase investment and job creation. This can be achieved, in 
particular, by providing better coordination of different policy instruments. 
Also, in countries with high and persistent unemployment, active labour 
market policies can help address emerging mismatch problems that hamper 
a faster labour market recovery. Finally, rising labour market discourage-
ment and structural unemployment should be tackled with new skills and 
training initiatives to help jobseekers find employment in alternative indus-
tries and to promote their employability more broadly. 
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The global labour market situation remains uneven and fragile. True, there are encouraging 
signs of economic recovery in those advanced economies most affected by the global financial 
crisis which erupted in 2008. Also, a number of emerging and developing countries − including 
recently in Sub-Saharan Africa − are enjoying relatively robust economic growth. The world 
economy may thus be growing somewhat faster than over the past three years.
However, the report finds that those economic improvements will not be sufficient to 
absorb the major labour market imbalances that built up in recent years. First, over the fore-
seeable future, the world economy will probably grow less than was the case before the global 
crisis. This complicates the task of generating the over 42 million jobs that are needed every 
year in order to meet the growing number of new entrants in the labour market. 
Second, and more fundamentally, the root causes of the global crisis have not been prop-
erly tackled. The financial system remains the Achilles heel of the world economy. The state of 
many banks is such that many sustainable enterprises, notably small ones, have limited access 
to credit, thereby affecting productive investment and job creation. Significant financial bub-
bles have re-appeared in a number of advanced and emerging economies, adding new uncer-
tainties and affecting hiring decisions. Also, global labour incomes continue to increase at a 
slower pace than justified by observed productivity gains, thus affecting aggregate demand.  
Third  −  and this is an important new finding in view of the post-2015 development 
debate  −  little progress is being made in reducing working poverty and vulnerable forms 
of employment such as informal jobs and undeclared work. If confirmed, this trend would 
unambiguously delay the achievement of development goals.
To ensure lasting job recovery, the report highlights the role of a strategy that combines 
short-term measures (job-friendly macroeconomic and labour market policies) with further 
action to tackle long-standing imbalances. Such a strategy would strengthen the economic 
recovery and pave the way for more and better jobs. 
Raymond Torres
Director of the ILO Research Department
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Executive Summary
Global unemployment increased by 5 million people in 2013… 
The uneven economic recovery and successive downward revisions in economic growth pro-
jections have had an impact on the global employment situation. Almost 202 million people 
were unemployed in 2013 around the world, an increase of almost 5 million compared with 
the year before. This reflects the fact that employment is not expanding sufficiently fast to 
keep up with the growing labour force. 
The bulk of the increase in global unemployment is in the East Asia and South Asia 
regions, which together represent more than 45 per cent of additional jobseekers, followed by 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. By contrast, Latin America added fewer than 50,000 add-
itional unemployed to the global number – or around 1 per cent of the total increase in un-
employment in 2013.
Overall, the crisis-related global jobs gap that has opened up since the beginning of the 
financial crisis in 2008, over and above an already large number of jobseekers, continues to 
widen. In 2013, this gap reached 62 million jobs, including 32 million additional jobseekers, 
23 million people that became discouraged and no longer look for jobs and 7 million econom-
ically inactive people that prefer not to participate in the labour market.
… and, on current trends, it would rise by a further 13 million people by 2018… 
If current trends continue, global unemployment is set to worsen further, albeit gradually, 
reaching more than 215 million jobseekers by 2018. During this period, around 40 million net 
new jobs would be created every year, which is less than the 42.6 million people that are expected 
to enter the labour market every year. The global unemployment rate would remain broadly 
constant during the next five years, at half a percentage point higher than before the crisis. 
… affecting young people disproportionately… 
Young people continue to be particularly affected by the weak and uneven recovery. It is esti-
mated that some 74.5 million young people – aged 15–24 – were unemployed in 2013; that 
is almost 1 million more than in the year before. The global youth unemployment rate has 
reached 13.1 per cent, which is almost three times as high as the adult unemployment rate. 
Indeed, the youth-to-adult unemployment ratio has reached a historical peak. It is particu-
larly high in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as in parts of Latin America and the 
Caribbean and Southern Europe. 
Importantly, in the countries for which information exists, the proportion of young 
people neither in employment, nor in education or training (NEET) has continued the steep 
upward trend recorded since the start of the crisis. In certain countries, almost one-quarter 
of young people aged 15 to 29 are now NEET. 
… intensifying long-term unemployment in advanced economies… 
As the recovery remains weak, the average length of unemployment spells has increased con-
siderably, a further sign of feeble job creation. In many advanced economies, the duration of 
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unemployment has doubled in comparison with the pre-crisis situation. In the crisis coun-
tries in the euro area, for instance, the average duration of unemployment has reached up to 
9 months in Greece and 8 months in Spain. Even in countries where encouraging signs of an 
economic recovery have appeared, such as the United States, long-term unemployment affects 
more than 40 per cent of all jobseekers. 
Such long unemployment spells are detrimental to the speed of labour market recovery 
even when economic activity is set to accelerate. First, they constitute a considerable burden 
for the public purse, requiring governments to raise taxes or cut spending elsewhere if they 
do not want to or cannot increase the fiscal deficit. More importantly, jobseekers who have 
been out of employment for long periods lose their skills at an accelerating pace, making it 
more difficult for them to find alternative employment at a similar occupation or skill level.
… and interrupting earlier progress in terms of, first, participation rates… 
Labour force participation rates are not improving and remain more than 1 percentage point 
below their pre-crisis level. The drop in participation rates has been particularly pronounced 
in East and South Asia, where many women have left the labour market. At the same time, 
as educational attainment improves, young people enter the labour market at a higher age in 
these regions, strengthening their future labour market prospects. In the Developed Econ-
omies region, on the other hand, participation rates have dropped as young workers in par-
ticular do not see opportunities in the labour market. Other regions, such as Central and 
Eastern Europe, experienced an increase in participation rates. There, and in other coun-
tries with less well developed social security systems and which suffered from large losses in 
(formal) employment, many previously economically inactive people returned to the labour 
market, often to take up informal employment in order to make up for loss in household 
income.
… second, vulnerable employment, expected to have reached 48 per cent of total employment… 
Vulnerable employment  –  that is, either self-employment or work by contributing family 
workers  –  accounts for almost 48  per cent of total employment. Persons in vulnerable 
employment are more likely than wage and salaried workers to have limited or no access to 
social security or secure income. The number of people in vulnerable employment expanded by 
around 1 per cent in 2013, which is five times higher than during the years prior to the crisis.
… third, working poverty, with 839 million workers living on less than US$2 a day… 
The number of working poor continues to decline globally, albeit at a slower rate than during 
previous decades. In 2013, 375 million workers (or 11.9 per cent of total employment) are esti-
mated to live on less than US$1.25 per day and 839 million workers (or 26.7 per cent of total 
employment) have to cope with US$2 a day or less. This is a substantial reduction in compar-
ison with the early 2000s when the corresponding numbers of working poor below US$1.25 
and US$2 were more than 600 million and more than 1.1 billion, respectively. However, the 
progress in reducing working poverty has stalled. In 2013, the number of workers in extreme 
poverty declined by only 2.7 per cent globally, one of the lowest rates of reduction over the 
past decade, with the exception of the immediate crisis year.
… and finally, stubbornly high informal employment.
Informal employment remains widespread in most developing countries, although regional 
variations are sizeable. In Eastern Europe, CIS countries and a few advanced economies, 
informal employment still accounts for over 20  per cent of total employment. In Latin 
Executive Summary 13
America, some countries have made good progress in maintaining informality rates below 
50 per cent but low-income Andean and Central American countries continue to experience 
rates of 70 per cent or more. Significantly higher informality rates can be found in economies 
in South and South-East Asia. In some countries in these regions, informality rates reach 
up to 90 per cent of total employment. Even though progress in reducing poverty has been 
strongest in these regions, the lack of formal employment opportunities is likely to constitute 
a barrier to a sustainable further reduction in poverty.
Tackling the employment and social gaps requires job-friendly macroeconomic policies… 
A faster recovery in global labour markets is held back by a deficit of aggregate demand. In 
this respect, the fiscal consolidation currently under way in many advanced economies consti-
tutes a drag on faster expansion of output growth, in addition to weak private consumption. 
This report shows that a rebalancing of macroeconomic policies and increased labour incomes 
would significantly improve the employment outlook. Simulation results suggest that in high-
income G20 countries, such a rebalancing could reduce unemployment by 1.8 percentage 
points by 2020, which corresponds to 6.1 million additional jobs. These achievements would 
also support fiscal goals. Indeed, simulation results suggest such a policy approach would 
result in a significant improvement over the baseline status quo scenario. 
Monetary policy continues to be accommodative, providing a beneficial stimulus to 
aggregate demand. Estimates of the impact of the current monetary policy regime show that 
unemployment would have been 1–2 percentage points higher in large advanced economies 
if policy-makers had not undertaken swift monetary action in the face of the financial crisis. 
Recent trends, however, indicate that an increasing share of the additional liquidity generated 
by such accommodative monetary policy is flowing into asset markets rather than into the 
real economy. This is generating the risk of future stock and housing price bubbles, potentially 
weighing on sustainable job recovery.
Given weak demand, uncertain sources of future demand and ample liquidity, large firms 
have tended to buy back shares and increase dividend payments to shareholders, rather than 
investing in the real economy. Estimates show that in certain countries hiring uncertainty 
can exercise upward pressure on unemployment over and above weak aggregate demand, an 
effect that can persist even when the recovery in economic activity is taking up. The result is 
a further constraint on employment creation. 
… and greater attention to labour market and social policies 
With 23 million people estimated to have dropped out of the labour market due to discour-
agement and rising long-term unemployment, active labour market policies (ALMP) need 
to be implemented more forcefully to address inactivity and skills mismatch. Indeed, with 
more and more potential workers becoming discouraged and remaining out of the labour 
force, the risk of skills degradation and obsolescence is increasing. However, currently only 
small amounts of public spending go into active labour market measures. Even in OECD 
countries, which tend to have relatively advanced institutions and practices in this respect, 
an average of less than 0.6 per cent of GDP was spent on such measures in 2011. Estimates 
show that by bringing spending up to 1.2 per cent of GDP, similar to those countries that 
spend the most on ALMP, an additional 3.9 million jobs could be created in the Developed 
Economies and European Union region. Regions that currently spend the least on active 
labour market policies are likely to benefit the most in terms of an improved functioning of 
their labour markets.
1.  Macroeconomic challenges and global 
labour market developments
Some positive signs in advanced economies  
amidst deceleration in emerging economies
In 2013, global economic growth slowed down to 2.9 per cent, its lowest rate since 2009 and 
more than 1 percentage point below the average annual growth rate over the pre-crisis decade 
(figure  1). Economic growth in emerging economies slowed down significantly whereas a 
modest pick-up in activity was recorded in advanced economies towards the end of the year. 
However, downside risks continue to predominate at the global level as aggregate demand is 
weak and macroeconomic uncertainty remains elevated.
Weaker economic growth in emerging and developing countries reflects both low aggre-
gate demand, particularly for their exports, and global financial instability associated with 
macroeconomic policy conditions in advanced economies. Recent outflows of capital from 
emerging markets in expectation of a less accomodative monetary policy stance in the United 
States have highlighted their vulnerability to volatile capital flows and external policy devel-
opments.1 The slowdown in emerging and developing countries is also a result of adjustment 
problems that have clouded the medium-term economic horizon. After a rapid catch-up, some 
large emerging and developing countries are facing significant bottlenecks, notably in terms of 
infrastructure and human capital, which are likely to weigh on growth in the coming years. 
In 2013, the Developed Economies and European Union region grew at a meagre rate 
of 1.0 per cent, 0.4 percentage points lower than in the year before. Annual output growth 
in the United States decelerated from 2.8 per cent in 2012 to 1.6 per cent in 2013, while the 
1 In fact, according to some accounts, around one third of the effect of quantitative easing on the long-term interest rate 
in the United States was undone merely through expectations of a less accommodative monetary policy, raised by the 
U.S. Federal Reserve in May 2013 (World Bank, 2013a).
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Notes: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–15 are projections.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2013.
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shift in fiscal and monetary policies have kept growth in Japan at a relatively strong 2.0 per 
cent, unchanged from the previous year. Growth in the euro area remained weak, although 
the region managed to exit recession during the year. The European Union as a whole experi-
enced stagnation, with a growth rate close to zero in 2013. The only two regions worldwide 
in which growth did not slow between 2012 and 2013 were South Asia and East Asia, which 
saw accelerations from 3.6 to 3.9 per cent and from 6.6 to 6.7 per cent, respectively. All other 
regions lost momentum in growth, with Central and South-Eastern Europe growing at a rate 
of 2.5  per cent, Latin America and the Caribbean at 2.7  per cent and Sub-Saharan Africa 
at 4.8 per cent in 2013. This is 0.3–0.5 percentage points lower than in 2012. A more pro-
nounced deceleration took place in South-East Asia and the Pacific, where the growth rate 
dropped from 5.7 per cent in 2012 to 4.9 per cent in 2013. The largest growth decelerations 
took place in the Middle East and North Africa, mainly due to political events.
The world economy is expected to see a modest recovery, with growth of 3.6  per cent 
in 2014, mainly driven by a pickup in activity in advanced economies (IMF, 2013). How-
ever, economic growth projections have consistently proved too optimistic over the past 
2  years (figure  2). In fact, several international organizations, including the IMF, expected 
the recovery to occur much earlier. Projections had to be revised downwards repeatedly, illus-
trating a broader problem with the assessment of the foundations of future growth. Unless a 
more solid foundation for future growth is built, the growth projections for 2014 may fail to 
materialize once again, thereby adversely affecting the employment outlook.
Unemployment edges higher in 2013 and is expected  
to remain at elevated levels for many years to come
Labour markets have been affected by the slower-than-projected economic recovery. 
Employment growth slowed down in 2013 across most regions, leading to a further upward 
revision of unemployment rates (see box 1 for a comparison of the current forecast with an 
earlier one). Global employment grew by a mere 1.4 per cent in 2013 – broadly unchanged 
from 2012, but lower than in any year of the pre-crisis decade. Employment growth dete-
riorated in every geographic region except South Asia and North Africa. Indeed, it was the 
strong acceleration of employment growth in South Asia that helped keep global employment 
growth stable in 2013 compared with 2012. The largest slowdowns occurred in Central and 
Figure 2. Evolution of global GDP growth estimates and projections,






Note: The graph shows global GDP growth estimates/projections for 2013 and 2014, produced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the World Bank and United Nations (UN) at different points in time.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook; UN, Project LINK Global Economic Outlook; UN, World Economic Situation and Prospects; World Bank, 
Global Economic Prospects (several editions).
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South-Eastern Europe and CIS, Latin America and the Caribbean and South-East Asia and 
the Pacific. As a consequence, the crisis-related global jobs gap, measuring the number of 
jobs lost in comparison to pre-crisis trends, widened further to 62 million workers in 2013 
(figure 3). The jobs gap includes not only the increase in unemployment, but also those people 
who have remained outside or dropped out of the labour force after having been discouraged 
by long spells of unemployment and/or perceived low prospects of finding new job opportun-
ities. At the global level, the ILO estimates a total of 23 million people are currently in this 
situation, so called “discouraged workers”. As unemployment continues to persist, by 2018 the 
global gap is projected to rise to 81 million; this includes some 30 million discouraged workers 
who might never come back to the labour market.
The global unemployment rate remained at 6.0  per cent of the global labour force, 
unchanged from 2012. The number of unemployed around the world is estimated to have 
reached 201.8 million in 2013, an increase of 4.9 million from a revised 196.9 million in the 
previous year. There were 31.8 million more unemployed persons around the world in 2013 
than in 2007, prior to the onset of the global economic crisis (figure 4). On the basis of current 
macroeconomic projections, the ILO expects little improvement in the global labour market 
in 2014, with the global unemployment rate ticking up to 6.1 per cent and the number of un-
employed rising by a further 4.2 million.








Notes: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections. The graph shows the global jobs gap, i.e. the difference 
between the actual or projected evolution of total employment on the one hand and employment as implied by the pre-crisis 
trend on the other hand. 
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013.
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Should a sustainable economic recovery fail to materialize once again, a downside scenario 
would imply that unemployment would rise much faster than in the baseline (figure 5). In such 
a scenario, global economic growth in 2014 would reach only 2.8 per cent, which is 0.1 per-
centage points less than in 2013 and 0.8  percentage points below the baseline. Also, after 
2014, output growth would be around 1 percentage point lower in each year than in the base-
line. Based on these assumptions, unemployment is projected to increase by a  further 5 mil-
lion jobseekers relative to the baseline projection of 215 million in 2018. The unemployment 
rate would reach 6.2 per cent in 2018 compared to 6.0 per cent in the baseline. Most of the 
additional increase in unemployment in the downside scenario would occur in the Developed 
Economies and European Union region, with almost 3  million more unemployed by 2018 
than in the baseline scenario.
Labour market developments differ widely across regions and countries (table 1). In the 
Developed Economies and European Union region, 8.6  per cent of the labour force is un-
employed, which is almost 3 percentage points higher than in 2007. Unemployment rates in 
the United States and the United Kingdom have declined, whereas they have edged up fur-
ther in Italy and France. Only small improvements in the unemployment rate were seen in 
Canada, Japan and Germany. In the medium-term, only the United States is expected to see 
substantially declining unemployment rates, and even there, the unemployment rate is pro-
jected to remain above pre-crisis levels. For other G7 countries, the unemployment rate is not 
projected to move substantially from current levels for the foreseeable future.
Across the regions, the highest unemployment rates are observed in North Africa and the 
Middle East, at 12.2 and 10.9 per cent respectively in 2013, largely unchanged as compared 
with 2012. In Central and South-Eastern Europe and CIS the unemployment rate remained 
relatively high in 2013, at 8.2  per cent, with an estimated increase of the unemployment 
rate in Turkey and the Russian Federation. Latin America and the Caribbean only saw a 
marginal decline in its regional unemployment rate, which edged down from 6.6 to 6.5 per 
cent. In Brazil, the unemployment rate went down slightly, while it ticked up in Mexico and 
Argentina. No significant changes in the regional unemployment rate are forecast in the year 
to come. In all other regions, unemployment rates remained roughly unchanged in 2013, as 
compared with the year before.
The global employment-to-population ratio stood at 59.6  per cent in 2013, 
unchanged from 2012 and still well below the pre-crisis level of 60.7  per cent.2 The male 
2 The employment-to-population ratio measures employment as a share of the working-age population aged 15+.
Figure 5. Annual change in global unemployment and GDP growth,















Note: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections. The graph displays past trends and projections for 
annual changes in global unemployment. The chart also includes projections for the annual change in global 
unemployment under the assumption of a further deterioration in world economic developments from 2014 onwards. 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2013; ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013.
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employment-to-population ratio stood at 72.2 per cent and the female ratio at 47.1 per cent, 
both essentially unchanged from the previous year. The global male unemployment rate edged 
up to 5.8  per cent in 2013 from 5.7  per cent in 2012, while the rate for women remained 
unchanged at 6.4 per cent. The employment-to-population ratio and unemployment rate indi-
cators paint a picture not of a sharp or abrupt deterioration in the global labour market in 
2013, but rather of a continued, gradual weakening, which is a result of the combination of 
persistently elevated unemployment rates combined with a gradual decline in the growth rate 
of the world’s working-age population. 
Table 1.  Global, regional and country-specific estimates and projections  
of the total unemployment rate, 2007–16 (percentage points)
Country/region 2007 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p
World 5.5 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.1
G20 Economies 5.1 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8
G20 Advanced Economies 5.7 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.1
G20 Emerging Economies 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.1
Developed Economies and the European Union 5.8 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.4 8.2
Australia 4.4 5.2 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.8
Canada 6.0 7.2 7.1 7.0 7.0 6.9
Japan 3.9 4.3 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.0
United States 4.7 8.2 7.5 7.2 6.8 6.4
European Union 7.2 10.5 11.0 11.1 11.1 10.9
France 8.0 9.9 10.5 10.9 10.8 10.7
Germany 8.6 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4
Italy 6.1 10.7 12.2 12.6 12.7 12.7
United Kingdom 5.4 8.0 7.5 7.3 7.2 7.1
Central and South-Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS 8.2 8.0 8.2 8.3 8.2 8.2
Russian Federation 6.0 5.5 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8
Turkey 10.3 9.2 9.9 10.0 9.7 9.6
Middle East 10.2 10.9 10.9 11.0 10.9 10.8
North Africa 11.1 12.1 12.2 12.2 12.1 12.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.5
South Africa 22.3 25.0 25.3 25.2 25.1 25.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 6.9 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Argentina 8.5 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.3
Brazil 8.1 6.9 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.5
Mexico 3.4 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.7
East Asia 3.8 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.9
Republic of Korea 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.4
South-East Asia and the Pacific 5.5 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3
Indonesia 9.1 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
South Asia 4.1 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1
Notes: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections. Estimates and projections for individual G20 countries are shown 
only when they are based on a minimum number of actual data points. Figures might differ from national estimates or those published 
in the Panorama Laboral (ILO, 2013a), mainly as a result of differences in geographical coverage.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013.
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Box 1.  What explains differences in unemployment projections?
As in previous editions of Global Employment Trends, global 
and regional unemployment levels and rates have been 
revised to take into account new information as it becomes 
available and revisions in economic growth projections. 
This box provides an overview of the revisions since the 
latest projection update in July 2013 (table B1.1). A distinc-
tion is made between revisions due to differences in the 
various input data used in Trends Econometrics Models 
(TEM) – including national unemployment rates, changes in 
GDP growth rate estimates and projections – and changes 
in labour force and population estimates.
New data on unemployment rates. Revisions in the histor-
ical unemployment data come either from revisions made 
by the original sources or from the fact that sometimes data 
releases from national labour force surveys contain a sub-
stantial time lag, which can be up to 1 or 2 years or even 
more in some rare cases.
Overall, there were 37 new observations in TEM October 
2013 as compared to the TEM July 2013; 17 of these new 
data points refer to the period 2000–11, and 20 refer to 
2012. For example, there were six more observations for 
Azerbaijan (2000–05), five more observations for Kuwait 
(2006–08, 2010–11), two more observations for Qatar 
(2006 and 2008) and one more observation for Tajikistan 
(2009).
In addition, the unemployment rate for India (2012) was 
revised upwards as the results of the all-India household 
survey (68th round survey programme during the period 
July 2011 to June 2012, conducted by the National Sample 
Survey Office) became available. This survey is the inter-
nationally comparable and utilized source for the historical 
series for the Indian unemployment rate.
Moreover, prior to 2012 there were some substantive 
revisions on some of the unemployment rate input data. 
For example, the unemployment rate was revised upwards 
by more than 1 percentage point for Colombia (2002–
06) and Tunisia (2005), and the unemployment rate for 
Armenia (2008) was revised downwards by about 12 per-
centage points.
In both TEM July and October 2013, unemployment 
estimates were preliminary for 52 countries for which only 
some quarters were available at the end of 2013. In the 
most recent model run (TEM October 2013), the most 
recent quarter available was the third quarter, whereas in 
the previous model run, the most recent quarter available 
was the second. However, even with the additional informa-
tion, the point estimate for these countries did not change 
significantly.
GDP growth rates. Taken from the IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) database, GDP growth estimates and fore-
casts change from one version of the WEO to another. For 
example, between the WEO October 2013 and the WEO 
July 2013 update, the GDP growth rate for Botswana was 
revised, specifically, for 2009 it was revised downwards by 
3.1 percentage points. For 2012, the global GDP growth 
rate was revised upwards by 0.1 percentage points. For 
2013, the global GDP growth rate was revised down-
wards by 0.2 percentage points. Such revisions of GDP 
and unemployment input data can also lead to revisions 
in the estimated relationship between the unemployment 
rate and the GDP growth rate, resulting in further revi-
sions to global and regional estimates of key labour market 
indicators.
The baseline estimate of the global unemployment rate 
in 2012 and 2013 has been revised upwards respectively 
by 0.04 and 0.01 percentage points. In 2012 and 2013, 
respectively, 36 and 46 per cent of the revision was caused 
by GDP growth rate revisions, and 64 and 54 per cent was 
caused by changes in the unemployment input data. How-
ever, the current estimates remain within the confidence 
interval that accompanied the previous forecasts.
Labour force estimates. The newest version of the ILO 
Economically Active Population Estimates and Projections 
(EAPEP) database (2013 edition) provided a new labour 
force benchmark for the GET estimates. In the meantime, 
the all-India household survey referring to 2012 became 
available. At the global level, this revision reduced the 
labour force estimate for 2012 by 12.4 million, which trans-
lated into a reduction in the estimated global participation 
rate of 0.2 percentage points. Overall, the impact of the 
labour force revision on the global unemployment rate was 
negligible compared with the revisions of GDP growth rates 
and unemployment input data.
Table B1.1.  Comparison of unemployment estimates/projections from July and October 2013
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
Unemployment (millions) 
TEM, October 2013 170.0 177.0 197.9 195.2 193.9 196.9 201.8 206.0 208.8 211.0 213.1 215.2
TEM, July 2013 169.9 178.3 197.8 195.0 193.2 196.3 202.2 205.9 208.5 210.6 212.7 214.8
Unemployment rate (per cent)
TEM, October 2013 5.5 5.6 6.2 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.0
TEM, July 2013 5.5 5.7 6.2 6.1 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
* 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, July and October 2013.
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Labour market situation of youth worsens further
The labour market outlook for young people worsened in nearly every region of the world. The 
global youth unemployment rate rose to 13.1 per cent in 2013, from 12.9 per cent in 2012 and 
11.6 per cent in 2007. The largest increase occurred in the Middle East region. This region has 
one of the highest youth unemployment rates in the world, with 27.2 per cent of young people 
in the labour force without work in 2013, versus 26.6 per cent in 2012. Central and South-
Eastern Europe and CIS, East Asia, South-East Asia and the Pacific and North Africa all saw 
a substantial increase in youth unemployment rates (figure 6). In the Developed Economies 
and European Union, the region that registered the largest increase in youth unemployment 
rates over the period 2007–12, unemployment among young people rose further to 18.3 per 
cent of the youth labour force. 
In total, 74.5 million young people aged 15–24 were unemployed in 2013, an increase 
of more than 700,000 over the previous year. There were 37.1  million fewer young people 
in employment in 2013 than in 2007, while the global youth population declined by only 
8.1 million over the same period. The global youth labour force participation rate, at 47.4 per 
cent in 2013, remains more than 2 percentage points below the pre-crisis level, as more young 
people, frustrated with their employment prospects, continue to drop out of the labour 
market. The global youth unemployment rate is expected to edge up to 13.2 per cent in 2014, 
with increases projected in the three Asian regions and in the Middle East, partially offset by 
a projected decline in the Developed Economies and European Union region.
The share of young people (aged 15–29) that are neither in employment, nor in education 
or training (NEET) has risen in 30 out of the 40 countries for which data are available for 2007 
and 2011–12 (see figure 7). In Ireland and Spain, the NEET rate rose by more than 9.4 and 
8.7 percentage points respectively since 2007. In both countries, the NEET rate is over 20 per 
cent. The largest declines in NEET rates occurred in Turkey and Macedonia, but in both coun-
tries, the NEET rate remains very high, at 34.6 per cent in Turkey in 2011 and 32.1 per cent in 
Macedonia in 2012. NEET rates are also high in Brazil where they stood at 18.4 per cent in 2009 
with considerable heterogeneity among labour market groups; only 12.1 per cent of Brazilian 
males were NEET but it affected 21.1 per cent females and even rose to 28.2 per cent among 
Afro-Brazilian female youth, a particularly high-risk group. High and/or rising NEET rates are 
a major concern for policymakers, as this group is neither engaged in employment, nor investing 
in skills development. Young people that are among the NEETs may be less engaged and more 
dissatisfied with their societies than their peers who are employed or in the educational system.
Note: * 2012–13 are preliminary estimates.


























Figure 6. Average annual change in the youth unemployment rate,
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Where are the decent jobs?
In addition to the slowdown in employment and increase in unemployment, the last year 
has also seen a notable deceleration in wage employment growth, which expanded by only 
28.1 million in 2013, down sharply from the annual growth of more than 35 million over the 
previous two years. Central and South-Eastern Europe and CIS, East and South Asia saw the 
largest deceleration in wage employment growth as compared with 2012. Wage employment 
growth was also down in comparison with pre-crisis trends. If the pre-crisis trend in the wage 
employment share since 2000 had continued, there would now be almost 22  million more 
workers in wage employment as opposed to vulnerable employment (table 2). This gap com-
pared with pre-crisis trends is expected to increase to more than 60 million by 2018. In contrast 
to wage employment trends, vulnerable employment around the world increased by 13.4 mil-
lion in 2013 compared with an increase of only 5.3 million in 2012 and 3.3 million in 2011.3 
3 Vulnerable employment comprises own-account workers and contributing family workers, two employment groups on 
average characterised by higher poverty rates and limited social protection.
Source: ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 8th edition, table 10c.
NEET rate (%)
Figure 7. Young people that are neither in employment, nor in education
 or training (NEET) as the share of the population aged 15–29
 (2007 and most recent year)
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By sector, services accounted for more than half of total global employment growth in 
2013, while agricultural employment accounted for around one quarter. Overall, just below 
32 per cent of the world’s workforce was employed in the agricultural sector in 2013, a decline 
of 11.7 percentage points over the previous two decades. The services sector employed 45.1 per 
cent of the world’s workers in 2013 and the share of services workers increased by 10.1 per-
centage points over the same period. Industrial employment now accounts for around 23 per 
cent of all global employment, an increase of only 1.6  percentage points over the past two 
decades. In 2013, employment in industry grew by 9.7 million, compared with an average of 
more than 21 million new industrial jobs annually between 2010 and 2012.
Labour productivity growth trends provide further insights related to these observed 
global labour market dynamics. Global productivity growth (measured as growth in output 
per worker) declined from 1.6 per cent in 2012 to 1.4 per cent in 2013, reaching its second 
lowest value at any time over the past decade (figure 8). In this light, the output of firms and 
economies is growing slowly both because labour input has not increased substantially and 
productivity is growing more slowly compared with past years. 
Slower productivity and employment growth have coincided with a strong recovery in 
corporate profits and global equity markets. The FTSE global all cap index, which tracks 
7,200 publicly traded stocks across 47 countries, gained more than 18 per cent in the year to 
mid-December 2013 and had risen more than 158 per cent since the low reached in March 
2009. The year 2013 saw a further widening between trends in global profit growth and equity 
prices on the one hand and the global labour market on the other. Modest relative global wage 
growth in recent years, coupled with a long-term decline in labour shares of national income 
in many countries, provides further evidence to this effect (ILO, 2013b).
Table 2.  The global wage employment gap (millions)
2007 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
Global wage employment –  
actual/projected
1394 1542 1570 1596 1622 1650 1676 1702
Global wage employment –  
continuation of pre-crisis trends 
1394 1557 1592 1626 1661 1695 1729 1763
Global wage employment gap 0.0 15.4 21.6 30.2 38.3 45.2 52.9 60.6
Notes: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections.The table shows the global wage employment gap, i.e. the difference 
between actual or projected wage employment on the one hand and wage employment as implied by the pre-crisis trend (2000–08) 
of the wage employment share on the other.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013.
Note: * 2013 are preliminary estimates.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2013; IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2013.
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Moreover, it is important to note that the large increases in global asset prices are occur-
ring as interest rates set by central banks across much of the developed world remain at or 
near the zero bound, with several large central banks still engaged in large-scale quantitative 
easing programmes. The successful efforts by central banks to keep interest rates low, while 
generally being supportive of economic recovery, may have unintended consequences in terms 
of firms’ incentives and the overall risk appetites of market participants. In many economies, 
share buybacks and dividends are at or near record levels, while hiring remains muted, as 
 further discussed in chapter 3. 
The strong rise in asset prices in some countries that has accompanied the extraordi-
nary monetary policy efforts raises concerns about potential bubbles, which could once again 
threaten economic growth and labour market prospects. Moreover, strong increases in house 
prices in some countries may also have adverse knock-on effects on job creation through a 
negative impact on competitiveness, as will be argued in chapter 2 (box 3). 
High rates of informality hamper sustainable  
progress in poverty reduction
In developing countries, many workers are self-employed in precarious conditions or are 
employed on a casual basis without a contract and access to social security. Such forms of 
employment are considered to be informal. Often, employment is informal out of necessity for 
those not able to find formal jobs and in the absence of privately or publicly provided social 
protection. Sometimes, informal employment is a tactic to avoid taxation and regulation. In 
most cases, informal employment procures lower, more volatile pay and worse working con-
ditions than employment in formal arrangements. Women continue to face a higher risk of 
informal employment than men, as they often have less legal and social protection. Being 
young in the labour market also increases the risk of informality. Finally, self-employed people 
face much higher risk of informality in developing countries, in part because the legal frame-
work is weak in many such countries and due to their engagement in low-productivity activ-
ities (e.g. street vending).
New estimates of the share of workers in informal employment for 2011 show that 
informal employment is particularly widespread in the Asian regions and in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, with a cross-country average of around 50 per cent (figure 9). Informal 
employment also covers a large share of workers in Africa, at an average of 40 per cent. Esti-
mates for Central and South-Eastern Europe and CIS and the Middle East are relatively 
lower, but still hover around or above 20 per cent on average. Bringing more workers out of 









































Note: Mean, maximum, and 
minimum calculations are based on a 
sample of 49 countries (8 countries 
in Africa, 11 countries in Asia and the 
Paciﬁc, 11 countries in Central and 
South-Eastern Europe, 16 countries 
in Latin America and the Caribbean 
and 3 countries in the Middle East).
Source: Davalos and Ernst, 
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informality remains crucial in order to reduce working poverty, improve working conditions 
and generate tax revenues that governments need to strengthen social welfare systems. How-
ever, in the past decade, the share of workers in informal employment declined in only 26 out 
of 49 countries for which estimates are available.
Unemployment is becoming more persistent
The average duration of unemployment has gone up in many economies (figure 10). In the 
United States, the average unemployed worker found a job after 3–4 months of job search 
prior to the crisis, but the average duration increased to around 6 months in 2012. In Spain, 
unemployment duration increased from around 5 months in 2008 to 8 months in 2012. In 
Greece, where the average unemployment duration has always been high, the unemployed 
now wait on average more than 9 months before getting back into the workforce, more than 
1 month longer than in 2009. Other developed countries experienced similar increases in 
unemployment duration. In several developing and emerging countries, in contrast, the 
average unemployment duration has trended downwards and the global economic crisis had 
only a slight impact on unemployment duration. Only in South Africa did the average un-
employment duration increase, rising by 0.5 months to more than 9 months over the period 
from 2008 to 2011.
Longer spells of unemployment can have persistent effects. As unemployment spells 
lengthen, labour market attachment tends to diminish and skills to depreciate. The observed 
increase in the average unemployment duration in some countries can make job searches harder 
and unemployment more persistent (e.g. Shimer, 2008). This change in the composition of the 
unemployment pool has likely been another factor inhibiting a labour market recovery. 
Unemployment comes with considerable personal and social costs, such as decreased life 
satisfaction and stigmatization. Further, the fiscal cost of unemployment is often underesti-
mated, both for the short term and for the medium to long term. The most obvious short-term 
fiscal cost of an increase in unemployment is the immediate cost of higher unemployment 
benefits and welfare payments. Spain, for example, has seen an increase in fiscal expenditure 
on unemployment benefits and early retirement plans from 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 
2.9 per cent in 2011, contributing to the increase in public debt in the country. For Ireland, 









Note: To calculate the average, unemployment is assumed to be distributed equally within the different duration 
categories, e.g. the average unemployment duration of those unemployed for more than 3 and less than 6 months is 
assumed to be 4.5 months. The average unemployment duration of those unemployed for at least 12 months is 
assumed to be exactly 12 months.
Source: ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 8th edition.
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this expenditure category has grown even faster, from 0.9 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 2.6 per 
cent of GDP in 2011.4 In addition to direct outlays, elevated unemployment levels indicate 
that an economy is producing below potential, which, in turn, has a negative impact on 
economic growth and on associated tax revenues, forcing governments to either cut on the 
expenditure side or increase their debt holdings.
Unemployment can also have adverse fiscal effects in the medium- and long-term. As 
longer unemployment spells lower workers’ earnings throughout their careers, more tax rev-
enues are foregone. Further, at least partly due to lower income, the unemployed tend to 
become less healthy on average than the employed, which increases the need for public health 
expenditures. These are costs that public budgets will have to address in the years to come.
Economic uncertainty remains high, with negative effects on hiring
One of the factors weighing on labour markets is hiring uncertainty that increased at the 
onset of the crisis in 2007 (figure 11). Given the persistence of weak aggregate demand and the 
uncertainty about the strength and speed of future recovery, firms may choose to wait for new 
information and further developments before investing and hiring (see also ILO, 2013c). In 
2013, uncertainty continued to be fuelled in some countries by the lack of policy coordination 
4 These numbers were calculated on the basis of data from Eurostat.








Note: Uncertainty indicators are shown on a scale from 0 to 100 for 2004–13.
Source: Ernst and Viegelahn, forthcoming; Baker, Bloom and Davis, 2013.
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and the continued delaying of critical decisions. This elevated level of uncertainty is particu-
larly harmful towards employment in economies with salary schemes that tie significant 
components of managers’ salaries directly or indirectly to the short-term profitability of com-
panies. Since investments require an upfront cost and generate a return only in the medium 
or long term, there is little incentive for managers to invest (Smithers, 2013), and they may 
find it more attractive to buy back company shares or increase dividends (see chapter 3). If 
the uncertainty surrounding returns to productive investment is elevated, these incentives are 
decreased further. Business investment and hiring rates, as a consequence, decrease.
Hiring uncertainty is a measure for the uncertainty that weighs on employers when they 
make decisions about hiring new workers.5 In contrast, policy uncertainty intends to measure 
the uncertainty that surrounds economic policy decisions of governments. Both hiring uncer-
tainty and policy uncertainty are at elevated levels in most of the G7 economies when com-
pared with pre-crisis years (figure  11). For all countries, both indicators of uncertainty are 
highly correlated, which indicates that much of the uncertainty that is relevant for hiring 
managers is also related to decisions by policy-makers. The hesitation of companies to invest 
is therefore unlikely to be driven merely by economic fundamentals.
Uncertainty may be a significant factor affecting unemployment in some countries, 
making it more persistent. For the United States, for instance, estimates indicate that the 
trend in unemployment since 2007 can be largely associated with movements in output 
growth. The lack of aggregate demand has been the most important factor in the increase 
of unemployment rates during the crisis. Uncertainty rather had a level-impact, shifting un-
employment rates up by an additional 1.5 percentage points (figure 12).
How is the growth slowdown in emerging economies  
shaping labour markets? 
Between 2011 and 2013, growth in emerging economies slowed markedly, another major trend 
shaping global labour markets (figure 13). In the previous decade, China grew at 10.5 per cent 
annually, but growth decelerated to 7.6 per cent in 2013 and is expected to slow further to an 
average of 7.0 per cent in the period from 2014 to 2018. India grew at a rate of only 3.2 per 
cent in 2012. Even though growth reaccelerated to 3.8 per cent in 2013, this figure is still far 
below the 7.6 per cent observed on average between 2001 and 2010. Brazil has also seen more 
growth in 2013 compared with 2012, but growth fell short by more than 1 percentage point of 
5 See Appendix 1 for a discussion of the ILO hiring uncertainty indicator and its setup.
Figure 12. Contribution of hiring uncertainty to the increase in the unemployment









Note: The graph depicts the contributions 
of uncertainty, GDP growth and other 
factors to changes in the unemployment 
rate of the United States since the ﬁrst 
quarter of 2007, based on the estimations 
of a structural VAR model.
Source: Ernst and Viegelahn, forthcoming.
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the figures achieved over the period from 2001 to 2010. In the Russian Federation and South 
Africa, economic growth slowed by 1.9 and 0.5 percentage points respectively in 2013 com-
pared to the previous year; current growth is also slower than in the years from 2001 to 2010. 
Aside from the BRICS countries, other emerging and developing economies have also seen 
growth slowdowns in the past 3 years, such as Argentina, Mexico, Thailand and Viet Nam.
Export-dependent emerging economies have suffered from lack of demand by the major 
importing countries throughout the crisis. More recently, volatile capital flows have added 
to the pressures on many emerging economies. The increasing share of foreign-owned bonds 
has made their economic fortunes more dependent on monetary policy decisions in other 
economies (Sinaert, 2012). Exchange rate depreciations mitigate some of the effects if foreign 
capital is withdrawn. On the other hand, these exchange rate movements can have a strong 
impact on the real economy, for example in countries with heavy dependence on imported raw 
materials and commodities where production costs may soar when the exchange rate depreci-
ates. Even though exporters should benefit, the negative impacts arising through the import 
channel may dominate. Overall, volatile capital flows and exchange rate movements have led 
to heightened uncertainty and associated lower growth in those emerging economies where 
they have been a factor.
A slowdown in structural transformation observed in many emerging economies has fur-
ther weighed on output growth in these countries (see also ILO, 2013c). Workers are not 
moving out of agriculture and into higher value-added activities as fast as they did in the 
past. While it continues to be important for governments to facilitate intersectoral mobility 
of workers, the pool of workers in subsistence agriculture has become smaller over time. By 
moving into urban areas and finding jobs in higher-productivity industry or services sec-
tors, workers that were originally employed in agriculture contributed to higher economic 
growth rates in the past. But in some countries this natural source of economic growth is 
currently losing its importance. If high growth rates are to be maintained in the future, they 
cannot come exclusively from an increase in the availability of production factors – labour and 
capital – but need to be built on improvements in total factor productivity instead. The chal-
lenge is to employ the available capital and workers more efficiently by moving into higher-
quality segments and higher-value added activities.
These trends are exemplified in China, which has grown at a remarkable pace over the 
past decades, moving from one of the least developed economies towards middle income status 
(figure 14). Over this period, the share of agricultural workers nearly halved, from around 70 per 
cent at the beginning of the 1980s to 35 per cent more recently. Workers previously engaged in 
agriculture were quickly absorbed into the manufacturing sector which today accounts for sig-
nificant parts of the global supply chain. Historical experiences from other countries, however, 
suggest that the share of employment in industry does not increase unboundedly. In addition, 
Notes: * 2013 are preliminary 
estimates; 2014–15 are projections.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, 
October 2013.
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the absolute number of people aged 15–64 in China is expected to decline in the years to 
come.6 As a consequence, China’s potential pool of workers for the manufacturing sector is not 
growing any more. This decrease in the potential workforce is narrowing the production base, 
which has led China to forge a growth model that is based more on technological upgrading, 
productivity enhancements and the development of stronger domestic consumption.
A different example is found in Brazil, which has experienced relatively modest economic 
growth over the past decades. Even though workers moved out of agriculture, many shifted 
to jobs in low-productivity services sectors, not into higher-productivity manufacturing. In 
addition, large parts of the manufacturing industry have not benefitted from significant 
6 See UN World Population Prospects, the 2012 Revision.
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Note: Every dot corresponds to a data point. 
The sample includes data for 139 countries 
for 1980–2012.
Source: ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour 
Market, 8th edition; IMF, World Economic 
Outlook, October 2013.
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innovation or diversification and, as a result, manufacturing productivity gains have not 
reached levels that support aggregate economic growth.
Some analysis points to the risk of “middle-income traps” in which countries enjoy a 
rapid sectoral transformation at early stages of economic growth and development but then 
seem unable to achieve the productivity and innovation increments that could move them to 
high-income status. At this point in time, China is a long way from such a situation, given 
that it continues to grow faster than the Republic of Korea did in the 1980s, when it was at a 
similar stage of development as China is now (figure 15). Malaysia and Thailand embarked on 
a medium growth path, although Thailand’s growth has slowed down more recently. India is 
now in a decisive phase, just having reached the level of GDP per capita after which the tra-
jectories of other countries diverged in the past.
The working middle class continues to grow  
in the developing world
The number and share of middle-class workers expanded rapidly across the developing world 
in the decade of the 2000s, reflecting stronger investment and consumption and thereby pro-
viding an important source of economic growth (ILO, 2013c). However the growth of the 
middle class must be differentiated in these economies, as it includes the developing middle 
class, living on US$ 4-13 per day and the expansion of a more secure middle class, living on 
above US$ 13 per day.
In East Asia, the developing middle class is expected to grow less over the period 2013–18 
than over the years 2008–13, while the developed middle class is expected to grow more 
(figure 16). In South-East Asia and the Pacific the expansion of the middle class is predicted 
to slightly accelerate, moving more workers into the middle class in the next 5 years compared 
with the previous 5 years. A stronger expansion of the middle class is expected for South Asia, 
while the reduction in extremely poor workers is forecast to remain stable at the same time. 
Sub-Saharan Africa will likely see a reduction in the number of extremely poor workers and 
expansions of all other economic classes. For Latin America and the Caribbean, the increase 
in the middle class is expected to follow a similar path in the next 5 years as in the previous 
5 years, in which the majority of new employment opportunities are middle class and above.
The Millennium Development Goals provide another useful means to analyse the pro-
gress on employment in developing countries (see box 2).
Figure 15. Trajectory of annual GDP per capita before and after the year









Note: Year 0 on the time scale is the ﬁrst year in which a country reaches a GDP per capita level of above US$ 3000 
in constant 2005 PPP terms. Figure is adopted from Aiyar et al. (2013).
Source: Own calculations based on Penn World Tables 7.1. 
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Figure 16. Changes in employment by economic class,







Notes: *2013–18 are projections. The 
absolute changes in employment add up 
to 100 per cent. Numbers in the columns 
indicate changes in employment by 
economic class (millions).
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Box 2.  MDG employment indicators
World leaders adopted the UN Millennium Declaration at 
the Millennium Summit in September 2000. The Declar-
ation has been translated into a framework of goals, tar-
gets and indicators that aims to reduce poverty and hunger 
and to tackle ill-health, gender inequality, lack of education, 
lack of access to clean water and environmental degrad-
ation. In 2008, a new target on decent work was included 
under the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG) on the 
eradication of poverty and hunger. MDG1 currently consists 
of three targets, the second of which, Target 1B, focuses 
on achieving “full and productive employment and decent 
work for all, including women and young people”. Target 
1B is monitored using four employment indicators, namely: 
(1) growth rate of GDP per person employed (growth rate 
of labour productivity); (2) employment-to-population ratio; 
(3) proportion of employed people living below US$ 1.25 
(at purchasing power parity, PPP) per day (working poverty 
rate); and (4) proportion of own-account and contributing 
family workers in total employment (vulnerable employment 
rate). In addition, the initial set of MDG indicators adopted 
in the year 2000 included one employment indicator under 
the third goal on gender equality (share of women in wage 
employment in the non-agricultural sector).
These indicators provide a framework for labour market 
analysis in developing economies. Labour productivity pro-
vides a starting point for assessing the extent to which an 
economy can generate and sustain decent employment op-
portunities. The indicator reflects the connection between 
the broader economy and the labour market, and investi-
gation of this connection can shed light on issues such 
as limitations of productivity gains to certain sectors or 
labour market segments, and the translation of these gains 
into better employment conditions. The second indicator, 
the employment-to-population ratio, captures the volume 
of employment. However, given that in many developing 
economies low-quality employment is widespread, the 
level of the employment-to-population ratio is not indica-
tive of the state of the labour market, and a rise in the 
ratio does not necessarily signify an improvement. Par-
ticularly in low-income countries, employment growth may 
be primarily driven by demographics and growth in low-
quality employment, which hampers the interpretation of 
indicators based on numbers of workers (employment, 
unemployment and participation rates). Therefore, the set 
of indicators is complemented by the two indicators on 
the quality of employment, which provide complementary 
information. Whereas vulnerable employment is measured 
at the level of individual workers (jobs), working poverty 
is conventionally determined on the basis of household 
consumption. This means that private or public trans-
fers, which affect household consumption, also influence 
working poverty. An expansion of social protection, for 
example, may help to reduce working poverty regardless 
of the job a worker is holding.
Post-2015 development agenda
The MDG employment indicators have proven their ana-
lytical value, not only in global and regional reports, 
including the Global Employment Trends series, but also 
in numerous country-level reports. Discussions on the 
post-2015 development goals are on-going, and one of 
the key elements of the vision for the development agenda 
is inclusive economic transformations that ensure decent 
jobs (UN, 2013a). The current set of MDG employment 
indicators provides a basic framework for tracking progress 
towards decent work, which should be extended and/or 
refined in many ways to better capture improvements in 
the quality of jobs and workers’ lives, and identify those 
who are excluded. For example, given that social protec-
tion can play a fundamental role in creating more inclusive 
and sustainable development pathways, and can be instru-
mental for the pursuit of many of the current MDGs, an 
indicator on social protection programmes has been widely 
proposed (UN, 2012). 
A possible overarching sustainable development goal on 
“full and productive employment and decent work” under 
the post-2015 development framework will require a set of 
targets and indicators going beyond the existing five MDG 
indicators. Additional indicators for targets in the areas of 
working poor, youth unemployment, informality, female 
labour force participation and social protection should be 
considered, in order to provide a menu of options to be 
adapted according to countries’ circumstances and avail-
ability of information.* It will also be important to monitor 
patterns of structural change, which is a major driver of 
productivity increases as well as the creation of better jobs 
in developing economies. Strengthening national collection 
of labour market statistics and supporting national capacity 
building, especially for the poorest countries, should be a 
main item of the global development agenda beyond 2015. 
* For an initial discussion, see ILO Post-2015 concept note 2, Jobs and livelihoods: Meaningful ways to set targets and monitor progress, http://www.
ilo.org/global/topics/post-2015/documents/WCMS_213209/lang--en/index.htm.
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Summary
Despite continuing risks, a modest recovery has occurred in recent months in the developed 
world, which may strengthen global economic growth in 2014. However, at current levels, 
growth is too weak to significantly improve the situation of workers worldwide. In many econ-
omies, particularly in the euro area, GDP levels are still far below the levels observed before 
the crisis, which is reflected in high unemployment figures. Some developing and emerging 
economies are lagging behind the economic growth rates observed in the past decade, resulting 
in slower poverty alleviation. Decent job creation slowed almost everywhere worldwide with 
a significant deceleration in both wage employment and industrial employment growth. In 
addition, the average unemployment duration increased in many countries. Significant policy 
action is urgently required to tackle the key factors that prevent labour markets worldwide 
from recovering. In this respect, the indicators provided in this Global Employment Trends 
report allow an analysis of progress and areas of interventions to promote more and better 
jobs around the world.
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Appendix 1.  The ILO hiring uncertainty indicator
The ILO has developed an indicator that captures employers’ assessment of uncertainty in the 
labour market in G7 countries. Details of its calculation are provided in Ernst and Viegelahn 
(forthcoming). The ILO hiring uncertainty indicator is based on a model by McDonald and 
Siegel (1986) that in its original version studies the optimal timing of an investment in an 
irreversible project. The model is adapted to firms’ hiring and lay-off decisions and analyses 
when it is optimal for an individual firm to change the size of its workforce. 
The first step in calculating the uncertainty indicator consists of deriving uncertainty as 
a function of a time discount factor with which firms discount future profits and a labour 
productivity threshold above which firms find it profitable to hire workers. In other words, 
only when labour productivity exceeds this threshold that is strictly larger than the sunk costs 
of hiring, firms find it optimal to hire workers. Assuming that uncertainty perceptions are 
the same across all firms in the economy, the same productivity threshold applies to the whole 
labour market. However, depending on an individual employers’ economic outlook, workers 
may produce more value and be more productive in some firms than in others. The second step 
then assumes that labour productivity is log-normally distributed across firms. Both the level 
of labour productivity and the respective shares of firms that intend to increase and decrease 
the size of their workforce then exactly pin down the parameters of this distribution as well 
as the productivity threshold.
Data on employers’ hiring intentions are taken from the ManpowerGroup’s Employment 
Outlook Survey that is published on a quarterly basis from a survey of employers. More specif-
ically, data are available on the percentage of employers that expect an increase of employment 
in their establishment for the next quarter and the percentage of employers that expect a 
decrease.7 Quarterly data on labour productivity, measured as output over total labour costs, 
are taken from the OECD. These data series are then directly plugged into the uncertainty 
equation of the model, providing for each quarter the level of uncertainty that is consistent 
with observed labour productivity and hiring intentions.
The indicator then reflects employers’ assessment of the volatility of future labour 
productivity. If the market uncertainty perceived by employers is high, there is a significant 
probability for hired workers to be much less productive than expected. This is then indicated 
by a larger value for the hiring uncertainty indicator. If the economic outlook is less uncertain 
and workers’ productivity is likely to be close to the expectations, the indicator will take on 
a lower value.
To understand the factors influencing the dynamics of hiring uncertainty, a multi-variate 
regression analysis was carried out, using the full panel of all seven countries (Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) for as many quarters as possible. Four 
sets of variables were regressed on the hiring uncertainty indicator: general economic perfor-
mance such as GDP growth and variability; overall labour market performance (both cur-
rent and past) such as unemployment rates and variances; financial market related variables 
such as the IMF’s financial stress index; and policy related variables such as the level of public 
debt, the degree of coordination between monetary and fiscal policies and regulatory variables 
such as the OECD’s product and labour market regulation indicators. Results presented in 
chapter 3 are displayed as marginal effects at the variable mean. Estimates use panel-corrected 
standard errors to account for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the data.
7 See http://www.manpowergroup.com/press/meos_landing.cfm.
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2.  Regional economic  
and labour market developments
Developed Economies and European Union
A recovery in activity, not in jobs
The first signs of a recovery in economic activity appeared and strengthened in the Devel-
oped Economies and European Union region throughout 2013. The euro area emerged from 
recession during the second quarter of 2013 after 18 months of contraction, the longest in its 
history, led by faster than expected growth in Germany thanks to its strong export sector. In 
the United States, growth firmed after a weak end-of-year in 2012 and reached more than 
4 per cent in the last quarter of 2013. Similarly, in Japan, growth remained steady in the first 
half of 2013 after having overcome a short-lived recession by the end of 2012. Throughout the 
region, a firming in output and improvements in expectations is visible. Business investment 
is creeping up, albeit slowly. Productivity growth also shows signs of recovery in the region 
after having decelerated sharply following the aftermath of the financial crisis. At the same 
time, improvements in external competitiveness in key crisis countries in the region have put 
the recovery on a broader basis, allowing both domestic and external factors to contribute. 
However, improvements in both productivity and competitiveness have not yet been strong 
enough to make a significant difference to the still large employment gap. It remains, so far, a 
recovery in economic activity, not in jobs.8
The lacklustre nature of the recovery is caused, in part, by the continued pursuit of fiscal 
consolidation policies in the region. In contrast to the positive if weak impulses to growth 
from the private sector, governments in several advanced economies continue to reduce their 
primary deficit by raising taxes and/or lowering spending. Even some of the countries that 
have sufficient fiscal space to provide a stimulus to aggregate demand that could potentially 
spill over to the region as a whole, pursue fiscal consolidation. This complicates the achieve-
ment of both employment and fiscal targets. Indeed, in the context of weak economic growth, 
public revenues remain depressed and public spending difficult to contain. In the region, 
public debt to GDP has reached more than 100 per cent of GDP, the highest ratio among all 
regions. Increasingly, the pursuit of these policies is being recognized as ineffective and pro-
longing the economic crisis unnecessarily (IMF, 2013). 
Further risks remain. As first signs of a recovery in the region have appeared, monetary 
authorities face increasing difficulties in communicating their future path of action, contrib-
uting to an already high level of uncertainty among investors and firms. Earlier announce-
ments of a tapering of the exceptional measures in the United States led to immediate market 
reactions and an increase in interest rates, threatening the modest recovery currently under 
way in the country. In Europe, banks continued to deleverage and have started to repay the 
loans that they had taken from the European Central Bank. Similarly to the United States 
and despite continuous easing of monetary policy in the euro area, interest rates have started 
to increase and firms, especially in crisis countries, continue to be shut off from taking out 
8 See also the discussion in chapter 1.
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credit. To date, only Japan follows a coordinated approach of monetary and fiscal stimulus, 
so far with promising results regarding the economic recovery.
The outlook for jobs remains bleak
Labour market conditions in the region have continued to worsen over 2013 (table  3). In 
the Developed Economies and European Union region, the unemployment rate remained 
in 2013 at 8.6 per cent or 45.2 million people. It is expected to gradually decline to below 
8 per cent around 2018, still significantly above the rate in 2008. At the same time, the youth 
unemployment rate in the region is expected to fall after having peaked in 2012. In 2013, 
18.3 per cent of young people in the region were out of a job, with a gradual decline expected 
to take hold to 2018. There is no difference between unemployment rates among women 
and men in the region, however, women are expected to benefit less from the timid recovery 
that is expected over the medium term; indeed, their unemployment rates will only gradually 
decline to 8.2 per cent in 2018, whereas men are projected to benefit from a stronger reduction 
to 7.6 per cent. At the same time, labour force participation continues to slide downwards, 
albeit at a slow rate, partly explained by demographic changes. Nevertheless, the labour force 
in advanced economies is still expected to increase by 8 million people by 2018.
In addition to the still high youth unemployment rate, a particularly worrisome trend is 
the large employment gap for young adults (aged 25-34; see figure 17). In certain crisis coun-
tries in the region, employment losses have been more pronounced for this age group than 
for youth, with particularly adverse consequences for a quick labour market recovery (see 
OECD, 2013). Indeed, young adults are the first to face job losses in crisis times due to their 
lower seniority and the job protection afforded to older workers. At the same time, they often 
cannot benefit from specific youth labour market programmes or retraining to improve their 
labour market chances, making a return to employment for this age group particularly pro-
tracted. Overall, it was younger age groups that suffered most from the crisis. For instance, 
employment in Greece, Ireland and Portugal as a whole declined by 1.6 million between 2007 
and 2012, but 75  per cent of this reduction, i.e. 1.2  million jobs, was concentrated among 
younger people (aged 15-34 years). In Italy, young adults faced a sharper decline in their 
employment-to-population ratio than youth, whereas older workers (aged 55-64) actually ben-
efited from an increase in employment between 2007 and 2012. Clearly, this concentration of 
job losses among younger workers bodes ill for a more rapid recovery if policy-makers are not 
taking decisive steps to expand their efforts to include young adults as well.
Table 3.  Labour market situation and outlook in Developed Economies and European Union (per cent)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
Labour force participation rate 60.4 60.2 59.9 60.0 59.9 59.9 59.8 59.8 59.7 59.6
Unemployment rate Total 8.4 8.8 8.4 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.4 8.2 8.0 7.9
Male 8.8 9.1 8.5 8.6 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.0 7.8 7.6
Female 7.9 8.4 8.3 8.5 8.6 8.6 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.2
Youth 17.4 18.1 17.6 18.0 18.3 18.0 17.4 16.8 16.3 16.0
Adult 7.1 7.5 7.2 7.4 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.0 6.9
Employment annual growth rate Total –2.2 –0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
  Male –3.1 –0.4 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
  Female –1.1 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4
  Youth –7.5 –4.0 –1.0 –1.1 –0.6 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0
  Adult –1.5 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5
Memorandum item: GDP annual growth rate –3.6 2.6 1.6 1.4 1.0 1.9 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.4
Notes: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013 (see Annexes 4 and 5); IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2013.
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Long-term unemployment is on the rise as skills mismatch increases
Labour market mismatch has increased since the peak of the crisis in many countries in the 
region (see figure 18). As sectoral demand for labour has shifted, unemployed workers find it 
more and more difficult to score employment opportunities in their previous sector of activity. 
In crisis countries that had benefited from large increases in housing investment prior to the 
crisis (e.g. Spain), the dramatic loss in employment in the construction sector has led to an im-
portant shift in skills demand and sectoral movements in employment. But even in countries 
that seem to have managed to protect their labour market from the effects of the crisis, shifts 
in external demand have triggered a rise in skills mismatch over recent years (e.g. Germany). 
Such a shift in the mismatch between skills offered and skills in demand will complicate the 
labour market recovery, as jobseekers need to acquire the relevant skills before being able to 
benefit from new employment opportunities. Countries therefore need to provide sufficient 
means for investment in training and education targeted specifically at those unemployed 
workers in crisis sectors.
Unemployment is becoming more persistent, although it is now mainly weak hiring 
rather than job destruction that keeps joblessness rates high (see figure  19). The beginning 
of the crisis saw a substantial uptick in labour shedding. Job destruction has now stabilised 
or continues a downward trend in those countries for which data are available. However, the 






























Note: pp = percentage points. The graph displays employment-to-population ratios by 5-year age brackets for a 
selection of OECD countries in 2007 (solid line) and 2012 (dashed line). The black dashes indicate the evolution of 
the employment-to-population ratio for youth (15-24 years) and young adults (25-34 years) between 2007 and 2012.
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continuous rise in average unemployment duration indicates a lack of job creation. Taken 
together, these trends confirm an earlier analysis that showed the crisis is actually slowing 
down structural adjustment of the economy towards faster growing sectors, thereby limiting 
the potential for a quick recovery (see ILO, 2013c).
Part of the slowdown in job creation and the rise in average unemployment duration can 
be attributed to long-term changes in demographic dynamics and population ageing. As the 
share of older people in the workforce of advanced economies rises, getting jobseekers back to 
employment can become more difficult. In general, job turnover rates – the sum of job cre-
ation and job destruction – are higher for younger people in the labour force. The employment 
recovery may, therefore, be particularly protracted in countries where employment losses have 
been large and demographic changes are well underway, such as in a large proportion of Euro-
pean crisis countries.







Source: ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour, 8th edition.






































































Note: The chart displays the iso-unemployment curve (see ILO, 2013) for a selection of developed economies between 
2011 and 2012. The IUC plots job destruction rates against average duration of unemployment across countries for a 
given year. An outward movement of the IUC indicates an increase in unemployment. The dashed and solid lines 
represent the theoretical IUC estimated for 2011 and 2012. The average unemployment rate for the countries in this 
chart amounts to 8.8 per cent in 2011 and 9.0 per cent in 2012.
Source: ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 8th edition.
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As average unemployment duration increases, trend unemployment creeps up as well, but 
it remains well below the overall increase in headline unemployment since the start of the 
crisis (see figure 20). Trend unemployment, a concept introduced in the Global Employment 
Trends report 2013, measures the average unemployment rate to be expected in a country over 
the course of the business cycle. It is an indication of both the extent to which labour market 
mismatch is prevalent – higher mismatch increases trend unemployment – and the average 
intensity of vacancy creation when the economy operates at a sustainable level. The trend un-
employment rate as measured by the ILO can be related to typical structural unemployment 
rates, but it is measured purely on the basis of labour market information, without reference 
to inflation rates or output gaps. This statistical identification of trend unemployment rates 
makes it less dependent on any specific theory and less data- and computation-heavy, therefore 
it is also suitable for countries for which only limited information is available. On the basis of 
this methodology (see ILO, 2013c, Chapter 3, Annex 1, for more details), a further increase 
in trend unemployment can be detected in several countries in comparison with the esti-
mates from 2013, an indication that structural labour market problems are becoming more 
and more prevalent in the Developed Economies and European Union region. Nevertheless 
and when compared with the total increase in unemployment during that period, the short-
term unemployment part that is sensitive to changes in aggregate demand remains the domi-
nant contributor. Countries should, therefore, continue to focus on appropriate strategies for 
strengthening labour demand as a primary policy objective.
The sluggish recovery in economic activity and the large gap in jobs have fuelled a debate 
as to the extent that GDP growth is too low for stronger employment creation. Figure 21 
compares the evolution of economic activity and the level of employment across G7 countries 
over the course of the recent global financial crisis and with the equivalent trends for previous 
recessions between 1970 and 2007. As the figure demonstrates, after the global financial crisis 
economic activity has expanded in these countries with almost the same strength as after 
earlier recessions, but the fall prior to the recovery was much deeper (figure  21, left panel). 
At the same time, the level of employment continued to fall during the global financial crisis, 
even after the recovery in output had already started, whereas in previous recessions, loss in 
employment stopped as soon as economic activity resumed (figure 21, right panel). Both views 
seem, therefore, to contain some validity, explaining the depth and persistence of the jobs 
crisis in advanced economies: the recovery in output is not strong enough to compensate for 
the losses during the recession and even in those countries where the expansion was strong, 


























Note: The chart displays estimated increases in trend unemployment since the beginning of the crisis, comparing 2012 
and 2013. The back triangles measure the increase in the absolute number of jobseekers between 2008 and 2012.
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Box 3.  Are house price cycles responsible for the slow jobs recovery?
Many advanced economies continue to experience house 
prices above historical averages in comparison to both 
disposable incomes and rents (see figure B3.1). Some 
observers have argued that high house prices can at least 
partly explain the large and persistent increase in un-
employment in these countries (Askenazy, 2013). 
At the same time, positive house price developments 
have long been welcomed as a positive driver of growth. 
As increases in house prices and house ownership makes 
private households feel richer, private consumption is 
expected to expand faster than economic activity (the 
“wealth effect”). Also, stronger house price increases allow 
for faster employment creation, as they will lead to the 
expansion of the construction sector, an employment-inten-
sive industry. Along these lines and prior to the crisis, many 
studies found that the housing cycle had a positive effect 
on business activity and that housing investment should be 
supported by government interventions – to the extent that 
house price increases were considered sustainable.
In order to estimate the contribution of house prices 
to unemployment, a small dynamic general equilibrium 
model has been set up for 14 advanced countries. The 
model contains three channels of house price increases 
on unemployment: (a) house price inflation leads to faster 
wage growth; (b) house price inflation depresses aggregate 
productivity as the size of the construction sector in the 
overall economy increases; (c) house price inflation leads 
to faster job creation and lower job destruction as private 
consumption improves and strengthens aggregate demand. 
At the same time, the model also includes a channel for 
general asset price increases (both housing and share 
prices) to affect gross fixed capital formation and long-term 
interest rates. All parameters of the model have been esti-




















Note: Index: 2005 = 100.
Source: OECD, house price database, October 2013.
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Based on the estimated model, figure B3.2 shows the 
average unemployment and output impact of shocks to 
(a) share prices, (b) house prices and (c) a combination of 
house and share prices. In panel A where only the impact 
of share prices is considered, employment expands unam-
biguously whereas economic activity expands only at the 
beginning; both effects dissipate quickly after the initial 
impact. In contrast, panel B demonstrates that the negative 
effect of house prices on employment dominates any posi-
tive impact arising through wealth effects, and that the rise 
in unemployment dissipates only at a low rate. Combining 
both types of shocks, similar to the situation observed 
during the 2000s, shows that improvements in employment 
and economic activity can indeed be observed over the 
short term but that the competitiveness effect of house 
prices on the labour market worsens the outlook consid-
erably and is long-lasting. House prices currently remain 
high, which therefore explains part of the persistence in un-
employment. This needs to be tackled – particularly in crisis 
countries – for employment to be restored more rapidly.
Figure B3.2 The effect of share and house price shocks on unemployment







Note: The graphs show the impulse-response functions for unemployment and the output gap over a 50-quarters period 
following (a) a share price shock, (b) a housing price shock, and (c) a combined shock (i.e. both higher share prices and 
higher housing prices).
Source: Ernst and Saliba, forthcoming.
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output levels in 2013 are barely 2 to 3 per cent above pre-crisis levels. At the same time, the 
jobs machine also seems to have been affected, as employment creation is much slower than 
would have been expected from earlier recessions. As is argued in box 3, this slow recovery in 
both output and employment can be partly explained by the characteristics of the crisis, in 
particular the strong expansion of asset prices and housing investment.
Social developments
The social situation has deteriorated during the crisis, in particular in the European Union: 
the latest Eurostat figure  from 2011 indicated that one in four persons (24.2  per cent) 
were at risk of poverty and social exclusion, and that this share has increased by 1.2  per-
centage points within just 2 years. This deterioration was especially dramatic in the coun-
tries most affected by the economic and financial crisis  –  Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain  –  although first signs of a moderate improvement in labour market conditions are 
visible in these countries, albeit starting from a very low level of employment. Other coun-
tries such as Austria, Germany and the Nordic countries remained somewhat insulated 
from the social and economic impact of the crisis. In contrast, the new European Union 
Member States (excluding Croatia) actually experienced an overall reduction in the pro-
portion of people at risk of poverty from 31.7 per cent in 2008 to 30.6 per cent in 2011, 
although the situation is mixed across countries. However, in the second phase of the crisis 
the majority of governments in the European Union countries embarked on fiscal consoli-
dation, with significant cuts to their welfare systems and provision of public services, which 
disproportionately affected jobless persons and their families as well as those groups of the 
population that are not covered or poorly covered by social protection systems, such as first-
time jobseekers, informal workers, ethnic and migrant groups, single-parent families and 
pensioners, with negative consequences for social cohesion and social justice. These policy 
choices have led to an increase in the risk of social unrest, especially in the European Union 
where the ILO’s Social Unrest Index has risen from 34 per cent in 2006/07 to 46 per cent 
in 2011/12 (ILO, 2013d).
In addition, the crisis has had a negative impact on the quality of employment in 
most countries as the incidence of involuntary temporary and part-time employment, in-
work poverty, informal work, job and wage polarization and income inequality have fur-
ther increased. In the United States, for instance, the underemployment rate – i.e. the share 
of people unemployed, marginally attached to the labour market or involuntarily working 
Figure 21. GDP and employment recoveries around recession turning points (G7 countries)











Note: The chart shows an index for economic activity and levels of employment in G7 countries around recessionary 
turning points comparing the global ﬁnancial crisis with the average situation of recessions between 1970 and 2007.
Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators; ILO staff calculations.
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part-time  –  almost doubled between 2007 and 2009 (from 8.3 to 16.2  per cent) and has 
only slightly moderated to 14.3 per cent in 2013 (Bell and Blanchflower, 2013). In the EU, 
the proportion of involuntarily accepted temporary employment increased by 1.1 percentage 
point between 2008 and 2012 and the share of involuntary part-time employment grew by 
2.4 points in the same period. Many workers have also had to accept low-paid employment 
and the share of low-wage earners reached 17 per cent in the European Union in 2012, raising 
concerns over the growing number of working poor.
Central and South-Eastern Europe (non-EU) and CIS
Growth decelerated sharply
The region of Central and South-Eastern Europe (non-EU) and the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS) faced a sharp deceleration of economic growth in 2012, from 5.6 per 
cent in 2011 to 3 per cent (see table 4 below). This aggregate figure hides a significant differ-
ence in economic dynamics between the Central and South-Eastern Europe (non-EU) sub-
region and the CIS subregion: while the latter lost 1.4 percentage points (the GDP growth 
rate fell from 4.8  per cent in 2011 to 3.4  per cent in 2012, in the former it declined by 
3.7  points, to 1.6  per cent. The main factors behind this sharp slowdown were the weak-
ening of global demand for hydrocarbons, metals and other minerals, which are the main 
export commodities of many of these countries, as well as the persistent crisis in the euro 
area, an important trading partner. This unfavourable development has continued in the 
CIS in 2013, mainly due to a further reduction of economic growth in the Russian Feder-
ation to an estimated 1.5 per cent, as a consequence of weak commodity exports combined 
with low domestic investment activity and low consumer demand. In contrast, economic 
growth in Central and South-Eastern Europe (non-EU) has slightly picked up, by an esti-
mated 0.6 percentage points in 2013, thanks in part to a moderate recovery in Turkey: its 
GDP is expected to grow by 3.6 per cent as a result of a domestic demand revival, supported 
mainly by surging public investment. If the anticipated, even though still timid, economic 
recovery in the European Union indeed materializes in 2014, the region will benefit and 
growth will accelerate, although growth is expected to remain well below the rates achieved 
in 2010-11. An increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) recorded in 2013 will contribute 
to this economic recovery, however it will inevitably cause a new deterioration of the current 
account balance, especially for Central and South-Eastern Europe (non-EU) countries, and 
thus sharpen the risk of future economic instability.
The labour market picture remains bleak
The disappointing economic development impacted negatively on employment growth and 
brought a longer-term trend increase in the employment rate to a temporary halt in 2013. 
However, both the employment level and the employment rate are expected to pick up again 
in 2014, if the projected recovery takes shape. While in the CIS subregion the employment 
rates are, in general, relatively high, the Central and South-Eastern Europe (non-EU) coun-
tries have significantly lower rates, which even drop below 40 per cent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Serbia and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
The fall in unemployment recorded since the crisis peak of 2009 was reversed in 2013, 
when the regional unemployment rate is estimated to have risen by 0.2  percentage points 
and is expected to remain at this elevated level until 2016. This aggregate figure  also hides 
wide cross-country differences. On the one hand, the Russian Federation is recording all-time 
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low unemployment levels, with the monthly rates fluctuating between 5 and 6  per cent of 
the labour force, and no tendency to grow in 2013, despite the current economic slowdown. 
On the other hand, the unemployment rates in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and The Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia steadily exceed 25 per cent, and some have even recorded 
increases in 2012 and in the first half of 2013. Turkey recorded a rise in unemployment in 
2013 for the first time after a period of rapid decline from 2009. 
In general, unemployment levels are significantly higher in the Central and South-
Eastern Europe (non-EU) subregion than in the CIS subregion, where only Armenia is 
recording high unemployment rates (17.3  per cent in 2012). However, in reality the dif-
ference is smaller: some persons counted as jobless in Central and South-Eastern Europe 
(non-EU) are actually engaged in informal employment (and labour force surveys do not 
fully capture this phenomenon) and a large proportion of employed persons in the CIS sub-
region are also informal workers. ILO estimates that one in four workers (26.5 per cent) in 
Azerbaijan worked informally, while almost one in three (30.6 per cent) in Turkey and more 
than one in two (59.2 per cent) in Kyrgyzstan in 2009 also worked informally (ILO, 2011a). 
Informality is mainly prevalent in sectors such as agriculture and services, although it is 
not limited to these sectors. Evidence suggests that within the region the low-educated, the 
young, the elderly and those with chronic health problems are most likely to accept informal 
employment, while migrant workers are at particular risk of informality. In most cases infor-
mality is not a choice, workers are pushed to it by a lack of good formal employment op-
portunities. When in informal employment, workers are often exposed to poor working 
conditions and low earnings. 
Informal and low-paid employment are also the main forms of vulnerable employment in 
the region as part-time jobs and fixed-term contracts are rather scarce. According to ILO esti-
mates, the share of vulnerable employment steadily decreased after 1999. However, the crisis 
put a halt to this favourable development and the declining trend is expected to restart only 
after 2015. While in comparison with other global regions, with the exception of econom-
ically advanced countries, the region looks well placed in this respect, still one in five workers 
are engaged in vulnerable employment. Nevertheless, there are significant differences in the 
level of vulnerable employment in countries across the subregion.
Long-term unemployment is high in the Western Balkan countries. The prolonged 
periods of unemployment sharply decrease jobseekers’ chances of re-employment as they lose 
relevant skills and labour market attachment. The availability and quality of training delivery, 
in a life-long learning perspective, should be further improved. Data on skill needs and skills 
forecasting should be regularly collected and shared for evidence-based policy-making. In 
addition, career counseling services should be further developed. Of even more concern, how-
ever, is that in a number of families, and even in some population groups (e.g. Roma), jobless-
ness already affects several generations, and young people from these families or population 
groups are not prepared to enter the labour market.
The gender gap in employment continues to be large in the region, with a general ten-
dency towards a further widening. Women are more present in the informal economy, often 
involved in subsistence agriculture. Given the economic crisis, women are frequently forced 
to accept jobs below their qualification levels in order to be able to continue supporting their 
households. The current fiscal consolidation measures and the cuts in government spending 
have heavily affected the funds available for social programmes for the most vulnerable 
groups of women. 
Countries including Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine record rather small dif-
ferences between male and female employment rates. In contrast, employment levels of women 
in Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as in the Caucasus and Central Asian countries, 
are significantly lower than for men. Turkey has the largest gender gap in employment in the 
region – 38.7 percentage points in 2012 (the male employment rate was 65 per cent while the 
female rate was only 26.3 per cent) – and this gap is closing only very slowly. 
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The crisis took a heavy toll on young people. In 2009, the reduction in employment of 
young people was five times greater than the reduction in adults employment, and no turna-
round to positive youth employment growth rates has been achieved. So far, this has not 
affected unemployment rates for young people as they prefer to stay longer in education or 
out of the labour force, fuelling a rising proportion of NEET (youth not in employment, 
education or training). The crisis has also reversed the declining trend in the proportion of 
youth to adult unemployment prevailing in the boom years after 2000. This ratio reached 
2.6 in 2013 and is projected to remain at that level over the next 5 years. There are again vast 
differences between countries in the region with regard to youth unemployment, with three 
countries  –  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
exceeding the 50 per cent rate for youth unemployment. In the Bosnia-Herzegovina the rate 
reached 63.1 per cent, i.e. almost two in three young people are jobless. 
Social developments
At the level of the US$2 per day poverty rate, the overall tendency has been a sharp reduction 
in the share of the working poor in total employment in the region in the 1990s, which slowed 
down after 2000, but the overall trend continued even during the crisis. However, despite this 
generally favourable social development, in some countries, in particular in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, large groups of population – including rural populations, jobless persons, large 
families and migrant workers in general – live on low incomes, well under the national pov-
erty line, and are not covered by social protection/assistance to supplement their low earnings 
or compensate for their loss of income.
The ILO Global Wage Database shows that during the crisis real wages declined in many 
non-EU Central and South-Eastern European countries, while in the CIS, growth in wages 
was significantly lower in comparison with the pre-crisis situation. As a number of coun-
tries in the region record high levels of the Gini index measuring income distribution among 
households (e.g. Georgia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and the Rus-
sian Federation have a Gini index close to or exceeding 0.4), this unfavourable wage develop-
ment has impacted negatively on poorer strata of the population.
There is also a significant gender wage gap in the region. While in the Western Balkan 
countries male wages exceed female wages on average by 23 per cent, in the CIS countries the 
difference is larger, reaching 50 per cent in Georgia and 65 per cent in Tajikistan, according 
to Sattar (2012). 
Table 4.  Labour market situation and outlook in the Central and South-Eastern Europe (non-EU)  
and CIS region (per cent)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
Labour force participation rate 59.0 59.1 59.5 59.7 59.8 59.9 59.9 59.9 59.9 59.7
Unemployment rate Total 9.9 9.2 8.5 8.0 8.2 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.1
Male 10.6 9.6 8.8 8.2 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.4 8.4
Female 9.2 8.7 8.2 7.7 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.8 7.8
Youth 20.0 19.0 17.9 17.5 18.0 18.1 18.1 18.0 18.0 18.0
Adult 8.2 7.6 7.0 6.6 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9
Employment annual growth rate Total –1.3 1.4 1.8 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 –0.1
  Male –1.7 1.8 1.9 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0
  Female –0.7 1.0 1.7 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 –0.1 –0.2
  Youth –5.0 –2.2 –0.9 –4.6 –3.7 –3.3 –3.2 –3.0 –2.7 –2.4
  Adult –0.7 2.0 2.2 1.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.2
GDP annual growth rate –5.9 5.8 5.6 3.0 2.5 3.3 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9
Notes: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections.
Source: ILO Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; ILO staff calculations based on the IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2013.
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Persistent and emerging challenges
After the collapse of manufacturing that occurred in many countries during the transition 
crisis, the region remains dependent on extractive industries and the export of hydrocarbons 
and minerals (which are further processed only in some countries), the textile industry, agri-
culture and the export of some agricultural products. The extractive and heavy industries, 
however, do not contribute much to total employment while employment in textiles and 
agriculture is characterized by low productivity. The services sector offers some high-quality 
jobs but the majority of jobs in services are of low quality and productivity. Efforts to diver-
sify the national production and the export base, increase the productivity and quality of 
current jobs and create new productive jobs are still insufficient and need to be strengthened 
further. 
Countries should promote policies that address gender inequalities in the world of work 
through accelerated reduction both in the vertical and horizontal labour market segrega-
tion and closure of the gender wage gap in order to improve women’s economic position. 
In parallel, measures for reconciling work and family responsibilities should be also further 
strengthened to improve women’s labour force participation and transition from informal to 
formal jobs. Targeted programmes should be designed for fostering female entrepreneurship 
and to help those women who are particularly vulnerable to poverty (women with disabilities, 
Roma, women in rural areas). The effective implementation of the existing gender-sensitive 
regulatory and policy frameworks should be further promoted.
High youth unemployment remains another big challenge for the region. Difficulties in 
transition from school to work are associated not only with the lack of work experience, but 
also with large mismatches between skills possessed by young people and skills demanded 
by employers. There is a need for countries to improve their education and training policies, 
engage the enterprise sector more in reforming and co-financing the education and training 
system and strengthen the employment services and labour market policies in order to over-
come skill mismatches and support the entry of young people into the labour market. Youth 
employability should be enhanced by the introduction of a flexible training systems leading to 
gainful employment and more and better career guidance services. The capacities of employers’ 
and workers’ organizations should be further enhanced to contribute to the improved rele-
vance and quality of education, training and lifelong learning policies and programmes. Youth 
employment should be fostered through private sector development, in particular the setting 
up of a system of incentives to promote youth employment and human capital development 
(with the active engagement of employers’ and workers’ organizations), and the establishment 
of dedicated youth entrepreneurship services. This is extremely important for countries with 
an ageing population, which are in majority in the region, in order to prevent future serious 
labour shortages, which would impede their economic growth. However, it is also important 
for the handful of countries with a young population (Albania, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Cen-
tral Asian countries) to help them better use this enormous potential for accelerating their 
economic and social development.
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Latin America and the Caribbean
Growth is slowing down
Economic activity continued to slow down in 2013 (figure  22). Economic growth fell to 
2.7 per cent in 2013, mainly driven by uncertainty about external conditions affecting invest-
ment decisions, which constrained aggregate supply in economies such as Argentina, Brazil 
and Paraguay. Uncertainty did not arise from the same sources in all countries in the region: 
South American countries were more sensitive to shocks in the euro zone and China, whereas 
Central American countries are mainly linked to the US economy (ECLAC, 2013). In the 
Caribbean, economic growth decelerated as well, with the Dominican Republic, Haiti and 
Jamaica experiencing growth rates of below 3 per cent. Conversely, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Peru and Venezuela showed above average growth rates, mostly explained by their commodity 
export markets (ECLAC, 2013).
Regional economic performance in recent years benefited from improvements in macro-
economic stability which brought down inflation. Fiscal reforms to support sustainable rates 
of public investment helped strengthen the economies. Widened fiscal space was used in sev-
eral countries to support interventions to alleviate poverty and inequality, which helped to 
strengthen the expansion of aggregate demand. The favourable macroeconomic environment 
has come under pressure as volatility in commodity markets and the absence of a strong 
recovery in the region’s main trading partners have spilled over into the region. Since mid-
2012, the economic environment has stabilized slightly, but these effects reduced growth in 
the region further in 2013. A modest turnaround in activity and growth is expected in 2014, 
mainly as a result of improvements in the external environment.
Some regional economies benefited from significant capital inflows over recent years, trig-
gered by high liquidity in international capital markets and investors trying to increase rates 
of return compared to historically low rates in leading money centers. However following the 
announced normalization of US monetary policy, which is eventually expected to push up 
interest rates and strengthen the US dollar, outflows became significant in some economies, 
showing the footloose character of the earlier inflows. 
Employment growth continues to outpace labour force expansion
As economic activity decelerated, employment growth slowed from 2.4 per cent in 2010 to 
less than 2 per cent in 2013 (see table 5). Nevertheless, unemployment continued to recede 
as labour force growth also decelerated. In 2013, 6.5  per cent of the active population of 
the region as a whole was estimated to be looking for a job. Despite the expected recovery 
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in output growth, employment will expand more moderately in 2014 and beyond, allowing 
for a further gradual decline in the unemployment until the end of the projection period 
in 2018.
Job quality continued to improve. In particular, working poverty or the share of workers 
living in households with consumption levels of less than US$2 per day and per person 
showed a clear and consistent improvement in the past decade, falling from 15  per cent of 
total employment in 2003 to an expected 6.7 per cent in 2013. The robust enhancement in 
working conditions between the 1990s (when working poverty remained between 15 and 
20 per cent) and today was boosted both by higher regional economic growth rates and policy 
interventions. Despite the moderation in growth, working poverty is expected to decline fur-
ther to reach less than 6 per cent by 2018.
The young labour force faces particular barriers to entering the labour market. As a result, 
the youth unemployment rate is more than twice the adult rate. Moreover, the quality of jobs 
is different for youth and adults since precarious jobs are concentrated among the young popu-
lation. Looking ahead to 2018, the prospects for youth do not suggest significant improve-
ments, as the youth-to-adult unemployment ratio is expected to reduce only moderately, from 
2.8 in 2012 to 2.6 in 2018.
Vulnerable employment has declined slightly in the region, but it continues to affect 
almost one-third of the working labour force. As a proxy for poorer working conditions, the 
vulnerable employment indicator provides an assessment of the importance of own-account 
workers and contributing family workers, as these groups are less likely to have formal work 
arrangements, be covered by social protection systems and have regular earnings. Up to 
2018, vulnerable employment should show a slight improvement which should help reduce 
informal employment as well, given the high correlation between both indicators. Informal 
employment, a more direct indicator of job quality, allows the identification of informal jobs 
inside and outside the formal sector.9 Most informal employment lies outside the formal sector 
but a significant proportion (above 11 per cent) is within the formal sector itself (figure 23). 
Despite the reduction in informal employment in many countries of the region, the informal 
economy remains a key buffer for those who have lost or cannot obtain a job in the formal 
sector, given that for the most part this region lacks general and sufficient coverage by social 
protection systems. In Mexico, for instance, the decreased probability of finding a job in the 
formal economy during recessionary periods is buffered by an increase in the job finding rate 
9 The characteristic features of informal employment are lack of protection in the event of non-payment of wages, com-
pulsory overtime or extra shifts, lay-offs without notice or compensation, unsafe working conditions and the absence of 
social benefits such as pensions, sick pay and health insurance
Table 5.  Labour market situation and outlook in Latin America and the Caribbean (per cent)
2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
Labour force participation rate 66.0 65.9 66.2 66.2 66.2 66.2 66.2 66.2 66.3
Unemployment rate Total 7.3 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.4
Male 6.0 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.3
Female 9.1 8.4 8.2 8.1 8.1 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.9
Youth 15.0 14.3 13.8 13.6 13.5 13.4 13.3 13.2 13.1
Adult 5.4 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9
Employment annual growth rate Total 2.4 2.2 2.3 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5
Vulnerable employment Total 31.8 31.7 31.7 31.6 31.5 31.3 31.1 31.0 30.8
  Male 31.6 31.5 31.7 31.6 31.5 31.3 31.1 30.9 30.7
  Female 32.0 32.0 31.7 31.6 31.5 31.3 31.2 31.1 30.9
Working poverty (US$2 a day) Total 7.5 7.2 6.9 6.7 6.4 6.1 5.8 5.5 5.3
GDP annual growth rate 6.0 4.6 2.9 2.7 3.1 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7
Note: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections. Figures here differ slightly from those published in Panorama Laboral (ILO, 2013a) mainly 
as a result of differences in geographical coverage.
Source: ILO Trends Econometric Models, October 2013 (see Annexes 4 and 5); IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2013.
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in the informal economy, which put a halt to the decline in informality observed in Mexico 
prior to the crisis (see box 4). 
Labour productivity in the region declined during the 2009 crisis but recovered mod-
erately immediately afterwards. Even though the region’s productivity is expected to grow at 
below the world average (see figure 24), the upward trend observed since 2003 is expected to 
continue beyond 2013, albeit still below the world average. This is due to the improved eco-
nomic growth predicted for 2014–2018 and the underlying labour productivity distribution, 
which exhibits a high employment share in lower productivity sectors.10 
10 Kucera and Roncolato (2012) find evidence of a stronger negative correlation between labour productivity and 
employment growth in developing countries than in developed countries.
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Box 4.  Labour flows in Mexico: Formal versus informal flows of workers
Analysing transition dynamics in the labour market pro-
vides useful information regarding the effects of an informal 
economy on cyclical fluctuations of the unemployment 
rate. As can be seen in table B4.1, average quarterly job 
finding probabilities (outflow rates from unemployment) 
are significantly higher in the informal than in the formal 
economy (23 per cent vs. 11 per cent) in Mexico. By 
contrast, informal employment is not correlated with un-
employment (correlation coefficient of –0.08 with the quar-
terly unemployment rate). As unemployment increases, the 
probability of finding an informal job does not vary signifi-
cantly. This result is driven by a relatively small decrease 
in the probability of becoming an employee in the informal 
economy (as compared to the formal economy) and an 
increase in the likelihood of becoming informally self-
employed. In other words, the probability of becoming 
self-employed in the informal economy is actually counter-
cyclical and strong enough to counteract the decrease in 
the job finding probability as an informal employee.
The risk of job separation (unemployment inflow rate) 
increases during periods of high unemployment in both 
economies and is twice as high for informal employees 
(1.1 per cent vs. 2.3 per cent). Even though informality 
buffers any increases in unemployment by offering higher 
job finding probabilities, the stability of such employment 
tends to be lower, due to the lack of contracts and labour 
regulations in the informal economy.
Table B4.1.  Transition rates into and out of unemployment (per cent)
Formal Informal Out of the 
labor force
Employee Self-employed Total Employee Self-employed Total
Outflows
Average quarterly hazard rate 10.9 0.3 11.2 17.3 5.8 23.0 19.7
Correlation with unemployment rate –43.8 –21.0 –46.0 –16.8 12.1 –8.2 –32.7
Inflows
Average quarterly hazard rate 1.2 0.4 1.1 1.8 0.9 2.3 1.1
Correlation with unemployment rate 66.2 61.9 67.8 78.3 82.8 83.9 66.5
Source: ILO estimates based on Mexican Household Survey, various years.
The importance of the decrease in job finding probabilities 
in the formal economy was particularly significant during 
the most recent recession (see figure B4.1). Data show 
that the main contributors to rising unemployment between 
June 2008 and September 2009 in Mexico were a com-
bination of lower job finding probabilities in the formal 
economy and higher job separations in both the formal and 
informal economies. Meanwhile, the availability of jobs in 
the informal economy seems to have buffered the rise in un-
employment observed during the periods. The increase in 
inflows to unemployment from the formal economy begins 
to reverse after two quarters whereas job separations from 
the informal economy continue rising as the recession pro-
gresses. In contrast, during earlier recessions, a reduction 
in outflows to both formal and informal jobs contributed to 
the rise in unemployment. These findings reinforce the idea 
that while informality can provide a safety valve to decrease 
the overall number of unemployment spells in the aggre-
gate economy, this type of employment is highly unstable, 
particularly during episodes of rising unemployment. 
Understanding and quantifying these shifts over the busi-
ness cycle is of great importance for public policy since it 
indicates that the best response to a rise in unemployment 
rates will differ according to whether policy is implemented 
at the outset of a downturn or later during the recession. 
Reallocation across sectors by firms and workers between 
formal and informal jobs can lead to temporary decreases 
in the unemployment rate but this reallocation will be 
reversed after a short period given the high turnover rate 
in the informal economy.
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Figure B4.1 Change in hazard rates into and out of unemployment during periods
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Social developments and emerging challenges
Even though informal employment is on the decline, reducing it remains central to improving 
labour market conditions as it affects almost one in two workers. Moreover, ILO estimates 
suggest that without proactive policies, labour productivity needs to increase by at least 
140 per cent in order for informality to be reduced by a half, which could take at least three 
decades. Thus, proactive policies to reduce informality are at the core of the labour market 
policy agenda across the countries of the region. In this respect, in August 2013, ILO’s 
Regional Office launched the “Formalización de la Informalidad en America Latina y el 
Caribe” (FORLAC) program, and in July, the Mexican government launched a programme of 
employment formalization (“Programa de formalización del empleo”). The Colombian Gov-
ernment is implementing the Program Colombia Trabaja Formal and other countries such as 
Brazil and Argentina have been implementing explicit policies for almost a decade. In some 
other countries (Peru, Dominican Republic), specific strategies are currently in discussion. 
Economic growth needs to become more inclusive, although significant progress was 
made over the past decade in many countries in the region. Translating economic growth 
outcomes into enhanced social well-being has become a priority in the region’s policy agenda. 
This includes reducing segmentation in the provision of social protection that arises from 
income inequality and the lack of coverage in publicly financed services and to mitigate the 
labour market vulnerability due to economic fluctuations and job destruction. In this regard 
proactive policies intended to close the historical productivity gaps are fundamental as they 
not only determine the income distribution but also play a crucial role in the fiscal sustain-
ability of social policies (ECLAC, 2012).
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East Asia
Global growth weighs on economic activity in the region
The slowdown in the global economic recovery continued to weigh down prospects in the East 
Asia region. In 2013, economic growth in East Asia was 6.7 per cent (table 6), a slight increase 
from 2012. Economic activity in China increased to 8.0 per cent – one of its lower rates in the 
past decade, a moderating trend that partly reflects a longer-term strategy to restructure the 
economy away from exports and investments and towards domestic consumption. Growth 
in Hong Kong (China), the Republic of Korea and Taiwan (China) was around 3.0 per cent 
in 2013, a slight rebound in each economy from the previous year. In Mongolia, growth was 
strong at 14.0 per cent in 2013, driven in part by demand in China, while consumer price 
inflation moderated but remained high at 11.1 per cent.11
Labour productivity growth in East Asia was a robust 6.2 per cent in 2013, surpassing all 
other regions. This increase, however, represented the region’s second slowest pace of expan-
sion in the past decade. Despite compounded annual growth in output per worker of 7.2 per 
cent since 1993, productivity levels remained less than one-quarter of that in the Developed 
Economies and European Union region in 2013. Within the East Asia region, there were sig-
nificant variations across both economies and industries. In the Republic of Korea – where 
labour productivity in 2012 was three times the level in China – output per worker in industry 
was nearly double that in services.12 In China, the largest intersectoral gap was between agri-
culture and industry with productivity in agriculture only one-sixth the level in industry. 
By contrast, output per worker in Mongolia was the lowest in East Asia, and the most pro-
nounced productivity gaps were those between the services sector and other sectors. 
The labour market picture
Reflecting various demographic and social changes, the labour force in East Asia has grown 
relatively little during the past decade, increasing by only 0.7  per cent in 2013. The youth 
labour force in particular has been shrinking since 2007 and contracted by 6.3  million 
(4.8 per cent) in 2013 alone. These trends are being driven both by an ageing of the econom-
ically active population and more young people opting to delay the transition from school to 
the labour market. In terms of a global comparison of economic participation, East Asia had 
the highest rates overall (70.8 per cent) and among youth (55.1 per cent) in 2013. However, 
closing the male–female gap in participation, which was 14.7 percentage points in 2013, will 
become more critical as the region aims to address increasing labour shortages. 
Consistent with weak labour force growth, employment in East Asia expanded by only 
5.6 million jobs, or 0.7 per cent, in 2013. Rising employment levels benefitted men more than 
women, however, as women occupied less than two in five newly created jobs. As a result, the 
male–female gap in the employment-to-population ratio edged up slightly, to 13.0 percentage 
points. Employment among young people decreased by 6.1 million jobs, or 5.2 per cent, in 
2013. Moreover, projections indicate that this pace of contraction will continue during the 
next 5 years, highlighting the mounting challenges for young graduates entering the labour 
market. 
The global economic situation has negatively affected prospects for East Asia’s jobseekers. 
Since 2007, unemployment in East Asia has increased by 8.0 million to 39.4 million in 2013. 
11 Country-level GDP growth and average consumer price inflation figures are based on IMF, World Economic Outlook 
database, April 2013.
12 Cross-country productivity comparisons are based on ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 7th Edition (Geneva, 
2011). Intersectoral productivity comparisons are ILO staff estimates based on National Bureau of Statistics, China Stat-
istical Yearbook 2012 (Beijing); national labour force surveys; and World Bank, World Development Indicators.
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The region now accounts for 19.5  per cent of the world’s unemployed, the second highest 
share globally following the Developed Economies and European Union. Overall, the un-
employment rate in 2013 increased moderately to 4.5 per cent, with the rate higher for men 
(5.2 per cent) than women (3.7 per cent). By contrast, unemployment among young people 
rose from 9.7 per cent to 10.1 per cent with a continued increase in the youth unemployment 
rate projected over the medium-term outlook to 2018. Compared with adults, young job-
seekers were 2.8 times more likely to be unemployed. 
Social developments
Formidable economic growth in East Asia over the past couple decades is leading to remark-
able social developments. One clear example is the increasing movement of workers out of 
more precarious and vulnerable jobs as own-account or contributing family workers into sal-
aried employment where earnings are more secure and working conditions are often better. 
In 2013, an estimated 415  million workers in East Asia held a salaried job, nearly double 
the level in 1991. Moreover, the share of wage workers in total employment increased sig-
nificantly by 18.5 percentage points to 50.1 per cent from 1991 to 2013 (figure 25). Women 
have clearly benefitted from this process. While male workers are still more likely to earn a 
salary or wage compared with female workers, the gap is gradually shrinking. By 2013, the 
gender gap in wage employment rates had fallen to 5.2 percentage points in East Asia. Not-
withstanding this achievement, the region still employed 398.6  million own-account and 
contributing family workers in 2013; priority measures are needed to help them transition 
to better quality jobs.
In line with robust economic growth and improvements in job quality, East Asia’s con-
sumer class is on the rise. The region’s middle-class workforce was 551.5 million in 2013, a 
year-on-year growth of 7.7 per cent and a staggering 14-fold increase in two decades. More 
than two in three workers are now middle class, and working poverty is shrinking rapidly. The 
share of East Asia’s workers living on less than US$1.25 per day fell to 4.5 per cent in 2013 
and the comparable share under the US$2-poverty line declined to 11.2 per cent. Since 1991, 
the region has successfully moved 464.5 million workers out of poverty, an astounding and 
unprecedented pace of improving household incomes and living standards. 
Table 6.  Labour market situation and outlook in East Asia (per cent)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
Labour force participation rate 70.7 70.2 70.4 70.6 70.8 70.8 70.9 70.8 70.7 70.5 
Unemployment rate Total 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.9 5.0 
Male 5.0 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 
Female 3.7 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.1 
Youth 9.4 9.1 9.4 9.7 10.1 10.5 10.8 11.1 11.4 11.6 
Adult 3.4 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.2 
Employment annual growth rate Total 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
  Male 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2
  Female 0.1 0.3 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0
  Youth –2.3 –3.2 –2.3 –3.9 –5.2 –5.7 –5.5 –5.1 –4.8 –4.2
  Adult 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.6
Memorandum item: GDP annual growth rate 7.1 9.9 8.3 6.6 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Notes: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2013.
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Emerging challenges
East Asia is experiencing various dynamics that will pose considerable challenges for the labour 
market. Economies in the region are undergoing rapid structural transformation, upgrading 
their industries and moving away from agriculture and labour-intensive manufacturing. In 
China, for instance, the share of medium- and high-skill and technology-intensive manufac-
turing exports increased from only 25 per cent in 1995 to 40.8 per cent in 2012, reflecting 
a shift from generally low-skilled industries such as garments (figure 26). In the Republic of 
Korea, industrial upgrading has continued from a relatively higher starting point, with the 
share of high-end manufacturing exports reaching 69 per cent in 2012. By contrast, the pro-
portion in Mongolia has fluctuated and remained comparatively lower, revealing the country’s 
broader challenge of economic diversification from commodities. 
With sustained structural transformation, skills development will be more and more 
critical if East Asian jobseekers are to compete in a rapidly shifting labour market. In the 
Republic of Korea, for example, employment demand to 2020 is projected to be greatest in 
human health services, given the country’s ageing demographics, and will require advanced 
education and training for a specialized workforce (Korea Employment Information Service, 
Figure 25. Share of wage and salaried workers in total employment (per cent)
 and male–female gap in wage employment rates (percentage points),








Note: 2012 and 2013 are preliminary estimates and projections.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, July 2013; IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2013.
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Figure 26. Share of medium- and high-skill and technology-intensive
 manufacturing in total manufacturing exports (per cent),









Source: ILO estimates from UNCTAD: UNCTADstat Database.
Available at: http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Statistics.aspx/
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2012). In China, improvement of training systems in terms of both access and quality would 
benefit the millions of rural-to-urban migrants moving into industrial jobs as a result of con-
certed urbanization policies (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and UNDP, 2013; Johnson, 
2013). For young Chinese graduates, such measures would also help them develop the relevant 
competencies and technical skills increasingly needed by enterprises in high-skill sectors, 
including those in the green economy. From 2011 to 2020, roughly 1.2  million green jobs 
will be created annually in China’s alternative fuel vehicle industry alone, and developing a 
work force with the right qualifications will be critical (Pan et al., 2011). In Mongolia, sound 
investments in skills institutions would accelerate efforts towards economic diversification 
and broadening economic gains to neglected populations (ILO, 2011b). In turn, the process 
of skills upgrading would help these East Asian economies foster a virtuous circle of increased 
productivity and sustainable improvements in job quality and living standards.
South-East Asia and the Pacific
Global spill-overs continue to weigh on growth in the region
Economic growth in South-East Asia and the Pacific is estimated to have decelerated to 4.9 per 
cent in 2013, compared with 5.7 per cent the previous year. In particular, economic growth 
in Indonesia, the region’s largest economy, is estimated to have moderated considerably in 
2013 to 5.3 per cent, compared with GDP growth exceeding 6.2 per cent annually from 2010 
through 2012, as demand for the economy’s exports slowed and the possibility of “monetary 
tapering” in the United States raised volatility in Indonesia’s financial markets.13 In contrast, 
GDP growth in the Philippines continued to remain strong, with the economy growing by 
6.8 per cent in 2013, supported by government spending on infrastructure. Economic growth 
in the Pacific subregion is projected to have softened to 5.0 per cent in 2013, compared with 
7.6 per cent the previous year. Excluding Timor Leste and Papua New Guinea, two large com-
modity exporters, growth in the subregion is projected to have slowed to 2.0 per cent in 2013.14
The region’s economies have grown quite robustly following the global economic crisis 
of 2008–09, but the driving factors behind this performance have varied across countries in 
the region.15 In Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Singapore, strong growth 
in real gross domestic capital formation led growth in GDP in the post-crisis years (2010–
2012). During the same period, growth in real private consumption expenditure has been 
the underlying factor behind the recent growth performance in Cambodia, while the growth 
in real government consumption expenditure played an important role in Thailand and Viet 
Nam. In Viet Nam, growth in exports, which outweighed growth in imports, also contrib-
uted toward robust GDP growth. In almost all countries in South-East Asia, both import and 
export growth tended to slow down in the recent years, compared with the pre-crisis years.
The labour market picture
Employment in South-East Asia and the Pacific is estimated to have expanded by 1.6 per cent 
in 2013, compared with its recent peak expansion in 2011 of 2.2 per cent (table 7). Looking 
forward, employment growth is projected to outpace working-age population growth, 
resulting in a slight increase in the employment-to-population ratio between 2009 and 2017 
13 IMF, World Economic Outlook database, October 2013. 
14 ADB, Pacific Economic Monitor, July 2013.
15 ADB, Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2013.
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(from 66.6 per cent to 67.0 per cent). The labour force participation rate is expected to remain 
steady at around 70 per cent in the region.
The unemployment rate in the region has trended down in recent years, from an average 
of 6 per cent between 2000 and 2008 to around 4.5 per cent projected over the next few years. 
In Indonesia, the unemployment rate stood at 5.8 per cent in May 2013 compared with an 
average of 9.1 per cent between 2000 and 2008. In contrast, in the Philippines, despite robust 
economic growth in excess of 6.8 per cent in the past 2 years, job growth has been subdued 
and the unemployment rate remained at around 7 per cent throughout 2012 and 2013.
Women in the region face slightly higher chances of unemployment than men, at around 
4.4 per cent compared to 4.1 per cent for men. For example, in Indonesia the unemployment 
rate for women in May 2013 was 6.3  per cent compared with 5.5  per cent for men. Con-
versely, in the Philippines, the unemployment rate for women in July 2013, at 7.2 per cent, 
was almost the same as that for men (7.3 per cent). Youth unemployment remains a major 
challenge in the region. The estimated youth unemployment rate (13.0 per cent in 2013) is 
almost three times that of the total unemployment rate, and approximately five times that of 
the adult unemployment rate. Given the young demographic profile of many of the countries 
in the region, adequately equipping youth with education and skills and enabling youth to 
obtain productive jobs that have upward earning prospects are likely to remain key policy 
concerns.
Social developments
Despite the robust economic performance of the region, structural change in the labour 
market, in terms of the movement of workers from low-productivity agriculture to higher-
productivity non-agricultural activities, has been slow in the past decade. Agriculture remains 
the largest sector of employment in the region, estimated at 41.4 per cent in 2013, although 
services are expected to account for the largest share of employment in the region over the next 
few years. This may be partly attributable to the limited job and career development prospects 
in non-agricultural sectors (particularly for youth and young women) and the limited skills 
and work experience acquired by members of the agrarian households (particularly youth). 
Generating more productive and remunerative rural (off-farm) employment opportunities is 
likely to remain an important issue, not only for the low-income countries but also for some 
of the middle-income countries in the region.
Table 7.  Labour market situation and outlook in South-East Asia and the Pacific (per cent)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
Labour force participation rate 70.7 70.2 70.4 70.6 70.8 70.8 70.9 70.8 70.7 70.5 
Unemployment rate Total 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.9 5.0 
Male 5.0 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 
Female 3.7 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.1 
Youth 9.4 9.1 9.4 9.7 10.1 10.5 10.8 11.1 11.4 11.6 
Adult 3.4 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.2 
Employment annual growth rate Total 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
  Male 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2
  Female 0.1 0.3 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0
  Youth –2.3 –3.2 –2.3 –3.9 –5.2 –5.7 –5.5 –5.1 –4.8 –4.2
  Adult 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.6
Memorandum item: GDP annual growth rate 7.1 9.9 8.3 6.6 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Notes: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013.
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The region’s labour market structure is also associated with a continued high incidence 
of vulnerable employment, which is estimated at 59 per cent in 2013. Vulnerable employment 
continues to affect women more than men (63.1 per cent for women compared to 56 per cent 
for men in 2013), but the incidence of women’s vulnerable employment is projected to decline 
slightly more than men’s by 2017. At the same time, the share of workers earning less than 
US$2 a day is estimated to have declined notably, from 62.3 per cent in 2000 to 30.5 per cent 
in 2013. This share is projected to decline further by almost 10 percentage points to around 
23 per cent by 2018. Concurrently, the share of workers in the “near poor” segment (workers 
living on more than US$2 but less than US$4 a day) is estimated to have increased notably, 
from 21.5 per cent in 2000 to a 36 per cent in 2013. In South-East Asia and the Pacific, the 
share of the “middle class” workers (living on between US$4 and US$13 a day) is projected 
to rise rapidly in the coming years, by almost 5 percentage points between 2013 and 2018.
Emerging challenges
Economic growth in the South-East Asia and Pacific region in 2014 is projected to decel-
erate to 5.3 per cent. Given the region’s high level of dependence on external markets, eco-
nomic and labour market developments in the region face considerable risks from the faltering 
global recovery. Within the region, aspirations and policy concerns differ across middle- and 
low-income countries. For some of the middle-income countries, a slow-down in their trend 
Box 5.  Education and youth unemployment in Viet Nam
Young women and men with college education and above 
face the highest rates of unemployment in Viet Nam – in 
excess of 15 per cent between 2010 and 2012 (figure B5.1). 
In general, youth unemployment rates in Viet Nam increase 
with the level of educational attainment. However, since 
young people with higher education usually have relatively 
little time in the labour market, the figures may also be 
capturing considerable temporary frictional unemployment. 
Indeed, adult unemployment rates for those with college 
education and above tended to remain low at less than 
2 per cent and declined slightly in recent years. 
Difficulties in obtaining jobs even for well-educated 
young people signals a lack of sufficient job opportunities, 
longer adjustments in reservation wages and expectation, 
and the possibility that education and training institutions 
are not responsive enough to the skills profile demanded 
in the changing economy. Well-educated youth can con-
tribute to productivity, innovation and future economic 
development and growth and their increasingly high job-
lessness and more difficult transition to the labour market 
may act as a constraint to the economy in the medium to 
long term if their challenges are left unaddressed.
Figure B5.1 Youth and adult unemployment rates in Viet Nam,
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growth rates has raised some concern regarding their potential for further catching up to 
income levels observed in developed economies. For the low-income countries, such as Cam-
bodia, Lao PDR and Pacific island countries, there is a strong desire to grow to middle-income 
status, as manifested in their long-term vision statements.
For ASEAN Member Countries, the ASEAN Economic Community 2015 will pre-
sent both opportunities and challenges in terms of growth prospects across different sectors, 
shifting trade patterns, the need to nurture comparative advantage within each country, skills 
mismatches and their implications for the labour market. In particular, a freer flow of labour 
is envisioned within the ASEAN community, signalling both new opportunities and chal-
lenges for jobseekers. In countries such as Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia and the Philippines, 
the labour force growth will continue to grow relatively rapidly at well above 1.5 per cent per 
year, while countries such as Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam will face a notable 
slowdown in labour force growth to less than 1 per cent per year (table 8). Such disparity in 
labour force growth and diverse employment opportunities within the region, in addition to 
considerable income differences, among others, leads to both push and pull factors for workers 
to move across borders. Improved labour market information systems, a cross-country skills 
recognition framework and job placement mechanisms at the country and the regional levels 
would benefit both the economies and the workers within the ASEAN sub-region.
For many Pacific island countries, dual and poorly integrated domestic economies – con-
sisting of a monetized, largely urban economy on the one hand, and a largely subsistence-
based rural economy on the other  –  continue to pose significant challenges. In Samoa for 
example, the lack of downstream value added chains from agriculture and fishing, such as pro-
cessing facilities, implies a loss of economic and job opportunities (Ronnas and Kim, Forth-
coming). To address these issues it will be necessary to stimulate broad-based increases in 
agricultural productivity, coupled with investment in labour-intensive industries (including 
tourism), underpinned by significant investment in education and skills development to meet 
the requirements of the labour market.
Furthermore, the countries in South-East Asia and the Pacific face high risks of natural 
disasters (Alliance Development Works, World Risk Report 2012), which in turn poses risks 
on sustaining livelihoods and employment. In 2012, out of 173 countries, almost half of the 
15 most risk-prone countries were found in South-East Asia and the Pacific region. In par-
ticular, risk of exposure to natural hazards is pronounced in the region. This poses additional 
challenges of being prepared at the policy, institutional, community and individual levels to 
cope with the livelihood consequences during and after the natural disasters.
Table 8.  Average annual growth rate of labour force, 
ASEAN Member Countries (per cent)
Country 2010–14 2015–20
Brunei Darussalam 1.88 1.46
Cambodia 2.03 1.67
Indonesia 1.48 1.24






Viet Nam 1.56 0.86
Source: Compound average annual growth rates are estimated from ILO, 
Economically Active Population, Estimates and Projections (6th edition, 
October 2011).
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South Asia
Growth has decelerated in South Asia  
due to both domestic and external factors
Like most developing regions, South Asia weathered the first phase of the global financial 
crisis (2008–2009) relatively well. In fact, the region’s economy grew by 9.5 per cent in 2010, 
the fastest rate in two decades. This result was driven by India, which expanded by over 11 per 
cent in 2010, while Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka all grew by between 
6 and 8 per cent. Late in 2011, the economies of the region started to slow down, again led 
by India. Due to domestic factors and the reverberations of the weak economic situation in 
advanced economies, South Asia is estimated to have grown by just 3.6 per cent in 2012 and 
3.9 per cent in 2013 (table 9). 
Overall, growth in South Asia has been largely reliant on the services sector (taking a 
production perspective) and private consumption (in terms of aggregate demand). However, 
the decomposition of GDP growth for India shows that sustaining high rates of growth rests 
on robust output from industry (figure  27, panel  A) and high investment rates (figure  27, 
panel B). In other words, the current slowdown in India has been propelled by poor perfor-
mance in the manufacturing sector and low levels of investment. Both of these dimensions 
are major barriers for South Asian countries in their pursuit of higher and more sustainable 
rates of growth – growth that also leads to job creation in the formal economy.
Beyond the overall slowdown of the economy, South Asia continues to face a number of 
macroeconomic challenges and imbalances. First, inflation has been high and persistent in 
this region: in 2013, average consumer price inflation is estimated to have ranged from 5.8 per 
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cent in the Maldives to 10.8 per cent in India. Second, all South Asian countries (apart from 
Afghanistan) run a current account deficit. In India, the deficit is estimated to have hit 4.9 per 
cent of GDP in 2013, which makes the economy reliant on external capital flows.16 The eco-
nomic slowdown, policy uncertainty and a general change in investor sentiment (away from 
emerging economies) led to volatility in capital flows in India (and hence, the exchange rate) 
in mid-2013. In Sri Lanka, the current account deficit exceeded 5 per cent of GDP in 2013. 
Finally, macroeconomic imbalances in South Asia are also caused by the large fiscal deficits, 
which reached almost 5 per cent of GDP in the case of India in 2012/13 (fiscal year).
Labour market situation is mixed
The labour markets in South Asia continue to be dominated by informal and agricultural 
employment, where jobs are generally poorly paid and unprotected. Looking at some of the 
key labour market indicators reveals part of the story. First, labour force participation rates 
in South Asia are amongst the lowest in the world (56.1 per cent in 2013) (table 9). However, 
this is driven mainly by the situation for women as discussed below. The participation rate of 
youth in South Asia has fallen in recent years, reaching 39.6 per cent in 2013, which reflects 
increased education enrolment, especially in secondary schooling.
Employment growth has been stronger in recent years (at 1.1 per cent in 2011 and 2012, 
and 1.0 per cent estimate for 2013), most notably for women (table 9). In the case of India, 
it has been argued that the country was experiencing “jobless growth” due to the fact that 
total employment grew by only 1.1 million from 2004/05 to 2009/10 (based on the National 
Sample Survey), representing an employment elasticity of almost zero. More recently, however, 
total employment in India expanded from 2009/10 to 2011/12 by a much healthier 13.9 mil-
lion, though many of these jobs are in the informal economy.17 
The total unemployment rate in South Asia is estimated to be just 4.0 per cent in 2013 
compared to 3.9 per cent in the previous year (table 9). However the unemployment rate is 
not the best indicator of distress in South Asian labour markets, given the high prevalence of 
16 IMF, World Economic Outlook database, April 2013.
17 National Sample Survey 61st, 66th and 68th rounds of the Employment and Unemployment Survey; ILO staff 
calculations.
Table 9.  Labour market situation and outlook in South Asia (per cent)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
Labour force participation rate Total 57.8 57.1 56.6 56.1 56.1 56.2 56.2 56.3 56.3 56.3
Male 81.8 81.4 81.0 80.6 80.7 80.7 80.7 80.7 80.7 80.6
Female 32.7 31.6 31.0 30.4 30.5 30.6 30.7 30.8 30.9 31.0
Youth 42.7 41.4 40.5 39.6 39.6 39.5 39.5 39.4 39.4 39.3
Adult 63.8 63.2 62.8 62.3 62.3 62.3 62.3 62.2 62.2 62.1
Unemployment rate Total 4.2 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
Male 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
Female 4.7 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8
Youth 9.8 9.7 9.7 10.1 10.2 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4
Adult 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7
Employment annual growth rate Total 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7
  Male 1.4 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6
  Female –1.3 –1.5 0.1 0.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0
  Youth –2.3 –2.2 –1.5 –1.9 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
  Adult 1.4 1.8 1.7 1.7 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0
Memorandum item: GDP annual growth rate 7.4 9.5 6.1 3.6 3.9 5.0 6.0 6.2 6.5 6.6
Notes: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013 (see Annexes 4 and 5); IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2013.
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informal employment and working poverty. That said, the unemployment figures do reveal 
that women and youth are more vulnerable to being jobless, as is the case in most other 
regions. In this regard, the youth unemployment rate for South Asia reached 10.2 per cent in 
2013 compared with 2.5 per cent for the adult population.
Gender gaps in the labour markets of South Asia
The female labour force participation rate in South Asia ranges from just 21 per cent in Afghan-
istan to 79.4 per cent in Nepal (national figures for various years) (figure 28). The participation 
rate of women in the labour force is below 40 per cent in all countries in the region except in 
the Maldives and Nepal. In Nepal, women are mostly engaged in agriculture, which is more 
a result of poverty than choice. In comparison, the participation rate for men in South Asia 
varies far less, ranging from 75 per cent in Sri Lanka and the Maldives to 82.7 per cent in India. 
The quality of employment and opportunities for better jobs continue to be unequally 
distributed between men and women in the region. When women work they tend to earn 
less (the gender wage gap), to work in less productive jobs (often a case of occupation segrega-
tion) and are over-represented in unpaid family work. For example, in India, 21.2 per cent of 
working men (aged 15–59) have a regular salaried job (2011/12), while only 13.4 per cent of 
women have such employment (National Sample Survey Office, 2013). 
In Nepal, a country where there is close to parity in labour force participation rates, 83.8 per 
cent of men working in non-agricultural employment were informally employed in 2008 com-
pared with 91.8 per cent of women. Moreover, like most countries, Nepalese men are paid more 
than females in both the agricultural sector (a median wage of NPR 150 for male workers versus 
NPR 100 for females in 2008) and the non-agricultural sector (a median wage of NPR 200 for 
males compared with NPR 125 for females) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009).
Slow progress in structural transformation in South Asia
In most countries in the region, informality, in all of its forms, persists as the norm. For 
example, in India, though the share of workers in the informal sector has fallen from 86.3 per 
cent in 2004/05 to 82.2  per cent in 2011/12, the proportion of informal workers in the 
formal sector has increased. In other words, new jobs are being created in larger, registered 
firms; however, these jobs are often without regular employment relationships and benefits as 
a result of the increasing use of contracted and casual labour. The proportion of wage and sala-
ried workers continues to be low, with only 22.5 per cent of workers in South Asia receiving 
a wage/salary in 2013, the lowest percentage of all regions. Self-employment continues to be 
Figure 28. Gender disparities in labor force participation rates (per cent)








Notes: Age coverage: Afghanistan – 14+; Bangladesh 
– 15+; India – 15-59; Maldives – 15+; Nepal – 15+; 
Pakistan – 15+; Sri Lanka – 15+.
Source: Afghanistan – National Risk and Vulnerability 
Assessment, 2011-12; Bangladesh – Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Survey, 2010; 
India – National Sample Survey, 68th Round, 
2011-12; Maldives – Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey, 2009-10; Nepal – National Living 
Standards Survey, 2010-11; Pakistan – Pakistan 
Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Survey, 2010-11; 
Sri Lanka – Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey, 2012.
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common for people in South Asia; in 2013, 59 per cent were own-account workers. Together 
with the percentage of unpaid family workers, this yields a vulnerable employment share of 
76.1 per cent, a figure that is only slightly down on previous years. 
Another manifestation of the slow structural transformation is the continuing high share 
of South Asian workers in the agricultural sector. In 2013, 51.7 per cent of workers in South 
Asia still make a living in agriculture. In Nepal and Pakistan almost three-quarters of working 
women are engaged in agricultural activities: 73.4 per cent in Nepal (2010/11) and 74.2 per 
cent in Pakistan (2010/11).18 
Outlook in South Asia remains uncertain 
The current slowdown and domestic challenges facing economies in South Asia imply that the 
goal of creating decent work will continue to be difficult in 2014 and the near future. However, 
some of the fundamentals are in place for countries to return or shift to higher growth paths, 
namely the large youth population and increased investment in infrastructure and skills develop-
ment that has been taking place. Nonetheless, many countries face considerable political uncer-
tainty and security threats (Afghanistan, the Maldives, Nepal and Pakistan), while all countries 
need to enhance efforts to ensure that growth translates into more decent employment, espe-
cially for the young men and women entering the labour market in the coming years. 
Middle East and North Africa
Social unrest has affected the region  
and threatens its long-term perspective
For the past three years, the attention of the world has been caught by the social unrest that 
has spilled over from events happening in Tunisia to other countries in the Middle East and 
North (MENA) region. The region is struggling in both addressing historical problems and 
offering a clear path of political stability and economic growth for its current and future gen-
erations. In particular, the crises in Syria and Libya have intensified the political tensions in 
the region and considerably slowed economic growth. As a result, neighbouring countries 
(such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia) have witnessed a significant flow of (return) 
migrants, which in turn will have a drastic effect on the labour markets in the MENA region 
(see box 6). And with high levels of youth unemployment and overall low employment levels, 
political tensions and social instability are expected to increase across the MENA region well 
into the 2020s (Schulz, 2012). 
Growth has decelerated sharply in the region, falling to 2.2 per cent in 2013, well below 
the global average (table 10). A slowdown in main commodity prices, a deceleration in world 
trade and a regional economy that is not very well integrated have weakened economic pro-
spects. Moreover, the stretched political transition and instability are further weighing on 
the economies in the region and are likely to result in a sluggish and protracted economic 
recovery, with unemployment at best stabilizing at currently high levels. Trying to achieve 
and maintain macroeconomic stability in this environment will be a key challenge for 2014 
and the coming years.
Economies in the MENA region suffer from a specialization in sectors that generate low 
employment growth and from a lack of structural transformation towards high-productive 
industries (see also ILO, 2013c). A few commodity-exporting sectors contribute most of the 
18 See CBS (2011) and PBS (2012). 
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output of the region but very little to employment opportunities. In addition, these sectors 
do not offer sufficient employment opportunities for the skills young people possess. The high 
wages paid in these sectors raise labour costs and wage expectations more broadly, inhibiting 
stronger job creation in other, more employment-intensive sectors in industry or services. Also, 
smaller, oil-exporting countries in the Middle East, in particular in Gulf Council Coun-
tries (GCC), redistribute the wealth generated from their main export goods via generous 
public employment offers to nationals, which further pushes up wage premiums for natives 
and limits the capacity of these countries to develop a sustainable business sector outside a 
few highly productive sectors.
Besides a lack of structural transformation, many countries in the region also suffer from 
a challenging business climate characterized by poor and limited infrastructure, such as costly, 
unreliable and inefficient supplies of electricity and water. This further dampens and limits 
investment opportunities and growth. As a result, the demographic change characterised by a 
growing young population is considered to be a burden on the economy rather than an asset. 
The scarce job opportunities are likely to fuel social unrest and instability further as a youthful 
population face severely limited opportunities.
Stress in labour markets remains high in the region
Over the past decade, the MENA region has witnessed economic growth of 2 per cent per 
annum. This growth rate has proven too low to generate sufficient employment opportunities 
for the fast growing population and many workers only find jobs in the informal economy 
(ILO and UNDP, 2013). Indeed, unemployment in the region remains the highest in the 
world, at least 2  percentage points above rates observed in the Developed Economies and 
European Union region, which had experienced a serious deterioration during the crisis. In 
contrast to many other regions, however, in the MENA countries the worsening of labour 
market conditions was mainly a result of the political instability that arose after 2011: the 
global economic crisis did not contribute significantly to labour market development in the 
region (see table 10).
Box 6.  Spill-overs from the Arab Spring: The case of Lebanon
According to World Bank estimates around 1 million Syr-
ians fled to Lebanon by the end of 2013, which is equiva-
lent of 22 per cent of the existing Lebanese population. 
An additional 600,000 were expected before the end of 
2014, bringing the total number of refugees to 1.6 million. 
This has raised serious concerns regarding the capacity 
of a small country like Lebanon, already characterized by 
lack of resources and a large fiscal deficit, to absorb the 
increase in population. 
The strong inflow of Syrians to Lebanon is expected to 
have substantial short- and long-term consequences for 
Lebanese economic growth and labour market conditions. 
Lebanon has been encountering a decrease in its revenue 
collection (around US$1.5 billion over the period 2012–14) 
and a rise in its government expenditure (around US$1.1 
billion). According to an economic and social impact assess-
ment undertaken by the World Bank at the request of the 
Lebanese government, the country will be facing costs of 
US$2.6 billion in order to meet the increasing demand for 
public facilities such as water, electricity, health and edu-
cation as a result of the influx of refugees. This will further 
worsen Lebanon’s fiscal deficit which is already US$3.7 
billion or 8.7 per cent of GDP in 2013.
Prior to the crisis in Syria, the Lebanese labour market 
already suffered from a high unemployment rate, espe-
cially among youth (21 per cent in 2013), skills mismatches, 
widespread informality (more than 56.2 per cent of total 
employment) and low-productivity and low-quality jobs. 
The substantial and quick rise in labour supply will further 
put pressure on existing jobseekers, adversely affecting 
working conditions and pushing down job finding rates. Cur-
rent estimates project a labour supply increase of between 
30 and 50 per cent, especially among unskilled workers, 
women and youth. This substantial rise is expected to push 
up both the unemployment rate and the share of informal 
employment in total employment by up to 10 percentage 
points each. In addition, 170,000 Lebanese will be pushed 
back into poverty by 2014, reversing earlier favourable 
trends in poverty reduction (World Bank, 2013b). In order 
to address these serious challenges and to at least stabilize 
the current labour market situation, Lebanon is in need 
of effective macroeconomic policies and targeted active 
labour market policies that aim to improve both product-
ivity and job quality through increasing the average skill 
level and providing job opportunities, especially for the 
low-skilled.
64 Global Employment Trends 2014 | Risk of a jobless recovery?
Youth unemployment in MENA countries remains the highest in the world, reaching 
27.2 per cent in the Middle East and more than 29 per cent in North Africa in 2013. This 
is more than twice as high as the global average. For example, unemployment among young 
people has reached around 19 per cent in Morocco, over 22 per cent in Algeria and Lebanon, 
25 per cent in Egypt, closer to 30 per cent in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, around 40 per cent in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories and over 42 per cent in Tunisia. The youth labour force 
is expected to decline over the coming years, but this will provide only a short-term relief: as 
of 2020, long-term demographic projections indicate a return of stronger growth of the youth 
population, making it essential that the region develops a labour market that can utilize the 
new entrants and benefit from the demographic dividend.
In many MENA countries, educational attainment actually increases the risk of joblessness. 
For instance, the unemployment rates for those with tertiary education are over 43 per cent in 
Saudi Arabia, 24 per cent in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 22 per cent in United Arab 
Emirates and in Morocco, 14 per cent in Tunisia and over 11 per cent in Algeria (O’Sullivan 
et al., 2011). Youth unemployment in the MENA region might take longer to recover due to 
the fact that educated youth may take a longer time to find a job that matches their skills and 
education. Some countries in the region, such as Tunisia, are characterized by overqualified 
young people accepting relatively low wages and engaging in insecure jobs. In contrast, edu-
cation systems in other countries, such as Egypt and Jordan, struggle to deliver graduates with 
the necessary skills for finding productive jobs. Given these trends, many young people in the 
region are both overqualified and underqualified for available positions compared to countries 
in other regions at similar levels of development (see figure 29). According to the World Bank’s 
Enterprise Surveys, labour skill levels are recognized to be one of the key constraints in Lebanon 
(38 per cent of surveyed firms), Syria (36 per cent), Jordan (33 per cent) and Egypt (31 per cent). 
Skills mismatches in most MENA countries are worsened because the educational sys-
tems are characterized by significant inequalities. Students coming from a disadvantaged 
background have less chance of completing their primary education. They also have a lower 
probability of gaining access to better quality education. Therefore, they will be less able to 
access university educations. This inequality is aggravated by the rapid decline in public invest-
ment in education (see figure 30). 
The unequal distribution and – on average – inadequate quality of education reduce the 
returns that many people receive from their education and prevents the region from benefiting 
from the large overall investment they make in education. At the same time, the fact that only 
few possess the skills actually required by local businesses creates substantial wage premiums, 
such as may be earned, for instance, by returning migrants in Egypt, who are often perceived 
as being more adequately educated (Özden and Schiff, 2007). As a result, the private sector 
Table 10.  Labour market situation and outlook in MENA countries (per cent)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
Labour force participation rate 48.0 48.2 48.5 48.8 49.0 49.2 49.4 49.6 49.7 49.7
Unemployment rate Total 10.4 10.7 11.3 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.4 11.4 11.3
Male 8.2 8.3 8.8 8.9 8.9 9.0 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.8
Female 18.9 19.8 20.9 21.3 21.2 21.1 21.0 20.9 20.8 20.7
Youth 23.8 25.0 27.0 27.9 28.3 28.6 28.8 28.9 29.0 29.1
Adult 7.0 7.3 7.6 7.8 7.9 8.0 8.0 8.1 8.1 8.1
Employment annual growth rate Total 2.9 2.7 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1
  Male 3.0 2.8 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1
  Female 2.5 2.6 1.7 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4
  Youth –0.3 –1.5 –2.8 –1.8 –1.6 –1.4 –1.1 –0.8 –0.6 –0.3
  Adult 3.6 3.6 3.2 3.3 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.5
Memorandum item: GDP annual growth rate 3.1 5.1 2.7 5.8 2.2 4.1 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.4
Notes: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013 (see Annexes 4 and 5); IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2013.
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faces both supply and price constraints in hiring the workforce needed to expand and success-
fully compete at the international level. 
Women face particular challenges in the labour market in the MENA region, in par-
ticular in GCC countries (see, also, ILO, 2013c). Female unemployment rates are high and 
the gender unemployment gap is large. Female labour market participation rates are lower 
than in any other region, reaching barely 25 per cent in North Africa and not even 20 per 
cent in the Middle East. Nevertheless, an increasing share of the female population has now 
attained tertiary level education, but so far they remain underutilized. Taken together, high 
unemployment and low participation rates leave a large employment gap and a huge catch-up 
potential should more women decide to enter the labour market (figure 31).
Expanding employment opportunities for both young people and women could con-
tribute significantly to an increase in GDP per capita and help larger parts of the population 
to benefit from wealth generated in these countries (table 11). Raising the employment rate 
for both young workers and women to the global average would increase employment by more 
than 58 million in the MENA region and could add more than 20 per cent on average to per 
capita income levels. Reducing youth unemployment rates by half would increase employment 
by 3  million, while maintaining youth unemployment rates at current levels (rather than 
seeing them increase further over the next few years) would have a minimal positive impact 
on GDP per capita levels (around 0.3  per cent) and still lead to a further reduction in the 
overall number of jobs (table 11). 
Figure 29. Skills mismatch, overeducation and undereducation
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Making foreign direct investment beneficial for job creation
The MENA region benefits from a substantial and growing inflow of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI). In principle, such investment should provide support for stronger growth and 
employment creation, both directly and indirectly, by spurring structural transformation and 
sectoral reallocation of jobs into higher value added industries. So far, however, there is little 
evidence that FDI has led to such changes in the region. This section discusses some of the 
recent trends and the reasons for the limited effects FDI had on employment creation in the 
region.
FDI into the MENA region has increased substantially over the past decade (from US$8.7 
billion in 2001 to US$94 billion in 2008). However, these FDI inflows were directed to only a 
few sectors, such as construction, telecommunications and mining, while the manufacturing 
and agriculture sectors were neglected (figure 32). In addition, high technology services sec-
tors have received very little FDI inflows, limiting positive spillovers onto productivity growth 
in the region. Moreover, FDI inflows have been highly concentrated in resource-rich coun-
tries, with Saudi Arabia receiving the lion’s share of the inflows (around 44 per cent; OECD 
and WEF, 2011). More importantly, with the onset of the Arab Spring and the rise of social 
protest, which has affected the political stability of the region, FDI inflows to the MENA 
region have declined by 13 per cent, in particular in Egypt and Tunisia.19 So far, FDI in the 
MENA region has not had the broad-based effect on economic development that was seen in 
Eastern Europe and Asia over the same period. 
19 The General Authority for Investment and Free Zones in Egypt stated that FDI declined by 40 per cent at the begin-
ning of 2011. As well as, Tunisia who witnessed a 30 per cent decline in FDI at the beginning of 2011.
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Table 11.  Jobs gap and contribution to GDP per capita in MENA countries
Jobs gap 
(thousands)
Change in GDP 
per capita (%)
Maintain youth unemployment at current levels –580 + 0.3
Reduce youth unemployment rate by half 3 019 + 1.1
Increase employment-to-population ratio for women and youth to global average 58 202 + 20.1
Notes: The table indicates the change in the absolute number of jobs and GDP per capita vis-à-vis current levels under different 
scenarios. The first scenario assumes a constant youth unemployment rate until 2018; the second scenario assumes that the youth 
unemployment rate falls by half compared with the 2013 rate; the last scenario assumes an increase of the employment-to-population 
rates for both youth and women to the global average.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometrics Models, October 2013; ILO staff calculations.
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In principle, FDI inflows can promote employment creation through two channels: 
yy When FDI comes as greenfield investments, new employment opportunities are generated 
immediately, especially if these investments are directed into labour intensive sectors such 
as agriculture, manufacturing, tourism and wholesale and retail trade. Greenfield invest-
ment is expected to have a positive impact on employment and to generate positive spillo-
vers to the whole economy. Over the past 5 years, around 90 per cent of FDI in the MENA 
region was in greenfield operations.
yy Alternatively, FDI can flow in through mergers and acquisitions. These typically do not 
create new job vacancies, and in the short term they might lead to job destruction. In 
the longer run, this type of investment is expected to increase productivity, which could 
enhance employment creation through sectoral reallocation of jobs.
So far, neither type of foreign investment has had a significant positive impact on employment 
in the MENA region. To a large part, this can be explained by the very limited number of 
sectors that have benefited from FDI inflows and the fact that they were not labour-intensive 
sectors. Most FDI has been directed to the hydrocarbons sector, which is a capital-intensive 
sector. For instance, in Algeria and Tunisia 50 per cent and 61 per cent, respectively, of FDI 
inflows were oriented towards the energy sector. In Egypt, 45 per cent of total FDI inflows 
were directed to the petroleum sector. Not only are these sectors capital-intensive, they offer 
job opportunities for a very limited number of occupations, such as petroleum engineers, 
which many MENA countries lack in a sufficient number and so need to import. In coun-
tries that are not oil exporters, FDI inflows often went into other capital-intensive sectors, 
such as telecommunications, again creating only limited new jobs. For example, in Tunisia 
and Morocco, 35 per cent and 33 per cent, respectively, of the FDI received during 2000 and 
2007 went to the telecommunications sector.
In addition, where investment went into labour-intensive sectors, such as construction, 
the native population often benefited very little from new job openings, which were quickly 
filled with migrants from countries outside the region. Indeed, in the Gulf countries in par-
ticular, wage premiums for native workers lead employers to hire migrant workers at lower 
wages, often with working conditions that would not be accepted by native workers (see also 
the discussion in ILO, 2013c). Moreover, cultural barriers often prevent women from working 
in some male dominated industries.
To ensure that labour markets receive more benefit from FDI, countries in the MENA 
region need to make substantial efforts to diversify the sectoral allocation of FDI inflows. 
Often, high barriers to market entry, a low level of perceived governance quality and a lack in 
proper infrastructure create substantial obstacles for foreign investors who wish to enter new 
markets. Also, in some countries in the region there seems to be a first-mover bias, where sub-
stantial protection from further competition is granted for the first investor in any particular 
sector, thereby limiting the possibility of a much broader positive employment effect from FDI.
Figure 32. Foreign direct investment inﬂows in the MENA region 
 by sector, 2003–10 (per cent)
Note: The countries included 
in this graph are: Algeria, Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
Syria and Tunisia.
Source: OECD and WEF, 2011.
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Sub-Saharan Africa
Economic growth has remained solid
Economic growth has continued to be solid in Sub-Saharan Africa. GDP year-on-year growth 
in 2013 is estimated at 4.8 per cent in 2013. This is slightly below the growth rates seen in 
recent years, but it is still the third fastest regional growth rate, after East Asia and South-East 
Asia and the Pacific (see Annex 1, table A1). Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is also high in 
comparison with the 1990s. From 1991 to 2000, regional economic growth averaged 2.3 per 
cent annually, compared with an average of 5.7 per cent during 2001–12. In 2013, more than 
half of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are estimated to have realized economic growth 
rates of at least 5 per cent, and only in two countries is growth likely to have been negative 
(Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea). Furthermore, the current economic out-
look suggests that regional growth rates of at least 5 per cent are sustainable, provided that 
global economic conditions do not weaken exports or reduce inflows of investment and aid 
(IMF, 2013). Both investment and aid are important, as different groups of countries tend 
to benefit from these financial flows. Official development assistance constitutes most of the 
external inflows in low-income countries, while middle-income countries rely more on remit-
tances, portfolio inflows and foreign direct investment (AfDB, 2013).
High rates of economic growth contributed to an improvement in some labour market 
indicators. Ghana, for example, realized an average annual economic growth rate of 6.8 per 
cent during 2001–12 (4.5 per cent during 1991–2000), and was classified as a lower-middle-
income economy by the World Bank in 2010. Data from the population censuses in this 
country indicate that the unemployment rate more than halved from 2000 to 2010 (from 
10.4 to 4.2 per cent), while data from the Ghana Living Standard Surveys show a declining 
share of workers in vulnerable employment (which covers own-account work and contributing 
family work). The vulnerable employment rate decreased from more than 80 per cent in the 
1990s to 75 per cent in 2006 (Sparreboom and Baah-Boateng, 2011). In a similar vein, the 
average unemployment rate in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole during the period 2001–12 is 
estimated to be half a percentage point below the rate during 1991–2000 (7.9 and 8.4 per cent, 
respectively). Comparing these two periods, the average regional youth unemployment rate 
decreased by almost a percentage point from 13.4 per cent to 12.3 per cent. 
Nevertheless, according to data from the Ghana Population Census, more than three-
quarters of the employed remained in vulnerable employment in 2010 (ILO, 2013e), which 
points to the lack of economic and labour market transformation in Ghana. Again, there 
is similarity with the development of Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, as the regional vul-
nerable employment rate decreased by only 2.3  percentage points from 2001 to 2012. All 
other developing regions show a larger decrease in the vulnerable employment rate, in most 
cases despite lower rates of economic growth than were experienced in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, economic growth averaged 3.5 per cent 
during 2001–12, while the vulnerable employment rate decreased by 4.4 percentage points in 
this period (figure 33).
The vulnerable employment rate in Sub-Saharan Africa is estimated at 77.4 per cent in 
2013, which is the highest rate of all regions. Facing underdeveloped or non-existent social 
protection systems, a large share of the working-age population in the region is obliged to 
work to provide a living to their families. As a consequence, the labour force participation 
rate across all labour market groups is estimated at 70.8 per cent in 2013, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa is the only region in which the male adult labour force participation rate is projected 
to rise in 2014 and 2015 (table 12).
In many developing economies, the manufacturing sector has served as an engine of paid 
employment creation, but by and large this has not happened in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
industrial sector in Ghana, for example, is composed mainly of mining and construction, 
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while manufacturing has been declining as a share of GDP in the last two decades (AfDB, 
2013). At the regional level, the share of industry in GDP also decreased slightly, from 30.7 per 
cent in 1991 to 29.7 per cent in 2011, but the share of manufacturing decreased significantly 
in this period, from 16.7 to 11.1 per cent (World Bank, 2013b). In terms of employment, the 
share of workers in industry in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is estimated at less than 10 per cent, 
is extremely low. In all regions this share is at least 20 per cent, and in the case of East Asia it 
is exceeds 30 per cent (Figure 34). 
The proportion of the working-age population in paid employment is also low in Sub-
Saharan Africa (13.7 per cent). Figure 34 suggests that the paid employment-to-population 
ratio tends to increase if the share of employment in industry rises. At first sight, the pos-
ition of South Asia seems not to fit in the pattern, as the paid employment-to-population 
ratio is at a similarly low level as in Sub-Saharan Africa, but in South Asia a much larger 
share of workers is in industrial employment. However, the share of workers in industrial 
employment in South Asia may appear relatively large due to the low female participation in 
labour markets, as female employment is typically concentrated in the services sector (ILO, 




































































Table 12.  Labour market situation and outlook in Sub-Saharan Africa (per cent)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
Labour force participation rate Total 70.4 70.4 70.5 70.6 70.8 70.9 71.0 71.1 71.2 71.2
Adult male 87.4 87.4 87.4 87.4 87.5 87.6 87.7 87.7 87.8 87.9
Adult female 71.4 71.4 71.6 71.7 71.8 71.9 72.1 72.2 72.3 72.4
Youth 54.2 54.1 54.1 54.2 54.3 54.3 54.4 54.4 54.4 54.3
Unemployment rate Total 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
Male 7.1 7.0 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.7
Female 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.3
Youth 12.1 12.0 11.9 11.9 11.9 11.8 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7
Adult 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
Employment annual growth rate Total 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
  Male 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1
  Female 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
  Youth 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7
  Adult 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
Memorandum item: GDP annual growth rate 2.6 5.6 5.5 5.2 4.8 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.7
Notes: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013 (see Annexes 4 and 5); IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2013.
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2012). Hence, given that in all regions the share of male industrial employment in total male 
employment is higher than the commensurate female share, low female participation tends to 
inflate the share of industry in total employment. Another factor influencing the relationship 
depicted in figure  34 is the role of self-employment and informal employment in industry, 
which seems to be more important in South Asia than in Sub-Saharan Africa.20 
African policy-makers have recognized the challenge of creating gainful employment op-
portunities and the related need for economic and labour market transformation. Regional 
consultations on the post-2015 development agenda recently resulted in the formulation of 
four desirable development outcomes in Africa, the first of which is structural transformation 
and inclusive growth (UNECA, 2013).21 The African Economic Outlook (AEO) 2013 argues 
that a four-layer approach could help transform African economies, in particular through 
the better utilization of their natural resources. According to this approach, the first layer 
consists of putting in place the right conditions for structural transformation. This includes 
basic requirements such as infrastructure and education to strengthen skills, but also suf-
ficiently large and competitive markets. The second layer is constituted by meeting the spe-
cific requirements of the primary sectors to fuel transformation, which includes for example 
good land management and resource-specific skills and research. The third layer is concerned 
with optimizing the revenue from natural resources and investing it wisely, while layer four is 
about promoting structural transformation with active policies. Such policies should focus on 
increasing agricultural productivity and building linkages to and from the extractive indus-
tries (AfDB, 2013).
For successful structural and labour market transformation, the African workforce needs 
to be properly prepared, as identified by the first layer in the AEO. Impressive strides have 
been made in expanding access to primary education in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the net 
enrolment rate increased from 60 per cent in 2000 to 77 per cent in 2011. Nevertheless, on 
current trends the region is unlikely to meet the target of universal primary education by 2015 
(UN, 2013b). Over time, low enrolment rates in primary education translate into low levels of 
educational attainment of the labour force. In some middle-income countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, workers with a secondary education may account for around a quarter of the work-
force. In Botswana, for example, 26 per cent of workers had a secondary education in 2006, 
while in Namibia, 23 per cent of workers had achieved this level in 2012. However, these pro-
portions are often much lower in low-income countries. For example, in Madagascar, the share 
of the labour force with secondary education was 15 per cent in 2005 (ILO, 2013e), while in 
20 Ideally, figure 34 would show the share of paid industrial employment in total paid employment, but such data are 
not available at the regional level. 
21 The other three are innovation and technology transfer, human development and financing and partnerships.
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Malawi the share of employed youth with secondary education reached the same percentage 
in 2012 (ILO, 2013f). 
Low levels of educational attainment result in widespread underqualification, which 
reduces the potential for economic and labour market transformation. Data from school-to-
work transition surveys in Malawi and Togo show that 82 and 55 per cent, respectively, of 
employed youth were underqualified in 2012 (ILO, 2013f). As levels of educational attain-
ment are typically much higher in paid employment than in self-employment and informal 
employment, low levels of educational attainment may also hamper formalization of jobs. In 
Ghana, for example, 36  per cent of workers in the private formal economy had obtained a 
secondary educational qualification in 2006, rising to 69 per cent in the public sector, while 
this was true for less than 7 per cent of workers in the informal economy (Sparreboom and 
Baah-Boateng, 2011). In Tanzania, more than 27 per cent of workers in paid employment had 
at least a secondary educational qualification in 2006, compared with less than 3 per cent of 
own-account workers and contributing family workers (Sparreboom and Nübler, 2013).
Low levels of educational attainment, widespread underqualification, a young and rap-
idly growing population and labour force, in combination with few opportunities for paid 
employment in Sub-Saharan Africa underline the need for increased social spending in the 
region. In most African countries, only 4–6 per cent of GDP is spent on social protection 
benefits, and average expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa is the lowest of all regions (ILO, 
2010). Although some progress has been made in reducing the proportion of people living 
in poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa, the region has seen a steady rise in the absolute number of 
extremely poor people (UN, 2013b). Social protection policies help to reduce poverty, and to 
strengthen the foundation for future inclusive growth. Social protection has also been dem-
onstrated to improve educational outcomes and build labour market skills, and in this way 
can contribute to inclusive economic growth (World Bank, 2012).
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3.  Policies for a stronger labour market 
and more inclusive growth
Persistent weakness in labour markets and economic  
growth necessitates a policy re-think
Entering 2014, the world still faces a jobs gap of 62 million – a harsh legacy of the global eco-
nomic crisis. Employment growth remains weak, unemployment continues to rise, particu-
larly among young jobseekers, and large numbers of potential workers remain discouraged and 
out of the labour market. Those that are unemployed are facing longer waiting times to secure 
employment, with a corresponding increase in the mismatch between the skills and employ-
ability of these jobseekers and the needs of firms and the labour market. On the current eco-
nomic and policy trajectory, unemployment is likely to continue to rise further, as a steady 
wave of new jobseekers – more than 220 million – enter the global labour market over the 
next five years without sufficient decent work opportunities to absorb them. Current trends 
suggest that many of these new jobseekers will not be able to secure formal wage employment, 
but rather will be relegated to informal or insecure work with little or no social protection 
and limited earnings opportunities. 
At the same time, persistently weak labour markets and slow growth continue to strain 
public budgets. As a result, many governments have pursued fiscal consolidation, which, in 
turn, constitutes a severe drag on expansion of output growth in many advanced countries, 
creating a vicious cycle. In turn, this weak growth in advanced economies has been spilling 
over to emerging and low-income countries, jeopardizing the global economic recovery at 
large. A lack of policy coordination has led to heightened uncertainty, resulting in suboptimal 
hiring and investment rates by firms and weaker spending by households. 
Monetary stimulus has prevented worse outcomes  
but has limitations and potentially adverse consequences
Monetary policy remains highly accommodative. In response to the sharp and abrupt decline 
in economic activity brought about by the global economic crisis, major central banks around 
the world dramatically reduced short-term lending rates starting in 2008. In the United 
States, Japan, the euro area, United Kingdom, Switzerland and other major currency areas, 
short-term rates remained between zero and 1 per cent to the end of 2013, marking six con-
secutive years of a near zero interest rate environment in many of the world’s major economies. 
In addition to the sharp reduction in short-term interest rates, unconventional measures to 
boost economic activity and to counter the risk of deflation have also been enacted by some 
central banks – most notably, large-scale asset purchase programmes or “quantitative easing”, 
which aims to lower bond yields and expand the monetary base, thereby encouraging lending 
and boosting economic activity.
Such large and long-lasting changes in the stance of monetary policy have important dis-
tributional consequences (McKinsey Global Institute, 2013). Estimates for the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and the euro area, show that between 2007 and 2012, governments 
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collectively benefited by US$1.6 trillion through reduced debt service costs and profits realized 
and remitted by central banks. At the same time, households in these countries lost an estimated 
US$630 billion in net interest income due to lower interest rates, with older households (which 
are more dependent on interest-bearing assets) having been particularly hard hit, while younger 
households (which are net borrowers) gained. Non-financial corporations benefited by an esti-
mated US$710 billion, as lower interest rates have made it cheaper for them to service debt. In 
sum, corporations have, on average, fared far better than households as regards capital incomes. 
On the other hand, liquidity creation by central banks did prevent a larger fall in 
employment. Estimates from macroeconomic models by the US Federal Reserve and the Bank 
of England, among others indicate that unconventional monetary policies have improved 
GDP by between 1 and 3 per cent compared with a “no action” scenario and have reduced 
unemployment rates by around 1 percentage point. In this respect, these measures have pre-
vented a larger shortfall in jobs. Nevertheless, this was not sufficient to allow for a stronger 
bargaining power of labour, with wages growing well below trend rates and the labour income 
share continuing to fall in most advanced economies. Taken together, these extraordinary 
monetary measures may have contributed to increased inequality by favouring corporate 
profits over households’ labour earnings.
The extended period of low interest rates and unconventional monetary policy measures 
is likely to have adverse effects on employment by skewing firms’ incentives towards an expan-
sion of capital rather than hiring. Indeed, currently stagnant labour market trends are a paradox 
when viewed alongside trends in corporate profits, which were at an all-time high at the end of 
2013.22 While hiring remains weak, many firms have been taking advantage of exceptionally 
low interest rates to issue debt. In 2012, firms in the United States issued US$1.36 trillion in 
debt, up more than 20 per cent even from the elevated levels during the boom years of 2006 and 
2007 and an increase of around 90 per cent compared with the average annual debt issuance reg-
istered between 2000 and 2005.23 The trend persisted into 2013: in the first 10 months of 2013, 
US corporate debt issuance was up a further 5.2 per cent compared with the same period in 2012. 
The rise in corporate profits and inexpensive borrowing did not, however, spark an invest-
ment boom in the real economy. Rather companies have decided to pay ever larger dividends 
to their shareholders. Over the 12 months to September 2013, dividend payments from S&P 
500 firms totalled US$329 billion, which is more than double the level from 2003 and 37.6 per 
cent greater than the average over the prior 10 years.24 In addition, firms have been buying back 
their own shares, and issuing debt to do so, with the aim of further bolstering share prices.25 
Taking advantage of ultra-low interest rates to buy back shares and increasing dividend pay-
ments to shareholders, alongside persistently weak hiring, can be seen as a choice to invest an 
increasing proportion of available corporate funds into financial capital, as opposed to into 
physical capital or into expanding the workforce. In the United States, at least, these trends 
have further worsened income inequality. Saez (2013) finds that between 2009 and 2012, 
average family incomes of the top 1 per cent of US households grew by 31.4 per cent, while 
the incomes of the bottom 99 per cent of households grew by only 0.4 per cent. According to 
his estimates the top 1 per cent in the United States captured 95 per cent of aggregate income 
gains in the first 2 years of the recovery.
A situation has thus emerged in which fiscal support remains too weak to jump-start a 
strong economic and labour market recovery, and monetary policy, which remains strong and 
has provided needed support, may also be contributing to some of the observed weaknesses 
in labour markets and to increased inequality. In this context, this report argues for three key 
areas of policy focus going forward. 
22 Data are available from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CP/.
23 Data are available from Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). http://www.sifma.org/re-
search/statistics.aspx.
24 Data are from http://www.factset.com/websitefiles/PDFs/dividend/dividend_9.16.13.
25 See http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/06/bonds-share-repurchases-idUSL6N0H23BF20130906.
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1.  Address weak aggregate demand through improved  
labour incomes and less fiscal consolidation
Global aggregate demand remains weak, with most economies growing considerably more 
slowly than before the crisis. Household spending remains muted, and the contribution of pri-
vate consumption growth to global economic growth in 2013 was the lowest since the depths 
of the global economic crisis in 2009. Consumption remains particularly weak in economies 
in which wages have stagnated and in those with high levels of household debt.26 This, in turn, 
has led to continued reluctance by firms to invest in expanding their productive capacity, as 
sources of new demand remain uncertain. The contribution of investment growth to global 
economic growth in 2013 was also lower than in any year since 2009. Accordingly, the year 
2013 has seen a widening between trends in global profit growth and equity prices on the one 
hand and the global labour market on the other. Weak global wage growth underscores the 
observed long-term decline in labour shares of national income in many countries. 
The combination of weak consumption and investment has also put downward pres-
sure on government revenues and government spending. Accordingly, breaking this vicious 
circle has become a key priority of policymakers, including through the G20 Labour and 
Employment and Finance Ministers’ joint communiqué in July 2013, which emphasised the 
need for “integrated macroeconomic, financial, and labour market policies that foster growth 
and employment”.27 
Yet, fiscal austerity pursued simultaneously in several advanced economies has depressed 
aggregate demand while at the same time failing to bring down the high levels of public debt 
(figure 35). In 2013, government debt rose further relative to output in most of the developed 
world. Particularly in the United States and in the euro area, debt-to-output ratios continue to 
rise despite fiscal consolidation measures. In the crisis economies at the periphery of the euro 
area, several consolidation packages have been implemented, where civil servants in particular 
have been hit hard through layoffs, permanent wage and pension cuts or a rise in working 
hours with unchanged pay, which had direct, negative effects on private consumption. As 
a consequence, economic growth has declined more than public debt, increasing the debt 
burden further relative to output in many advanced economies. Different policies have been 
26 EIU country data; ILO, “The global economic and employment situation and policy options”, Report to the Gov-
erning Body 319th Session (October 2013). 
27 See: http://www.ilo.org/global/publications/WCMS_218017/lang--en/index.htm
Figure 35. Government debt to GDP ratio in selected countries







Note: Crisis economies comprise Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2013.
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Box 7.  Fiscal consolidation versus employment-friendly policies – Simulation results
This box illustrates the employment effect of a fiscal consol-
idation scenario against an employment-friendly scenario 
in G20 countries (Cripps, 2013). These scenarios are 
assessed using the Global Policy Model, a macro econo-
metric model grouping 130 countries into 15 blocks and 
3 income groups: high-income G20 countries, developing 
G20 countries and rest of the world. The data used for esti-
mation are annual and cover the period from 1970 to 2011.
 
In high-income G20 countries, employment-friendly 
policies achieve both lower unemployment rates  
and lower public debt–to-GDP ratios
The baseline scenario starts with 2012 estimates and is in 
line with GDP forecasts from the IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook and employment projections from the ILO Trends 
Econometric Models. In the baseline scenario, GDP growth 
is expected to be 1.6 per cent per annum over the period 
2013–2020. Although unemployment rates are projected 
to decline slowly over this period, they remain 2.5 per-
centage points higher compared with the pre-crisis level 
(see dark blue line in figure B7.1). Similarly, the public debt-
to-GDP ratio decreases only slightly to 76 per cent by 2020 
down from 84 per cent in 2012.
The consolidation policy scenario in high-income coun-
tries targets a public debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 per cent by 
2020. The instrument used to achieve this target is a reduc-
tion in public spending of 5 per cent by 2020. The alternative 
scenario targets country-specific levels of unemployment 
within 1 percentage point of the lowest unemployment rate 
over the period 1993–2012 by 2020. The instruments used 
to achieve this objective are a combination of expansionary 
fiscal policies and a rebalancing of income distribution 
towards labour income. Fiscal policies consist of a 4.4 per 
cent progressive increase in public spending by 2020. 
Labour market policies consist of a 2 percentage point 
increase in labour share of income over the same timeframe.
Fiscal consolidation fails to achieve higher growth and 
lower unemployment rates. GDP growth is expected to be 
lower than in the baseline scenario, at 1.2 per cent per 
annum down from 1.6 per cent per annum over the period 
2013–2020. In line with poor growth performance, the un-
employment rate is 0.4 percentage points higher under the 
consolidation policy compared with the baseline. This cor-
responds to 2.4 million fewer jobs (see light blue line in 
figure B7.1). Consolidation policies are associated with a 
moderate reduction of government debt from 84 per cent 
to 74 per cent of GDP (see figure B7.2).
In contrast, an alternative employment-friendly policy is 
found to successfully enhance economic growth. GDP 
growth reaches 2.1 per cent per annum over the period 
2013–20. Unemployment rates drop to 6.4 per cent, com-
pared with 8.2 per cent in the baseline scenario. This 
corresponds to 6.1 million additional jobs compared with 
the baseline. Public debt drops to 72 per cent of GDP, a 
lower level of indebtedness compared with both the base-
line and fiscal consolidation  scenarios. In contrast to 
self-defeating consolidation policies, a switch to such a 
pro-growth policy stimulates aggregate demand through 
expansionary fiscal policy and a rebalancing of income 
towards labour that supports consumption and only weakly 
affects external competitiveness.
In developing G20 countries, employment-friendly 
policies improve both productivity and labour 
incomes
Developing G20 countries face different challenges than 
high-income G20 countries, such as under-employment 
and low wages and low job quality rather than high un-
employment rates. In the baseline scenario, the un-
employment rate is 5 per cent on average in low- and 
middle-income G20 countries, far below the level pre-
vailing in high-income countries. The developing country 
simulation package combines a set of targets capturing 
the challenges these countries are facing. First, output per 
person employed is targeted to increase by 5.5 per cent 
per annum for G20 middle-income countries as a group, 
20 per cent of this target being achieved by 2014. Second, 
rebalancing of income involves targeting a labour share of 
50 per cent of GDP at market prices, while keeping price 
inflation at 2 per cent per annum. Third, the agriculture 
productivity gap is targeted to be less than 20 per cent of 
GDP. The agriculture productivity gap measures the gap in 
earnings between persons working in agriculture and those 
working in other sectors.
These targets are achieved via the stimulation of 
increased investment, private consumption and govern-
ment spending. Specifically, the ratio of private consump-
tion to GDP is increased by 1.2 percentage points, while 
the ratio of government spending to GDP is increased by 
2 percentage points. The policy is implemented to achieve 
the targets defined above as well as putting a ceiling on 
inflation and fiscal deficit. The constraints are defined such 
that inflation stays below 2 per cent per annum by 2020 
and that the fiscal deficit does not exceed 5 per cent.
This policy package stimulates economic growth, which 
increases to 7.5 per cent per annum over the period 2013–
2020, while the unemployment rate declines to 3.9 per cent 
by 2020. Figure B7.3 illustrates the positive impact of such a 
policy on the growth rate of productivity measured as output 
per employee. The productivity growth rate increases from 
3.2 per cent per year in the baseline scenario to 5.7 per 
cent per year in the alternative scenario between 2013 and 
2020. Similarly, average earnings are growing faster from 
5 per cent in 2012 to 6 per cent in 2020.
followed by Japan which has chosen an expansionary fiscal stance to get the economy going. 
Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio has risen in 2013, but not at a faster pace than in the years before. 
Nevertheless, with debt approaching 250 per cent of output, some structural reforms for fiscal 
consolidation and an increase in the consumption tax can be expected in the months to come.
Even though growth rates are still weak and below trend, the developed world is now 
showing some signs of economic recovery and the growth outlook has become somewhat 
more optimistic. Yet, the pace and harshness with which fiscal consolidation policies have 
been implemented, the lack of coherence with monetary policies and the lack of policy coord-
ination among countries have impeded a more solid recovery (see also ILO, 2013c). In par-
ticular, many euro area economies shrank considerably during the crisis and their current 
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Figure B7.1 High-income G20 unemployment rate in scenario with ﬁscal austerity



























Figure B7.2 High-income G20 public debt to GDP ratio in scenario with ﬁscal austerity






























Figure B7.3 Effect on output per person employed of the policy package in (selected)
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output is below the levels observed in 2007 (figure 36). For example, if Greece had grown at 
the same pace over the period from 2007 to 2013 as it did over the two decades before the 
global economic crisis, its economy would now be 19.7 per cent larger compared with 2007. 
Instead it shrank by 23.5 per cent. Emerging and developing economies, in contrast, tend to 
be less far away from what they would have achieved in the past six years if they had grown at 
pre-2007 growth rates. In particular, Philippines, Indonesia and Brazil have grown faster on 
average in the past six years than in the two decades before.
The size of the gap between where many economies stand and where they would have 
stood had the crisis not occurred has had significant consequences for labour markets. To 
bring down unemployment rates to pre-crisis levels, economies need to grow faster than they 
did before the crisis. However, economic growth has been gaining momentum only slowly and 
the growth that is expected for the coming years is unlikely to allow for such a catch-up in 
most of the crisis economies. ILO projections based on the current economic outlook indicate 
that especially for crisis countries, it might take more than a decade before unemployment 
rates can be expected to fall back to pre-crisis levels.
In this context, additional policy levers may be needed in some countries, such as a rein-
troduction of expansionary fiscal policy, targeted towards improved labour market outcomes. 
Some fiscal stimulus measures targeted at bringing down unemployment rates were intro-
duced in the European Union during 2013, where policy-makers adopted the plan to imple-
ment youth guarantee schemes in the countries hit hardest by the crisis and released funds to 
combat youth unemployment. At the time of preparing this report, these decisions have not 
had any measurable impact, given that so far no funds have been spent. Such measures, how-
ever, are likely to provide some much-needed stimulus to the crisis economies. ILO simula-
tions show that employment-friendly policies are indeed likely to lead to improvements in the 
labour market, without harming fiscal sustainability disproportionately (see box 7).







Notes: The line indicates where values for 2007 and 2013 are identical (100 per cent).
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2.  Address high hiring uncertainty  
through better policy coordination
In addition to the strong impact of deficient aggregate demand, hiring uncertainty also con-
tributes to persistent unemployment, as discussed in chapter 1. Estimates for individual coun-
tries show that up to one third of the post-crisis rise in unemployment can be attributed to 
employers’ uncertainty regarding the economic and labour market outlook as employers find 
it difficult to anticipate new sources of growth. For example, as the slowdown in economic 
growth has now also affected emerging economies that were thought to be more resilient, this 
source of growth appears more uncertain. In this context, lack of policy coordination – such 
as fiscal consolidation in an environment of accommodative monetary policy – increases the 
uncertainty in the real economy. Stress in the financial market due to still unresolved banking 
problems further aggravates the problem and add to hiring uncertainty. These factors dis-
courage both investment in real capacity and hiring of new workers (see Hall, 2013). Rather, 
companies prefer to keep vacancies unfilled until they anticipate more stable and lasting 
demand for their products and services.
A further analysis of the factors contributing to hiring uncertainty shows that it is the 
lack of policy coordination and high sovereign debt risk premiums that contribute most to 
hiring uncertainty (see figure 37).28 To a lesser extent, financial stress in the private sector also 
pushes up hiring uncertainty. The level of public debt itself, however, does not seem to play a 
prominent role in the outlook of employers, despite the the attention it has received in recent 
policy debates. Rather, when it comes to public debt, hiring uncertainty appears to increase 
only when high sovereign debt risk premiums occur, which happened even in situations of 
relatively low levels of public debt, reflecting risk factors other than debt levels per se. This fur-
ther supports the recommendation for a less strict path of fiscal consolidation, which would 
help to boost aggregate demand and reduce hiring uncertainty, which are both important to 
stimulate job creation.
28 See Annex 1 in chapter 1 for more details on the analysis of determinants of hiring uncertainty.





Note: The graph displays the marginal effect of the level of 
public debt, the level of ﬁnancial stress, the degree of lack of 
policy coordination and the level of sovereign debt premiums 
on the ILO hiring uncertainty indicator in Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United 
States between 1992Q2 and 2013Q2. The lack of policy 
coordination is measured by an index of dissimilarity 
between changes in the monetary policy rate and shifts in 
public sector spending.
Source: Financial stress index is taken from Cardarelli et al., 
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3.  Address inactivity and skills mismatch  
through active labour market policies
The global jobs gap has continued to widen throughout the period of economic recovery. 
Around 60 per cent of this gap has emerged due to the heightened level of unemployment 
around the world, particularly in the advanced economies. Much of the remainder – around 
23 million – is due to the “discouragement effect”, in which potential workers, facing bleak 
labour market prospects, do not enter or remain in the labour market. These individuals are 
not included among the unemployed, but their lack of participation in the labour market is, 
in many respects, equally as detrimental as increased unemployment, in terms of foregone 
economic potential. 
With potential workers remaining out of the labour force and the unemployed experi-
encing longer spells of joblessness on average, the risk of skills degradation and obsolescence is 
on the rise. Accordingly, in addition to addressing the shortfall in aggregate demand by raising 
incomes and consumption and limiting fiscal consolidation, it is essential to improve the 
functioning of the labour market by employing active labour market policy measures. Such 
measures match workers with available employment opportunities, incentivize discouraged 
workers to reengage in the labour market and promote skills development, so that workers 
are equipped with the skills that are in demand in the labour market. Measures include, 
among others, effective public and private employment services, investments in and support 
for workers’ skills development, upgrading and re-skilling, including vocational training and 
entrepreneurial skills programmes. Box 8 highlights the potential for active labour market 
policies to increase employment.
Box 8.  The potential of active labour market policies to boost growth and employment
Active labour market policies (ALMP) enhance the effi-
ciency of labour markets by improving information and 
coordination to match unemployed persons with vacancies 
and by supporting and encouraging appropriate training and 
retraining. This helps firms to find the right workers faster, 
thereby directly increasing output, but also raising aggre-
gate demand as newly employed workers consume more, 
creating a virtuous and self-reinforcing cycle. However, 
there is still a lot of room for increasing ALMPs across most 
countries. For example, in 2011, the OECD countries spent 
an average of 0.6 per cent of GDP on ALMP, while northern 
European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) spent 
almost twice as much, on average 1.1 per cent of GDP.
With the help of the Global Economic Linkages (GEL) 
Model, a dynamic general equilibrium model with an ex-
plicitly modelled search and matching labour market, the 
effect of a doubling of spending on ALMPs (from 0.6 to 
1.2 per cent) until 2016 in developed economies has been 
simulated (figure B8.1). The unemployment rate can be 
reduced by 0.8 percentage points relative to the Global 
Employment Trends baseline, translating into an additional 
3.9 million jobs in the developed economies. Employment 
increases due to both the improved functioning of the 
labour market and the increased aggregate demand stimu-
lated by higher government expenditures.
Figure B8.1 Impact of doubling spending on ALMP




























Note: The graph shows the evolution of 
unemployment rates in the Developed 
Economies and European Union region 
under the current baseline projection in 
comparison with an alternative scenario 
where spending on ALMPs would be 
increased to reach 1.2 per cent of GDP 
between 2013 and 2016.
Source: ILO, Global Employment Linkages Model
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Conclusion
In June 2009, in the midst of the sharpest downturn in global economic activity since the 
Great Depression of the 1930s, the International Labour Conference, made up of represen-
tatives of governments and workers’ and employers’ organizations from more than 180 coun-
tries, unanimously adopted the Global Jobs Pact, a set of jobs-centred policies intended to 
reduce the time lag between economic recovery and a recovery in decent employment oppor-
tunities. Four and a half years later, as this report has shown, the global labour market remains 
deeply scarred by this crisis. Labour market improvements during the recovery have not kept 
pace even with modest GDP gains, which themselves have been disappointing. 
While there was a robust and fairly well coordinated initial policy response to the crisis 
by many governments, notably the G20, which supported an initial recovery, recent years 
have seen a tendency towards aggressive fiscal consolidation and overreliance on expansionary 
monetary policy, with far less international coordination. Not surprisingly, the economic 
recovery has weakened, and many labour markets remain deeply distressed. Inequality con-
tinues to increase in many parts of the world. 
The current state of the global economy and global labour market necessitates a policy 
re-think, one that brings the recommendations of the Global Jobs Pact back to the fore. Most 
notably, stronger efforts are needed to accelerate employment creation and to support the 
enterprises that create jobs. Active labour market policies and skills development initiatives, 
along with investments in public infrastructure and in strong social protection systems should 
be prioritized as appropriate, given national circumstances and specificities. 
Across all countries, future policy development must respect international labour stand-
ards, including respect for fundamental principles and rights at work. These must be under-
pinned by effective social dialogue, with workers, employers and governments collaborating 
to design and enact effective policies to promote a strong and sustainable recovery in the real 
economy and in the labour market.
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Annex 1. Global and regional tables
Table A1. Annual real GDP growth rates, world and regions (%)
Region 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014* 2015* 2016* 2017* 2018*
World 5.3 2.7 –0.4 5.2 3.9 3.2 2.9 3.6 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1
Developed Economies 
and European Union
2.6 0.1 –3.6 2.6 1.6 1.4 1.0 1.9 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.4
Central and South-
Eastern Europe  
(non-EU) and CIS
7.9 4.3 –5.9 5.8 5.6 3.0 2.5 3.3 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9
East Asia 12.1 7.9 7.1 9.9 8.3 6.6 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
6.6 4.5 1.7 7.6 4.7 5.7 4.9 5.3 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.5
South Asia 9.1 4.2 7.4 9.5 6.1 3.6 3.9 5.0 6.0 6.2 6.5 6.6
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
5.7 4.2 –1.2 6.0 4.6 2.9 2.7 3.1 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7
Middle East 6.1 5.1 2.8 6.1 5.6 3.0 2.0 3.3 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.3
North Africa 5.7 4.9 3.5 4.2 –0.2 8.6 2.4 4.8 5.1 4.4 4.2 4.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 7.1 5.7 2.6 5.6 5.5 5.2 4.8 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.7
Note: * 2013–18 are projections.
Source: ILO staff calculations based on IMF, World Economic Outlook database, October 2013.
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Table A2. Unemployment rate by sex, world and regions (%)







World 5.5 5.6 6.2 6.1 6.0 6.0 5.9 6.0 6.1
Developed Economies  
and European Union
5.8 6.1 8.4 8.8 8.4 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.7
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
8.2 8.1 9.9 9.2 8.5 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.4
East Asia 3.8 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.6
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
5.5 5.2 5.1 4.7 4.4 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.3
South Asia 4.1 4.1 4.2 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.0
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
6.9 6.5 7.5 7.3 6.7 6.6 6.4 6.5 6.6
Middle East 10.2 10.1 10.3 11.1 10.8 10.9 10.7 10.9 11.1
North Africa 11.1 10.5 10.6 10.4 11.8 12.1 11.8 12.2 12.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 7.5 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.6 7.7







World 5.2 5.4 6.1 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8
Developed Economies  
and European Union
5.6 6.0 8.8 9.1 8.5 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.7
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
8.6 8.5 10.6 9.6 8.8 8.2 8.3 8.5 8.6
East Asia 4.3 4.9 5.0 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.2
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
5.3 5.1 5.1 4.4 4.2 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.2
South Asia 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
5.5 5.1 6.3 6.0 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.4 5.5
Middle East 8.2 8.0 8.3 8.8 8.5 8.6 8.5 8.7 8.8
North Africa 9.0 8.3 8.0 7.8 9.0 9.2 8.9 9.2 9.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.8 7.0 7.1 7.0 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.9 7.0







World 5.8 5.9 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.5
Developed Economies  
and European Union
6.1 6.2 7.9 8.4 8.3 8.5 8.5 8.6 8.6
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
7.8 7.7 9.2 8.7 8.2 7.7 7.7 7.9 8.0
East Asia 3.1 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.8
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
5.7 5.4 5.1 5.0 4.6 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5
South Asia 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.8
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
9.0 8.4 9.4 9.1 8.4 8.2 7.9 8.1 8.2
Middle East 19.4 19.6 19.3 21.6 21.3 21.4 20.8 21.1 21.5
North Africa 17.6 17.6 18.6 18.3 20.6 21.2 20.7 21.3 21.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.3 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.4 8.5
Note: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; CI = confidence interval.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; for further information see Annex 4 and Estimates and projections of labour 
market indicators, in particular, Trends econometric models: A review of methodology, available at: http://www.ilo.org/empelm/pro-
jects/WCMS_114246/lang--en/index.htm. Differences from earlier estimates are due to revisions of World Bank and IMF estimates of 
GDP and its components that are used in the models, as well as updates of the labour market information used. The latter is based 
on ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 8th edition, 2013 update.
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Table A3. Unemployment rate for youth and adults, world and regions (%)







World 12.8 12.8 12.4 11.6 12.0 12.9 12.9 12.7 12.9 12.9 13.1 13.3
Developed Economies  
and European Union
13.5 14.3 13.3 12.5 13.3 17.4 18.1 17.6 18.0 18.2 18.3 18.4
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
20.0 18.2 18.4 17.5 16.9 20.0 19.0 17.9 17.5 17.7 18.0 18.3
East Asia 9.4 8.7 8.4 8.0 9.2 9.4 9.1 9.4 9.7 9.9 10.1 10.3
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
13.2 17.4 17.0 14.8 14.1 13.9 14.5 12.9 12.7 12.8 13.0 13.3
South Asia 10.3 10.1 9.8 9.2 9.5 9.8 9.7 9.7 10.1 10.0 10.2 10.4
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
16.1 16.4 15.1 14.1 13.6 15.5 15.0 14.3 13.8 13.3 13.6 13.9
Middle East 25.5 25.4 25.1 23.9 24.1 23.7 26.2 26.0 26.6 26.8 27.2 27.7
North Africa 29.5 27.7 25.5 24.2 23.7 23.9 23.7 28.1 29.2 28.6 29.4 30.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 13.3 11.7 12.2 11.7 12.1 12.1 12.0 11.9 11.9 11.7 11.9 12.0







World 4.6 4.5 4.2 4.0 4.1 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.6
Developed Economies  
and European Union
5.7 5.8 5.3 4.8 5.0 7.1 7.5 7.2 7.4 7.3 7.3 7.4
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
8.8 7.3 7.2 6.6 6.6 8.2 7.6 7.0 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9
East Asia 3.4 3.1 3.0 2.8 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.7
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
2.6 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3
South Asia 2.6 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
6.4 5.6 5.2 4.9 4.6 5.5 5.4 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.8 4.9
Middle East 6.9 7.0 6.8 6.5 6.4 6.9 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.4 7.6 7.7
North Africa 10.1 7.8 7.4 7.4 7.0 7.1 7.1 7.9 8.1 8.0 8.2 8.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.9 6.0 6.0 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.1
Note: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; CI = confidence interval.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of table A2.
Table A4. Unemployment in the world (millions)







Total 176.7 186.0 179.8 170.0 177.0 197.9 195.2 193.9 196.9 198.8 201.8 204.8
Male 102.7 105.4 102.2 97.7 102.5 116.1 112.3 111.1 113.2 114.5 116.2 118.0
Female 74.0 80.5 77.6 72.2 74.5 81.8 82.9 82.9 83.7 84.3 85.6 86.9
Youth 74.2 78.0 75.2 70.1 71.8 76.0 74.9 73.5 73.8 73.3 74.5 75.7
Adult 102.5 108.0 104.6 99.9 105.2 121.9 120.3 120.5 123.2 125.5 127.3 129.1
Notes: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; CI = confidence interval. Totals may differ due to rounding.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of table A2.
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Table A5. Employment-to-population ratio, world and regions (%)







World 61.1 60.8 60.7 60.7 60.4 59.7 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.7
Developed Economies  
and European Union
56.6 56.1 56.6 57.0 57.0 55.3 54.9 54.8 54.8 54.7 54.8 54.8
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
52.3 53.0 53.1 53.8 54.1 53.1 53.7 54.4 54.9 54.8 54.9 55.0
East Asia 72.7 69.6 69.2 68.8 68.0 67.5 67.3 67.4 67.5 67.5 67.5 67.6
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
66.9 66.0 66.0 66.4 66.6 66.7 67.0 67.3 67.5 67.4 67.4 67.5
South Asia 57.0 58.2 57.6 57.0 56.1 55.4 54.9 54.4 53.9 53.9 53.9 54.0
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
58.3 60.0 60.5 60.9 61.4 60.7 61.2 61.5 61.8 61.8 61.9 62.0
Middle East 41.1 42.8 42.7 43.0 42.5 42.6 42.7 43.1 43.4 43.6 43.6 43.7
North Africa 41.0 42.3 42.4 43.0 43.3 43.3 43.5 42.9 43.0 42.9 43.1 43.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 64.0 64.8 64.8 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.1 65.2 65.3 65.3 65.4 65.4







World 73.9 73.1 73.1 73.1 72.8 72.1 72.1 72.2 72.2 72.2 72.2 72.3
Developed Economies  
and European Union
65.8 64.2 64.7 65.0 64.7 62.3 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.5 61.5 61.6
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
61.9 62.4 62.3 63.2 63.7 62.3 63.2 64.1 64.6 64.6 64.7 64.8
East Asia 78.3 75.5 75.1 74.9 74.1 73.7 73.6 73.7 73.8 73.8 73.9 73.9
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
78.4 77.7 77.7 77.7 77.7 77.8 78.3 78.6 78.8 78.6 78.7 78.7
South Asia 79.5 79.9 79.7 79.4 78.9 78.5 78.5 78.2 77.8 77.6 77.7 77.8
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
74.8 74.9 75.4 75.5 75.9 74.6 74.9 75.1 75.3 75.2 75.3 75.4
Middle East 67.1 67.4 67.3 67.6 67.2 67.3 67.4 67.9 68.3 68.4 68.5 68.6
North Africa 65.4 67.4 67.1 67.2 67.8 67.9 68.1 67.4 67.5 67.4 67.6 67.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 71.2 70.8 70.9 71.0 71.0 70.9 71.0 71.1 71.2 71.2 71.3 71.3







World 48.5 48.6 48.4 48.4 48.0 47.4 47.1 47.1 47.1 47.0 47.1 47.1
Developed Economies  
and European Union
48.0 48.4 49.0 49.5 49.7 48.8 48.6 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
43.9 44.8 45.0 45.6 45.7 45.1 45.3 46.0 46.4 46.3 46.3 46.4
East Asia 66.8 63.4 62.9 62.5 61.6 61.1 60.7 60.8 60.9 60.9 60.9 60.9
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
55.6 54.6 54.7 55.4 55.8 55.9 56.0 56.4 56.6 56.5 56.6 56.6
South Asia 33.1 35.2 34.3 33.4 32.2 31.1 30.1 29.5 29.0 29.0 29.1 29.1
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
42.7 46.0 46.6 47.1 47.7 47.6 48.2 48.6 49.1 49.2 49.3 49.4
Middle East 12.8 15.2 15.0 15.0 14.3 14.5 14.3 14.6 14.7 14.9 14.9 15.0
North Africa 16.7 17.4 17.9 19.0 19.1 19.0 19.2 18.8 18.8 18.7 18.9 19.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 57.1 58.9 58.9 59.2 59.2 59.2 59.3 59.4 59.5 59.5 59.6 59.7
Note: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; CI = confidence interval.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of table A2.
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Table A6. Annual employment growth, world and regions (%)







World 1.7 1.6 1.0 0.4 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5
Developed Economies  
and European Union
0.9 1.5 0.6 -2.2 -0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
1.2 2.0 1.1 -1.3 1.4 1.8 1.1 0.0 0.2 0.3
East Asia 1.0 0.9 0.0 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.7
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
1.7 2.3 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.5 1.6 1.7
South Asia 2.3 1.0 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.8 1.9 2.0
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
2.6 2.3 2.6 0.7 2.4 2.2 2.3 1.7 1.8 2.0
Middle East 4.6 4.3 2.3 3.7 3.1 3.8 3.1 2.6 2.8 3.0
North Africa 3.3 3.6 2.9 2.0 2.4 0.6 1.9 1.6 2.0 2.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.2
Note: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; CI = confidence interval.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of table A2.











World 23 331 2.4 3.6 1.5 –1.1 3.8 2.2 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.5
Developed Economies  
and European Union
73 224 1.5 1.1 –0.5 –1.6 2.8 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
25 927 5.8 5.6 3.1 –4.9 4.3 3.8 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5
East Asia 15 929 8.1 11.2 7.9 6.7 9.2 7.3 5.8 6.0 6.0 6.1
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
10 416 4.1 4.3 2.4 –0.3 5.3 2.3 3.7 3.2 3.3 3.3
South Asia 8 116 4.8 8.0 3.3 7.1 8.4 4.9 2.6 1.9 2.0 2.1
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
23 654 1.1 3.3 1.5 –2.2 3.3 2.2 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0
Middle East 42 117 0.9 2.0 3.2 –1.7 2.1 1.2 –0.2 –0.9 –0.7 –0.5
North Africa 18 737 1.4 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.8 –4.6 3.3 –0.1 0.3 0.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 5 615 2.3 3.7 2.4 –0.3 2.4 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.7
Notes: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; CI = confidence interval. Output calculated on the basis of constant 2005 PPP-adjusted international dollars.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of Table A2.
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Table A8. Labour force participation rate by sex, world and regions (%)
Both sexes 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013*
World 65.3 65.1 65.0 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.5 64.2 64.0 63.7 63.4 63.4 63.4 63.5
Developed Economies  
and European Union
60.7 60.4 60.2 60.2 60.1 60.2 60.4 60.5 60.6 60.4 60.2 59.9 60.0 59.9
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
58.5 57.8 58.0 58.0 58.0 58.2 58.3 58.6 58.9 59.0 59.1 59.5 59.7 59.8
East Asia 76.1 75.4 74.7 73.9 73.2 72.6 72.0 71.5 71.1 70.7 70.2 70.4 70.6 70.8
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
70.4 70.7 70.4 70.6 70.6 70.4 70.2 70.2 70.2 70.3 70.3 70.4 70.4 70.4
South Asia 59.7 59.9 60.1 60.4 60.7 61.0 60.3 59.4 58.6 57.8 57.1 56.6 56.1 56.1
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
63.9 64.1 64.5 64.4 65.0 65.3 65.4 65.4 65.6 65.7 66.0 65.9 66.2 66.2
Middle East 46.5 46.6 46.9 47.3 47.7 48.2 47.9 47.8 47.2 47.5 48.0 48.4 48.7 49.0
North Africa 48.1 47.5 47.1 47.7 48.1 48.4 47.9 48.3 48.4 48.4 48.5 48.7 48.9 49.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 70.1 70.2 70.3 70.1 69.9 70.1 70.2 70.2 70.4 70.4 70.4 70.5 70.6 70.8
Males 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013*
World 78.7 78.4 78.1 77.8 77.7 77.6 77.4 77.2 77.0 76.7 76.5 76.5 76.5 76.6
Developed Economies  
and European Union
70.2 69.7 69.3 69.0 68.8 68.8 68.9 68.9 68.8 68.2 67.8 67.4 67.4 67.4
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
69.2 68.4 68.1 68.0 68.3 68.7 68.6 69.2 69.6 69.7 69.9 70.3 70.4 70.7
East Asia 82.6 81.9 81.2 80.5 79.8 79.2 78.7 78.3 77.9 77.6 77.3 77.5 77.7 77.9
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
82.7 82.9 82.7 83.0 83.1 82.6 82.3 82.1 81.9 82.0 81.9 82.0 82.0 82.0
South Asia 83.2 83.2 83.2 83.3 83.4 83.5 83.2 82.7 82.2 81.8 81.4 81.0 80.6 80.7
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
80.7 80.5 80.3 79.9 80.2 80.1 80.1 79.8 80.0 79.6 79.7 79.5 79.6 79.5
Middle East 74.3 74.1 74.0 74.0 74.0 74.2 73.8 73.6 73.0 73.4 73.9 74.3 74.7 75.0
North Africa 74.8 74.0 73.9 74.3 74.7 74.9 73.9 73.8 73.9 73.9 73.9 74.1 74.3 74.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 77.3 77.0 76.8 76.4 76.0 76.1 76.1 76.1 76.4 76.3 76.3 76.3 76.5 76.6
Females 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013*
World 51.9 51.9 51.9 51.9 51.9 52.0 51.7 51.3 51.0 50.7 50.4 50.3 50.3 50.3
Developed Economies  
and European Union
51.8 51.7 51.7 51.9 52.0 52.2 52.5 52.6 52.9 53.0 53.0 52.8 52.9 52.9
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
49.1 48.6 49.1 49.3 48.9 49.1 49.2 49.4 49.5 49.7 49.7 50.1 50.2 50.3
East Asia 69.4 68.7 67.9 67.1 66.3 65.6 65.0 64.4 63.9 63.4 62.9 63.0 63.2 63.3
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
58.5 58.9 58.5 58.5 58.5 58.6 58.5 58.7 58.9 58.9 59.0 59.1 59.2 59.2
South Asia 34.7 35.1 35.6 36.1 36.7 37.3 36.2 34.9 33.7 32.7 31.6 31.0 30.4 30.5
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
48.0 48.7 49.6 49.8 50.8 51.3 51.5 51.8 52.1 52.6 53.0 53.1 53.5 53.6
Middle East 16.3 16.7 17.2 17.8 18.4 19.0 18.7 18.6 17.8 17.9 18.3 18.5 18.7 18.9
North Africa 21.6 21.1 20.5 21.3 21.8 22.1 22.2 23.1 23.2 23.3 23.5 23.7 23.8 24.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 63.2 63.6 63.9 64.0 64.0 64.3 64.5 64.5 64.7 64.7 64.7 64.8 64.9 65.1
Notes: * 2013 are preliminary estimates. The October 2013 update version of the ILO EAPEP database (7th edition) only updates the 2012 estimates for India, 
and hence the base year for the projections.
Source: ILO, Economically Active Population Estimates and Projections (EAPEP) database, 7th edition (October 2013 update).
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Table A9. Labour force participation rate for adults and youth, world and regions (%)
Youth 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013*
World 53.2 52.6 52.1 51.6 51.4 51.2 50.5 49.8 49.2 48.5 47.7 47.6 47.3 47.4
Developed Economies  
and European Union
52.6 51.7 50.8 49.8 49.8 49.9 50.3 49.9 49.8 48.6 47.4 47.0 47.0 47.3
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
43.3 42.0 41.6 40.5 40.4 40.2 40.1 40.3 41.3 41.4 40.9 41.1 40.3 40.5
East Asia 66.3 64.4 62.6 60.9 59.5 58.2 57.3 56.6 55.9 55.2 54.2 54.7 55.1 55.1
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
56.4 56.8 55.9 55.9 55.7 55.1 54.0 53.2 52.7 52.6 52.3 52.4 52.4 52.4
South Asia 47.8 47.9 48.2 48.3 48.4 48.6 47.2 45.6 44.1 42.7 41.4 40.5 39.6 39.6
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
54.6 54.5 54.3 53.6 54.1 54.2 53.7 53.4 53.3 52.5 52.6 52.4 52.5 52.5
Middle East 32.6 32.8 32.8 33.0 33.1 33.3 32.5 31.7 30.8 30.7 30.9 31.1 31.1 31.1
North Africa 36.1 34.1 34.7 35.5 36.2 36.6 34.6 34.1 34.0 33.6 33.4 33.5 33.6 33.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 54.3 54.4 54.5 54.4 54.4 54.4 54.3 54.2 54.3 54.2 54.1 54.1 54.2 54.3
Adults 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013*
World 69.4 69.3 69.3 69.3 69.3 69.4 69.2 69.1 68.9 68.6 68.4 68.3 68.2 68.2
Developed Economies  
and European Union
62.3 62.1 62.0 62.1 62.1 62.2 62.3 62.5 62.6 62.5 62.4 62.1 62.2 62.1
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
62.9 62.4 62.7 63.2 63.1 63.5 63.5 63.8 63.8 63.7 63.8 64.2 64.3 64.2
East Asia 78.8 78.4 78.1 77.6 77.2 76.8 76.3 75.9 75.5 75.0 74.6 74.5 74.4 74.3
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
76.1 76.3 76.2 76.2 76.3 76.2 76.2 76.3 76.4 76.3 76.3 76.3 76.2 76.1
South Asia 64.9 65.1 65.3 65.6 65.9 66.2 65.7 65.1 64.4 63.8 63.2 62.8 62.3 62.3
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
67.6 67.9 68.4 68.5 69.1 69.4 69.6 69.6 69.9 70.2 70.5 70.3 70.6 70.5
Middle East 54.0 54.2 54.5 54.9 55.3 55.8 55.6 55.6 54.8 55.0 55.2 55.4 55.5 55.6
North Africa 54.0 53.9 53.1 53.5 53.7 53.8 53.9 54.6 54.6 54.7 54.7 54.7 54.8 54.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 79.0 79.1 79.1 78.9 78.6 78.8 79.0 79.1 79.3 79.3 79.2 79.3 79.4 79.5
Note: * 2013 are preliminary estimates.
Source: ILO, EAPEP database, 7th edition (October 2013 update); see also source of table A8.
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Table A10. Employment shares by sector and sex, world and regions (%)
Both sexes Agriculture Industry Services
2000 2007 2012 2013* 2000 2007 2012 2013* 2000 2007 2012 2013*
World 40.4 35.3 31.9 31.8 20.5 22.2 23.0 23.0 39.1 42.5 45.0 45.1
Developed Economies  
and European Union
5.5 3.9 3.6 3.6 27.2 25.0 22.5 22.5 67.3 71.1 73.9 73.9
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
25.3 18.8 20.1 18.3 25.1 26.1 24.0 27.1 49.6 55.1 55.9 54.6
East Asia 47.4 38.7 31.0 31.2 23.7 27.4 30.9 30.2 28.9 33.9 38.1 38.6
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
49.8 44.0 39.2 40.3 16.4 18.4 19.8 19.2 33.9 37.6 41.1 40.5
South Asia 59.5 52.9 48.5 47.2 15.6 19.6 22.2 22.9 25.0 27.6 29.3 29.9
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
21.5 17.8 15.7 15.5 21.2 22.2 21.1 20.9 57.3 60.0 63.2 63.5
Middle East 22.9 18.6 14.9 14.8 23.9 26.2 27.2 27.4 53.2 55.2 57.9 57.7
North Africa 33.8 32.6 30.1 30.0 20.1 21.6 21.5 21.1 46.1 45.9 48.3 48.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 65.5 62.6 61.1 61.3 8.1 8.7 8.9 8.9 26.3 28.7 30.0 29.9
Males Agriculture Industry Services
2000 2007 2012 2013* 2000 2007 2012 2013* 2000 2007 2012 2013*
World 38.3 33.5 30.8 31.0 24.0 26.1 26.9 26.7 37.7 40.4 42.3 42.3
Developed Economies  
and European Union
6.1 4.5 4.3 4.4 36.4 34.8 32.0 31.9 57.6 60.7 63.6 63.7
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
25.3 19.1 20.9 17.5 30.9 33.3 28.4 33.7 43.8 47.7 50.7 48.8
East Asia 41.6 34.6 28.6 29.8 26.5 30.2 33.8 32.1 31.8 35.2 37.6 38.1
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
48.7 43.4 38.4 40.8 18.4 21.0 22.5 21.4 33.0 35.6 39.1 37.8
South Asia 53.3 46.0 42.2 40.9 17.4 21.7 24.1 24.8 29.3 32.3 33.7 34.3
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
26.1 22.2 20.2 20.0 25.9 27.8 27.4 27.4 48.0 50.0 52.4 52.7
Middle East 20.8 16.2 12.8 12.7 26.0 28.4 30.1 30.4 53.2 55.4 57.1 56.8
North Africa 31.0 29.2 27.4 27.3 22.3 24.4 24.5 24.0 46.7 46.4 48.1 48.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 64.6 61.8 60.2 60.7 9.9 10.8 10.9 10.9 25.5 27.4 28.9 28.4
Females Agriculture Industry Services
2000 2007 2012 2013* 2000 2007 2012 2013* 2000 2007 2012 2013*
World 43.7 38.0 33.7 33.2 15.2 16.2 17.2 17.4 41.1 45.7 49.2 49.4
Developed Economies  
and European Union
4.7 3.2 2.8 2.7 15.5 12.9 11.1 11.2 79.7 83.9 86.1 86.1
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
25.3 18.4 19.1 19.2 17.9 17.4 18.6 19.2 56.8 64.2 62.2 61.6
East Asia 54.5 43.8 34.0 32.9 20.1 23.9 27.3 27.7 25.4 32.3 38.7 39.3
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
51.3 44.7 40.2 39.7 13.6 14.9 16.1 16.2 35.1 40.4 43.7 44.1
South Asia 75.2 70.1 66.4 64.8 11.0 14.2 16.7 17.5 13.8 15.7 17.0 17.7
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
13.8 11.2 9.2 9.1 13.5 13.8 12.1 11.7 72.7 75.1 78.7 79.2
Middle East 35.3 30.8 26.0 25.9 11.7 15.1 11.8 11.5 53.0 54.1 62.2 62.6
North Africa 44.5 44.5 40.0 39.7 11.5 11.5 11.0 10.8 44.0 44.0 49.0 49.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 66.7 63.5 62.2 61.9 6.0 6.2 6.5 6.5 27.4 30.3 31.4 31.6
Note: * 2013 are preliminary estimates.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of table A2.
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Table A11. Employment by sector and sex, world and regions (millions)
Both sexes Agriculture Industry Services
2000 2007 2012 2013* 2000 2007 2012 2013* 2000 2007 2012 2013*
World 1 056.5 1 038.1 990.9 1 001.4 536.3 652.2 714.7 724.4 1 020.6 1 249.2 1 396.9 1 419.0
Developed Economies  
and European Union
24.6 18.7 17.2 17.2 122.1 119.4 106.5 106.8 301.5 339.3 349.5 351.0
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
36.8 29.6 33.1 30.2 36.5 41.3 39.5 44.8 72.3 87.1 92.1 90.0
East Asia 355.2 309.6 254.8 258.2 177.4 219.5 254.4 250.1 216.7 271.5 313.4 319.8
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
120.6 120.4 118.5 124.0 39.6 50.4 59.9 59.0 82.1 103.2 124.3 124.5
South Asia 302.3 313.7 300.2 297.5 79.3 116.1 137.2 144.3 126.9 163.6 181.3 188.6
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
44.7 44.0 42.9 43.2 44.2 54.8 57.7 58.3 119.1 148.4 172.6 176.9
Middle East 9.5 10.5 9.9 10.1 9.9 14.8 18.0 18.7 22.0 31.2 38.3 39.3
North Africa 15.0 18.0 18.3 18.6 8.9 11.9 13.1 13.0 20.5 25.3 29.3 30.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 147.9 173.6 195.9 202.4 18.4 24.1 28.4 29.3 59.5 79.7 96.2 98.6
Males Agriculture Industry Services
2000 2007 2012 2013* 2000 2007 2012 2013* 2000 2007 2012 2013*
World 602.5 591.9 578.0 589.0 378.2 461.7 504.4 508.7 594.0 713.0 794.1 804.9
Developed Economies  
and European Union
15.2 11.9 11.2 11.4 91.6 91.9 82.6 82.7 145.0 160.2 164.3 165.1
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
20.3 16.5 18.9 15.9 24.8 28.8 25.7 30.6 35.3 41.3 45.9 44.3
East Asia 171.8 154.3 131.8 138.3 109.6 134.5 155.4 149.1 131.4 156.8 173.2 176.5
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
68.1 68.5 66.7 72.0 25.7 33.1 39.1 37.8 46.1 56.2 67.8 66.6
South Asia 194.9 195.0 192.3 189.8 63.6 92.1 110.1 115.2 107.2 137.0 153.7 159.2
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
33.9 33.0 32.7 32.8 33.6 41.3 44.2 44.9 62.2 74.4 84.6 86.5
Middle East 7.3 7.7 7.2 7.3 9.2 13.4 16.8 17.4 18.7 26.2 31.8 32.5
North Africa 11.0 12.5 13.0 13.2 7.9 10.5 11.6 11.6 16.5 19.9 22.8 23.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 80.0 92.6 104.2 108.4 12.3 16.1 18.9 19.4 31.6 41.0 49.9 50.6
Females Agriculture Industry Services
2000 2007 2012 2013* 2000 2007 2012 2013* 2000 2007 2012 2013*
World 454.1 446.2 412.9 412.4 158.1 190.5 210.3 215.7 426.6 536.2 602.9 614.1
Developed Economies  
and European Union
9.3 6.8 5.9 5.8 30.5 27.4 23.9 24.1 156.5 179.1 185.2 185.9
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
16.5 13.1 14.2 14.3 11.7 12.4 13.8 14.2 37.1 45.8 46.2 45.8
East Asia 183.4 155.3 123.0 119.9 67.8 84.9 99.0 101.1 85.3 114.6 140.1 143.3
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
52.5 51.9 51.8 52.0 14.0 17.3 20.8 21.2 36.0 46.9 56.5 57.9
South Asia 107.4 118.6 107.9 107.7 15.7 24.0 27.1 29.2 19.7 26.6 27.6 29.4
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
10.8 11.0 10.3 10.4 10.6 13.6 13.5 13.4 56.9 74.0 88.0 90.3
Middle East 2.2 2.8 2.7 2.8 0.7 1.4 1.2 1.2 3.3 5.0 6.5 6.8
North Africa 4.0 5.5 5.3 5.4 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.5 4.0 5.4 6.6 6.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 67.9 81.0 91.7 94.1 6.1 8.0 9.5 9.8 27.9 38.7 46.3 48.1
Notes: * 2013 are preliminary estimates. Totals may differ due to rounding.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of table A2.
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Table A12. Vulnerable employment shares by sex, world and regions (%)
Both sexes 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2018*
World 52.4 51.3 50.7 50.2 49.1 49.0 49.1 48.5 48.0 47.8 46.8
Developed Economies  
and European Union
11.3 10.9 10.6 10.4 10.2 10.1 10.3 10.1 10.1 10.0 9.5
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
22.6 21.3 20.3 19.7 19.5 19.9 20.1 19.7 19.3 19.2 18.6
East Asia 57.5 54.1 53.6 52.6 50.3 48.8 48.6 47.6 46.5 45.8 42.6
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
65.6 61.9 61.6 61.3 61.4 60.6 60.7 60.2 59.7 59.0 56.6
South Asia 80.9 80.7 80.2 79.8 78.5 78.6 78.5 77.3 76.4 76.1 74.5
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
35.4 33.5 32.5 31.8 31.5 31.7 31.8 31.7 31.7 31.6 30.8
Middle East 32.2 30.1 29.0 28.5 26.8 26.7 25.8 25.4 25.4 25.2 24.7
North Africa 39.1 40.8 39.5 39.7 36.7 37.3 36.3 36.0 35.8 35.6 34.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 79.9 78.0 77.8 77.6 77.2 77.8 77.7 77.6 77.6 77.4 76.4
Males 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2018*
World 50.5 49.6 49.3 48.8 47.8 48.0 48.1 47.5 47.1 46.9 45.9
Developed Economies  
and European Union
11.9 12.0 11.7 11.6 11.4 11.4 11.7 11.3 11.4 11.3 10.9
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
22.8 21.9 20.8 19.9 19.6 20.1 20.0 19.6 19.2 19.1 18.5
East Asia 52.2 49.1 48.5 47.8 45.8 44.8 44.6 43.7 42.9 42.3 39.7
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
61.9 58.5 58.3 57.6 58.2 57.4 57.5 57.1 56.6 56.0 53.8
South Asia 77.9 77.9 78.1 77.7 76.5 76.7 76.6 75.5 74.7 74.4 72.8
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
35.1 33.4 32.3 31.6 31.1 31.4 31.6 31.5 31.7 31.6 30.7
Middle East 30.3 27.7 26.8 26.4 25.1 25.1 24.4 24.1 23.9 23.7 23.1
North Africa 35.1 36.4 35.1 34.8 31.3 32.1 30.8 30.5 30.4 30.2 29.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 74.2 71.0 70.8 70.8 70.1 71.0 70.9 70.8 70.7 70.5 69.1
Females 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2018*
World 55.3 53.8 52.9 52.4 51.0 50.6 50.5 49.9 49.3 49.1 48.2
Developed Economies  
and European Union
10.5 9.5 9.2 9.0 8.8 8.6 8.7 8.5 8.5 8.3 7.9
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
22.3 20.5 19.7 19.4 19.3 19.6 20.2 19.9 19.3 19.3 18.7
East Asia 64.0 60.4 59.8 58.7 55.8 53.9 53.7 52.5 51.2 50.3 46.4
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
70.7 66.6 66.2 66.3 65.7 64.8 65.0 64.4 63.9 63.1 60.4
South Asia 88.7 87.4 85.3 85.1 83.6 83.8 83.8 82.4 81.1 80.9 79.2
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
36.0 33.6 32.8 32.2 32.0 32.1 32.0 32.0 31.7 31.6 30.9
Middle East 43.3 41.8 40.2 39.2 35.7 35.0 33.7 32.9 33.3 33.2 32.7
North Africa 55.0 57.9 56.1 56.9 55.4 55.6 55.4 55.3 54.8 54.7 53.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 86.9 86.1 85.9 85.7 85.4 85.8 85.7 85.6 85.6 85.5 85.1
Note: * 2013–18 are projections.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of table A2.
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Table A13. Vulnerable employment by sex, world and regions (millions)
Both sexes 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2018*
World 1369.7 1460.0 1467.3 1475.8 1458.2 1462.0 1480.5 1483.8 1489.1 1502.5 1566.2
Developed Economies  
and European Union
50.7 50.3 49.9 49.8 49.0 47.6 48.4 47.3 47.7 47.4 46.3
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
32.9 32.7 31.5 31.1 31.2 31.3 32.2 32.2 31.7 31.6 30.9
East Asia 430.7 425.4 425.0 421.4 402.3 392.2 392.7 388.2 382.6 379.2 358.5
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
159.1 163.0 165.0 167.9 171.5 172.3 176.2 178.7 180.8 181.4 187.0
South Asia 411.5 469.0 471.3 473.7 468.0 471.8 475.9 473.6 472.5 480.0 513.8
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
73.7 78.8 78.5 78.7 79.8 80.9 83.1 84.7 86.7 88.0 92.9
Middle East 13.3 15.7 15.7 16.1 15.5 16.0 16.0 16.3 16.8 17.2 19.0
North Africa 17.4 21.2 21.0 21.9 20.8 21.6 21.5 21.4 21.7 22.1 23.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 180.5 204.1 209.3 215.3 220.2 228.3 234.5 241.3 248.6 255.7 294.0
Males 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2018*
World 795.7 847.0 855.6 861.7 855.2 862.4 876.5 879.3 884.4 892.8 931.8
Developed Economies  
and European Union
30.1 30.8 30.5 30.6 30.1 29.2 29.8 29.1 29.5 29.3 28.9
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
18.3 18.5 17.7 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.6 17.6 17.4 17.3 17.0
East Asia 215.4 214.0 214.1 213.1 204.5 201.1 201.7 199.7 197.4 196.1 187.7
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
86.6 89.2 90.4 90.9 93.4 93.7 96.0 97.2 98.3 98.7 101.9
South Asia 284.9 319.5 326.0 329.6 328.5 333.8 340.0 339.8 340.6 345.6 367.8
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
45.5 47.6 47.1 46.9 47.3 47.8 49.1 49.9 51.3 51.9 54.5
Middle East 10.7 12.1 12.2 12.5 12.3 12.7 12.7 13.0 13.3 13.6 14.9
North Africa 12.4 15.0 14.7 14.9 13.8 14.5 14.2 14.2 14.4 14.6 15.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 91.9 100.5 102.9 105.9 108.0 112.3 115.4 118.8 122.4 125.7 143.7
Females 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2018*
World 574.0 613.0 611.7 614.2 603.0 599.6 604.0 604.5 604.7 609.7 634.4
Developed Economies  
and European Union
20.7 19.5 19.4 19.3 18.9 18.4 18.6 18.2 18.2 18.0 17.4
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
14.5 14.2 13.8 13.9 13.9 14.0 14.6 14.6 14.4 14.3 13.9
East Asia 215.3 211.3 210.9 208.3 197.8 191.1 191.0 188.5 185.2 183.1 170.8
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
72.5 73.7 74.6 77.0 78.2 78.6 80.3 81.5 82.5 82.7 85.1
South Asia 126.7 149.5 145.3 144.0 139.4 137.9 135.9 133.8 131.9 134.4 146.0
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
28.2 31.2 31.4 31.8 32.5 33.1 34.0 34.9 35.4 36.1 38.4
Middle East 2.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.6 4.1
North Africa 5.0 6.2 6.3 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.5 8.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 88.6 103.6 106.4 109.4 112.1 116.0 119.1 122.5 126.2 130.0 150.4
Notes: * 2013–18 are projections. Totals may differ due to rounding.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of table A2.
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Table A14a. Working poor indicators, world and regions (US$ 1.25 a day)
Both sexes
 
Numbers of people (millions) Share in total employment (%)
2000 2007 2011 2012* 2013* 2018* 2000 2007 2011 2012* 2013* 2018*
World 692.9 490.9 406.3 385.0 374.7 284.7 26.5 16.7 13.3 12.4 11.9 8.5
Central and South-
Eastern Europe  
(non-EU) and CIS
6.6 2.8 2.0 1.8 1.6 0.9 4.6 1.8 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.6
East Asia 232.8 94.7 58.0 47.3 43.1 19.4 31.1 11.8 7.1 5.7 5.2 2.3
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
83.0 49.2 36.9 34.0 34.4 24.7 34.2 18.0 12.4 11.2 11.2 7.5
South Asia 224.5 201.1 167.2 160.7 155.0 111.9 44.2 33.9 27.3 26.0 24.6 16.2
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
16.4 10.6 8.9 8.7 8.5 6.9 7.9 4.3 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.3
Middle East 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.8
North Africa 3.1 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 6.9 3.9 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 125.9 129.5 130.6 130.0 129.6 118.6 55.8 46.7 42.0 40.5 39.2 30.8
* 2012–18 are projections.
Note: Totals may differ due to rounding.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of Table A2.
Table A14b. Working poor indicators, world and regions (US$ 2 a day)
Both sexes
 
Numbers of people (millions) Share in total employment (%)
2000 2007 2011 2012* 2013* 2018* 2000 2007 2011 2012* 2013* 2018*
World 1199.2 989.5 878.1 851.0 839.0 736.2 45.9 33.7 28.7 27.4 26.7 22.0
Central and South-
Eastern Europe  
(non-EU) and CIS
17.9 8.1 6.7 6.4 6.0 4.7 12.3 5.1 4.1 3.9 3.6 2.8
East Asia 412.9 224.1 144.6 123.5 111.6 52.4 55.1 28.0 17.7 15.0 13.5 6.2
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
150.9 114.8 98.9 94.8 93.9 75.9 62.3 41.9 33.3 31.3 30.5 23.0
South Asia 399.4 414.6 392.8 389.0 387.8 359.8 78.5 69.9 64.1 62.9 61.5 52.2
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
33.4 22.6 19.1 18.9 18.5 15.9 16.0 9.1 7.2 6.9 6.7 5.3
Middle East 3.8 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 4.9 9.3 8.7 7.6 7.5 7.4 6.4
North Africa 10.6 9.2 8.9 8.8 8.8 8.6 23.8 16.7 14.9 14.6 14.2 12.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 170.3 191.1 202.2 204.6 207.4 214.0 75.4 68.9 65.0 63.8 62.8 55.6
Notes: * 2012–18 are projections. Totals may differ due to rounding.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of Table A2.
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Table A15a. Employment by economic class in developing world and regions, both sexes
















middle class  
and above 
(above US$13)
Developing world 1991 810.6 424.0 275.0 242.1 88.9
2001 674.8 513.5 518.9 404.1 95.1
2011 406.3 471.7 669.4 787.2 255.5
2012* 385.0 466.0 674.9 823.3 280.2
2018* 284.7 451.5 688.3 984.8 448.8
Central and South-
Eastern Europe  
(non-EU) and CIS
1991 3.6 7.2 23.2 69.6 43.3
2001 6.1 10.6 34.4 72.4 22.4
2011 2.0 4.7 18.5 82.7 55.2
2012* 1.8 4.6 18.4 83.0 56.9
2018* 0.9 3.8 15.6 82.9 62.7
East Asia 1991 374.8 176.1 83.0 34.2 3.9
2001 217.8 175.9 212.2 136.2 13.8
2011 58.0 86.6 222.6 367.9 80.7
2012* 47.3 76.3 214.1 387.5 97.5
2018* 19.4 33.1 137.0 436.8 214.3
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
1991 93.7 49.7 29.0 20.2 3.3
2001 74.6 70.6 58.5 35.2 7.4
2011 36.9 62.0 105.1 75.1 17.8
2012* 34.0 60.8 108.1 80.4 19.4
2018* 24.7 51.2 118.6 105.3 30.5
South Asia 1991 225.1 134.2 54.1 5.3 2.0
2001 228.2 180.8 99.8 13.8 1.8
2011 167.2 225.6 174.2 41.7 3.9
2012* 160.7 228.3 180.1 45.1 4.4
2018* 111.9 247.9 232.2 88.1 9.6
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
1991 13.6 14.3 37.6 73.6 25.3
2001 17.4 18.0 47.5 93.5 36.5
2011 8.9 10.2 42.0 131.7 74.4
2012* 8.7 10.2 42.4 134.9 77.1
2018* 6.9 8.9 40.8 147.2 97.6
Middle East 1991 0.7 2.8 7.7 14.1 5.4
2001 0.7 3.4 11.6 20.2 7.3
2011 0.7 4.1 14.0 31.0 14.2
2012* 0.8 4.2 14.7 31.8 14.7
2018* 0.6 4.3 16.8 36.6 18.8
North Africa 1991 3.5 7.0 13.5 9.9 1.6
2001 3.0 7.5 19.3 14.2 1.2
2011 1.9 7.0 26.8 22.5 1.5
2012* 1.9 6.9 26.9 23.2 1.8
2018* 1.6 7.0 28.6 28.1 3.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 1991 95.5 32.7 26.9 15.3 4.1
2001 127.0 46.7 35.6 18.6 4.6
2011 130.6 71.6 66.2 34.7 7.8
2012* 130.0 74.7 70.2 37.4 8.3
2018* 118.6 95.4 98.6 59.7 12.3
Notes: * 2012–18 are projections. Totals may differ due to rounding.
Source: October 2013 update of the model in: Kapsos, S. and E. Bourmpoula (2013). Employment and Economic Class in the Developing World.  
ILO Research Paper No 6.
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Table A15b. Employment shares by economic class in developing world and regions, both sexes
















middle class  
and above 
(above US$13)
Developing world 1991 44.0 23.0 14.9 13.2 4.8
2001 30.6 23.3 23.5 18.3 4.3
2011 15.7 18.2 25.8 30.4 9.9
2012* 14.6 17.7 25.7 31.3 10.7
2018* 10.0 15.8 24.1 34.5 15.7
Central and South-
Eastern Europe  
(non-EU) and CIS
1991 2.5 4.9 15.8 47.4 29.5
2001 4.2 7.3 23.6 49.6 15.3
2011 1.2 2.9 11.3 50.7 33.8
2012* 1.1 2.8 11.2 50.4 34.6
2018* 0.6 2.3 9.4 50.0 37.8
East Asia 1991 55.8 26.2 12.3 5.1 0.6
2001 28.8 23.3 28.1 18.0 1.8
2011 7.1 10.6 27.3 45.1 9.9
2012* 5.7 9.3 26.0 47.1 11.9
2018* 2.3 3.9 16.3 52.0 25.5
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
1991 47.9 25.4 14.8 10.3 1.7
2001 30.3 28.6 23.7 14.3 3.0
2011 12.4 20.9 35.4 25.3 6.0
2012* 11.2 20.1 35.7 26.5 6.4
2018* 7.5 15.5 35.9 31.9 9.2
South Asia 1991 53.5 31.9 12.9 1.3 0.5
2001 43.5 34.5 19.0 2.6 0.3
2011 27.3 36.8 28.4 6.8 0.6
2012* 26.0 36.9 29.1 7.3 0.7
2018* 16.2 35.9 33.7 12.8 1.4
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
1991 8.3 8.7 22.9 44.8 15.4
2001 8.1 8.5 22.3 43.9 17.2
2011 3.3 3.8 15.7 49.3 27.8
2012* 3.2 3.7 15.5 49.4 28.2
2018* 2.3 3.0 13.5 48.8 32.4
Middle East 1991 2.4 9.2 25.1 45.7 17.6
2001 1.5 7.9 26.8 46.7 17.0
2011 1.1 6.4 21.9 48.4 22.2
2012* 1.2 6.4 22.2 48.0 22.2
2018* 0.8 5.6 21.8 47.5 24.4
North Africa 1991 9.8 19.8 38.1 27.9 4.4
2001 6.5 16.5 42.8 31.5 2.7
2011 3.2 11.7 45.0 37.7 2.5
2012* 3.1 11.4 44.3 38.3 2.9
2018* 2.4 10.2 41.9 41.1 4.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 1991 54.7 18.7 15.4 8.8 2.4
2001 54.6 20.1 15.3 8.0 2.0
2011 42.0 23.0 21.3 11.1 2.5
2012* 40.5 23.3 21.9 11.7 2.6
2018* 30.8 24.8 25.6 15.5 3.2
Notes: * 2012–18 are projections. Totals may differ due to rounding.
Source: October 2013 update of the model in: Kapsos, S. and E. Bourmpoula (2013). Employment and Economic Class in the Developing World.  
ILO Research Paper No 6.
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Table P1. Unemployment 2007–18 (rates)
Region Rate (%)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
World 5.5 5.6 6.2 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.0
Developed Economies  
and European Union
5.8 6.1 8.4 8.8 8.4 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.4 8.2 8.0 7.9
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
8.2 8.1 9.9 9.2 8.5 8.0 8.2 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.1
East Asia 3.8 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.9 5.0
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
5.5 5.2 5.1 4.7 4.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4
South Asia 4.1 4.1 4.2 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
6.9 6.5 7.5 7.3 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.4
Middle East 10.2 10.1 10.3 11.1 10.8 10.9 10.9 11.0 10.9 10.8 10.8 10.7
North Africa 11.1 10.5 10.6 10.4 11.8 12.1 12.2 12.2 12.1 12.1 12.1 12.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 7.5 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
Region
 
Change from 2007 (percentage points)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
World 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Developed Economies  
and European Union
0.3 2.6 3.0 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.1
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
–0.1 1.7 1.0 0.3 –0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.1 –0.1
East Asia 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2
South-East Asia and the Pacific –0.2 –0.4 –0.8 –1.1 –1.3 –1.2 –1.2 –1.2 –1.2 –1.1 –1.1
South Asia 0.1 0.1 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Latin America and the Caribbean –0.4 0.6 0.4 –0.2 –0.3 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.5 –0.5 –0.5
Middle East –0.1 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5
North Africa –0.5 –0.5 –0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Note: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections; the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval are shown in the figures in Annex 3.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of table A2 and Annex 5.
Annex 2. Unemployment projections
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Table P2. Unemployment 2007–18 (numbers of people)
Region Number (millions)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
World 170.0 177.0 197.9 195.2 193.9 196.9 201.8 206.0 208.8 211.0 213.1 215.2
Developed Economies  
and European Union
29.4 31.1 42.9 45.0 43.4 44.5 44.7 44.7 44.0 43.1 42.2 41.6
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
14.2 14.2 17.4 16.2 15.2 14.3 14.8 14.9 14.8 14.8 14.7 14.7
East Asia 31.4 36.2 37.1 35.5 36.8 38.1 39.4 40.6 41.8 42.8 43.7 44.4
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
15.8 15.4 15.3 14.3 13.6 13.1 13.6 13.9 14.2 14.5 14.8 15.0
South Asia 25.1 25.8 26.3 24.3 24.4 25.0 26.0 26.9 27.7 28.2 28.7 29.2
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
18.4 17.5 20.8 20.6 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.7 19.9 20.2 20.4 20.7
Middle East 6.4 6.5 6.9 7.7 7.8 8.1 8.3 8.6 8.8 8.9 9.1 9.2
North Africa 6.9 6.7 6.8 6.9 8.0 8.4 8.6 8.8 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 22.4 23.7 24.4 24.8 25.5 26.3 27.2 27.9 28.7 29.4 30.2 31.1
Region
 
Change from 2007 (millions)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
World 7.1 28.0 25.3 24.0 27.0 31.8 36.1 38.8 41.0 43.1 45.2
Developed Economies  
and European Union
1.7 13.5 15.6 14.0 15.1 15.4 15.3 14.7 13.7 12.9 12.2
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
0.0 3.3 2.0 1.1 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5
East Asia 4.8 5.7 4.1 5.4 6.8 8.0 9.3 10.4 11.4 12.3 13.0
South-East Asia and the Pacific –0.4 –0.5 –1.5 –2.3 –2.8 –2.3 –2.0 –1.6 –1.4 –1.1 –0.8
South Asia 0.6 1.1 –0.9 –0.8 –0.2 0.8 1.8 2.5 3.1 3.6 4.0
Latin America and the Caribbean –0.8 2.4 2.2 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.3
Middle East 0.0 0.4 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.8
North Africa –0.2 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.3 2.0 2.4 3.1 3.8 4.7 5.5 6.2 7.0 7.8 8.6
Note: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections; the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval are shown in the figures in Annex 3.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of table A2 and Annex 5.
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Table P3. Unemployment 2007–18 (rates), downside scenario
Region Rate (%)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
World 5.5 5.6 6.2 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.2
Developed Economies  
and European Union
5.8 6.1 8.4 8.8 8.4 8.6 8.6 8.7 8.6 8.6 8.5 8.4
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
8.2 8.1 9.9 9.2 8.5 8.0 8.2 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3
East Asia 3.8 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.0
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
5.5 5.2 5.1 4.7 4.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.5
South Asia 4.1 4.1 4.2 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
6.9 6.5 7.5 7.3 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Middle East 10.2 10.1 10.3 11.1 10.8 10.9 10.9 11.0 11.0 10.9 10.9 10.8
North Africa 11.1 10.5 10.6 10.4 11.8 12.1 12.2 12.2 12.1 12.1 12.1 12.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 7.5 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.5
Region
 
Change from 2007 (percentage points)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
World 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Developed Economies  
and European Union
0.3 2.6 3.0 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.6
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
–0.1 1.7 1.0 0.3 –0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
East Asia 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
South-East Asia and the Pacific –0.2 –0.4 –0.8 –1.1 –1.3 –1.2 –1.2 –1.1 –1.1 –1.0 –1.0
South Asia 0.1 0.1 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.1 –0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Latin America and the Caribbean –0.4 0.6 0.4 –0.2 –0.3 –0.4 –0.3 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4
Middle East –0.1 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6
North Africa –0.5 –0.5 –0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Note: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections based on the downside scenario; the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval  
are available upon request.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of table A2 and Annex 5.
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Table P4. Unemployment 2007–18 (numbers of people), downside scenario
Region Number (millions)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
World 170.0 177.0 197.9 195.2 193.9 196.9 201.8 206.7 210.7 214.2 217.2 220.0
Developed Economies  
and European Union
29.4 31.1 42.9 45.0 43.4 44.5 44.7 45.1 45.1 44.9 44.7 44.4
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
14.2 14.2 17.4 16.2 15.2 14.3 14.8 15.0 15.0 15.1 15.1 15.0
East Asia 31.4 36.2 37.1 35.5 36.8 38.1 39.4 40.6 41.8 42.9 43.8 44.5
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
15.8 15.4 15.3 14.3 13.6 13.1 13.6 13.9 14.3 14.7 15.1 15.5
South Asia 25.1 25.8 26.3 24.3 24.4 25.0 26.0 26.8 27.8 28.4 29.1 29.6
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
18.4 17.5 20.8 20.6 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.9 20.1 20.5 20.7 21.0
Middle East 6.4 6.5 6.9 7.7 7.8 8.1 8.3 8.6 8.8 9.0 9.2 9.3
North Africa 6.9 6.7 6.8 6.9 8.0 8.4 8.6 8.8 8.9 9.1 9.2 9.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 22.4 23.7 24.4 24.8 25.5 26.3 27.2 27.9 28.7 29.6 30.4 31.3
Region
 
Change from 2007 (millions)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
World 7.1 28.0 25.3 24.0 27.0 31.8 36.7 40.7 44.2 47.3 50.1
Developed Economies  
and European Union
1.7 13.5 15.6 14.0 15.1 15.4 15.8 15.8 15.6 15.3 15.0
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
0.0 3.3 2.0 1.1 0.1 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
East Asia 4.8 5.7 4.1 5.4 6.8 8.0 9.3 10.5 11.5 12.4 13.2
South-East Asia and the Pacific –0.4 –0.5 –1.5 –2.3 –2.8 –2.3 –1.9 –1.5 –1.1 –0.7 –0.4
South Asia 0.6 1.1 –0.9 –0.8 –0.2 0.8 1.6 2.6 3.3 3.9 4.5
Latin America and the Caribbean –0.8 2.4 2.2 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.7
Middle East 0.0 0.4 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.9
North Africa –0.2 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.3 2.0 2.4 3.1 3.8 4.7 5.5 6.3 7.1 8.0 8.8
Note: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections based on the downside scenario; the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval  
are available upon request.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of table A2 and Annex 5.
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Table P5. Youth unemployment 2007–18 (rates)
Region Rate (%)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
World 11.6 12.0 12.9 12.9 12.7 12.9 13.1 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2
Developed Economies  
and European Union
12.5 13.3 17.4 18.1 17.6 18.0 18.3 18.0 17.4 16.8 16.3 16.0
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
17.5 16.9 20.0 19.0 17.9 17.5 18.0 18.1 18.1 18.0 18.0 18.0
East Asia 8.0 9.2 9.4 9.1 9.4 9.7 10.1 10.5 10.8 11.1 11.4 11.6
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
14.8 14.1 13.9 14.5 12.9 12.7 13.0 13.3 13.5 13.6 13.8 14.0
South Asia 9.2 9.5 9.8 9.7 9.7 10.1 10.2 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
14.1 13.6 15.5 15.0 14.3 13.8 13.6 13.5 13.4 13.3 13.2 13.1
Middle East 23.9 24.1 23.7 26.2 26.0 26.6 27.2 27.9 28.2 28.4 28.5 28.6
North Africa 24.2 23.7 23.9 23.7 28.1 29.2 29.4 29.5 29.5 29.5 29.5 29.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 11.7 12.1 12.1 12.0 11.9 11.9 11.9 11.8 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7
Region
 
Change from 2007 (percentage points)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
World 0.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Developed Economies  
and European Union
0.8 4.9 5.6 5.1 5.6 5.8 5.5 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.5
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
–0.6 2.6 1.5 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
East Asia 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.6
South-East Asia and the Pacific –0.7 –0.9 –0.3 –1.9 –2.1 –1.8 –1.5 –1.3 –1.2 –1.0 –0.8
South Asia 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3
Latin America and the Caribbean –0.6 1.4 0.9 0.2 –0.3 –0.5 –0.6 –0.8 –0.9 –1.0 –1.0
Middle East 0.2 –0.2 2.4 2.1 2.7 3.4 4.0 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.7
North Africa –0.5 –0.3 –0.6 3.8 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.1
Note: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections; the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval are shown in the figures in Annex 3.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of table A2 and Annex 5.
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Table P6. Youth unemployment 2007–18 (numbers of people)
Region Number (millions)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
World 70.1 71.8 76.0 74.9 73.5 73.8 74.5 74.5 74.2 73.8 73.5 73.4
Developed Economies  
and European Union
8.1 8.6 10.9 11.0 10.5 10.7 10.9 10.6 10.2 9.8 9.5 9.3
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
4.6 4.5 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.5
East Asia 12.0 13.6 13.6 12.7 12.8 12.8 12.7 12.5 12.2 11.9 11.7 11.4
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
8.6 8.1 7.9 8.3 7.4 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.9 8.0
South Asia 12.7 12.8 12.9 12.5 12.3 12.6 12.9 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.3 13.4
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
8.0 7.7 8.7 8.5 8.1 7.9 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7
Middle East 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5
North Africa 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 9.6 10.2 10.4 10.6 10.8 11.0 11.3 11.5 11.8 12.1 12.4 12.7
Region
 
Change from 2007 (millions)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
World 1.8 6.0 4.8 3.4 3.7 4.4 4.5 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.3
Developed Economies  
and European Union
0.5 2.8 2.9 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.2
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
–0.1 0.7 0.2 –0.2 –0.5 –0.5 –0.6 –0.7 –0.8 –1.0 –1.0
East Asia 1.6 1.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.2 –0.1 –0.3 –0.6
South-East Asia and the Pacific –0.5 –0.7 –0.3 –1.2 –1.3 –1.1 –0.9 –0.8 –0.7 –0.6 –0.6
South Asia 0.2 0.2 –0.2 –0.3 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7
Latin America and the Caribbean –0.3 0.7 0.5 0.0 –0.2 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4
Middle East 0.0 –0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
North Africa –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.0
Note: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections; the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval are shown in the figures in Annex 3.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of table A2 and Annex 5.
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Table P7. Youth unemployment 2007–18 (rates), downside scenario
Region Rate (%)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
World 11.6 12.0 12.9 12.9 12.7 12.9 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.5
Developed Economies  
and European Union
12.5 13.3 17.4 18.1 17.6 18.0 18.3 18.1 17.9 17.6 17.4 17.2
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
17.5 16.9 20.0 19.0 17.9 17.5 18.0 18.2 18.3 18.4 18.5 18.6
East Asia 8.0 9.2 9.4 9.1 9.4 9.7 10.1 10.5 10.8 11.1 11.4 11.6
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
14.8 14.1 13.9 14.5 12.9 12.7 13.0 13.3 13.7 14.0 14.3 14.5
South Asia 9.2 9.5 9.8 9.7 9.7 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.5 10.5 10.6 10.6
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
14.1 13.6 15.5 15.0 14.3 13.8 13.6 13.6 13.5 13.4 13.4 13.3
Middle East 23.9 24.1 23.7 26.2 26.0 26.6 27.2 27.9 28.4 28.6 28.8 29.0
North Africa 24.2 23.7 23.9 23.7 28.1 29.2 29.4 29.5 29.5 29.6 29.6 29.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 11.7 12.1 12.1 12.0 11.9 11.9 11.9 11.8 11.8 11.8 11.8 11.8
Region
 
Change from 2007 (percentage points)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
World 0.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9
Developed Economies  
and European Union
0.8 4.9 5.6 5.1 5.6 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.1 4.9 4.7
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
–0.6 2.6 1.5 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1
East Asia 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.8 3.1 3.4 3.6
South-East Asia and the Pacific –0.7 –0.9 –0.3 –1.9 –2.1 –1.8 –1.5 –1.1 –0.8 –0.5 –0.3
South Asia 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4
Latin America and the Caribbean –0.6 1.4 0.9 0.2 –0.3 –0.5 –0.5 –0.7 –0.7 –0.8 –0.8
Middle East 0.2 –0.2 2.4 2.1 2.7 3.4 4.0 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.1
North Africa –0.5 –0.3 –0.6 3.8 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Note: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections based on the downside scenario; the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval  
are available upon request.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of table A2 and Annex 5.
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Table P8. Youth unemployment 2007–18 (numbers of people), downside scenario
Region Number (millions)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
World 70.1 71.8 76.0 74.9 73.5 73.8 74.5 74.7 74.9 74.9 75.0 75.1
Developed Economies  
and European Union
8.1 8.6 10.9 11.0 10.5 10.7 10.9 10.7 10.5 10.3 10.2 10.0
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
4.6 4.5 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6
East Asia 12.0 13.6 13.6 12.7 12.8 12.8 12.7 12.5 12.2 12.0 11.7 11.5
South-East Asia  
and the Pacific
8.6 8.1 7.9 8.3 7.4 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.9 8.1 8.2 8.3
South Asia 12.7 12.8 12.9 12.5 12.3 12.6 12.9 13.1 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6
Latin America  
and the Caribbean
8.0 7.7 8.7 8.5 8.1 7.9 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8
Middle East 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
North Africa 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 9.6 10.2 10.4 10.6 10.8 11.0 11.3 11.6 11.8 12.1 12.5 12.8
Region
 
Change from 2007 (millions)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014 p 2015 p 2016 p 2017 p 2018 p
World 1.8 6.0 4.8 3.4 3.7 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.9 4.9 5.0
Developed Economies  
and European Union
0.5 2.8 2.9 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9
Central and South-Eastern  
Europe (non-EU) and CIS
–0.1 0.7 0.2 –0.2 –0.5 –0.5 –0.6 –0.7 –0.8 –0.8 –0.9
East Asia 1.6 1.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.0 –0.3 –0.5
South-East Asia and the Pacific –0.5 –0.7 –0.3 –1.2 –1.3 –1.1 –0.9 –0.7 –0.5 –0.4 –0.2
South Asia 0.2 0.2 –0.2 –0.3 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Latin America and the Caribbean –0.3 0.7 0.5 0.0 –0.2 –0.3 –0.2 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.2
Middle East 0.0 –0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
North Africa –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.2
Note: * 2013 are preliminary estimates; 2014–18 are projections based on the downside scenario; the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval  
are available upon request.
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2013; see also source of table A2 and Annex 5.
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Annex 3. Global and regional figures
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Annex 4. Note on global and regional estimates
The source of all global and regional labour market estimates in this Global Employment 
Trends report is ILO, Trends econometric models, October 2013. The ILO Employment Trends 
Unit has designed and actively maintains econometric models which are used to produce esti-
mates of labour market indicators in the countries and years for which country-reported data 
are unavailable. These give the ILO the ability to produce and analyse global and regional 
estimates of key labour market indicators and the related trends.
The Global Employment Trends Model (GET Model) is used to produce estimates – dis-
aggregated by age and sex as appropriate  –  of unemployment, employment, status in 
employment and employment by sector. The output of the model is a complete matrix of data 
for 178 countries. The country-level data can then be aggregated to produce regional and 
global estimates of labour market indicators such as the unemployment rate, the employment-
to-population ratio, sector-level employment shares, status in employment shares and vulner-
able employment.
Prior to running the GET Model, labour market information specialists in the 
Employment Trends Unit, in cooperation with specialists in ILO field offices, evaluate 
existing country-reported data and select only those observations deemed sufficiently com-
parable across countries – with criteria including: (1) type of data source; (2) geographic cov-
erage; and (3) age group coverage.
yy With regard to the first criterion, in order for data to be included in the model, they must 
be derived from either a labour force survey or population census. National labour force 
surveys are typically similar across countries, and the data derived from these surveys are 
more comparable than data obtained from other sources. A strict preference is therefore 
given to labour force survey-based data in the selection process. Yet many developing coun-
tries without adequate resources to carry out a labour force survey do report labour market 
information based on population censuses. Consequently, due to the need to balance the 
competing goals of data comparability and data coverage, some population census-based 
data are included in the model.
yy The second criterion is that only nationally representative (i.e. not prohibitively geograph-
ically limited) labour market indicators are included. Observations corresponding to only 
urban or only rural areas are not included, as large differences typically exist between rural 
and urban labour markets, and using only rural or urban data would not be consistent with 
benchmark files such as GDP.
yy The third criterion is that the age groups covered by the observed data must be sufficiently 
comparable across countries. Countries report labour market information for a variety of 
age groups and the age group selected can have an influence on the observed value of a given 
labour market indicator.
Apart from country-reported labour market information, the GET Model uses the following 
benchmark files:
yy United Nations World Population Prospects, 2012 revision for population estimates and 
projections.
yy ILO Economically Active Population, Estimates and Projections (EAPEP, July 2013 edi-
tion) for labour force estimates and projections.29
29 This database was updated in October 2013 to include the 2012 observation for India. The projections afterwards use 
the same trend as in the ILO-EAPEP database. For the full EAPEP database, see http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/home/
statisticaldata/data_by_subject?_adf.ctrl-state=qsnwz2c9l_187&_afrLoop=266825864906349.
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yy IMF/World Bank data on GDP (PPP, per capita GDP and GDP growth rates) from the 
World Development Indicators and the World Economic Outlook October 2013 database.
yy World Bank poverty estimates from the PovcalNet database.
The first phase of the GET Model produces estimates of unemployment rates, which also 
allows for the calculation of total employment and unemployment and employment-to-popu-
lation ratios. After all comparable unemployment rates are compiled, multivariate regressions 
are run separately for different regions in the world in which unemployment rates broken 
down by age and sex (youth male, youth female, adult male, adult female) are regressed on 
GDP growth rates. Weights are used in the regressions to correct for biases that may result 
from the fact that countries that report unemployment rates tend to be different (in statisti-
cally important respects) than countries that do not report unemployment rates.30 The regres-
sions, together with considerations based on regional proximity, are used to fill in missing 
values in the countries and years for which country-reported data are unavailable.
During subsequent phases, employment by sector and status in total employment are esti-
mated. The models use similar techniques to the GET Model to impute missing values at the 
country level. In addition to GDP growth rate, the variables used as explanatory variables for 
the above are the value added shares of the three broad sectors in GDP, per capita GDP and 
the share of people living in urban areas.
Additional econometric models are used to produce global and regional estimates of 
working poverty and employment by economic class.31 For more information on the meth-
odology of producing world and regional estimates, see www.ilo.org/trends.
Sources of historical revisions in the global and regional estimates
Over the various GET Model runs, the main sources of revision in the global and regional 
estimates are revisions and changes in the benchmark files (i.e. GDP, population, labour force) 
and in the original sample of the reported unemployment rates. Any additional observation 
in the original sample and/or revision in the main explanatory variables can cause changes in 
the estimated relationship (e.g. between GDP and the unemployment rate) and hence in the 
estimated/imputed rates. This is most common in regions where the statistical base is rela-
tively poor. For the 2012 estimate, due to the combination of both the changes in the original 
sample and the revisions in the benchmark files, the downsize revision of unemployed as com-
pared to the Global Employment Trends 2013 report was 0.385 million, globally.
In addition, the unemployment rate for India (2012) was upwards revised as the results 
of the all-India household survey (68th round survey programme during the period July 2011 
to June 2012, conducted by the National Sample Survey Office) became available. This survey 
is the internationally comparable and utilized source for the historical series for the Indian 
unemployment rate.
30 For instance, if simple averages of unemployment rates in reporting countries in a given region were used to estimate 
the unemployment rate in that region, and the countries that do not report unemployment rates are different with re-
spect to unemployment rates than reporting countries, without such a correction mechanism, the resulting estimated 
regional unemployment rate would be biased. The “weighted least squares” approach adopted in the GET Model serves 
to correct for this potential problem.
31 See Kapsos and Bourmpoula (2013).
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Annex 5. Note on global and regional projections
Unemployment rate projections are obtained using the historical relationship between un-
employment rates and GDP growth during the worst crisis/downturn period for each 
country between 1991 and 2005, and during the corresponding recovery period.32 This was 
done through the inclusion of interaction terms of crisis and recovery dummy variables with 
GDP growth in fixed effects panel regressions.33 Specifically, the logistically transformed un-
employment rate was regressed on a set of covariates, including the lagged unemployment 
rate, the GDP growth rate, the lagged GDP growth rate and a set of covariates consisting of 
the interaction of the crisis dummy, and of the interaction of the recovery-year dummy with 
each of the other variables.
Separate panel regressions were run across three different groupings of countries, based on: 
(1) geographic proximity and economic/institutional similarities;
(2) income levels;34
(3) level of export dependence (measured as exports as a percentage of GDP).35 
The rationale behind these groupings is the following. Countries within the same geographic 
area or with similar economic/institutional characteristics are likely to be similarly affected 
by the crisis and have similar mechanisms to attenuate the crisis impact on their labour mar-
kets. Furthermore, because countries within geographic areas often have strong WTO and 
financial linkages, the crisis is likely to spill over from one economy to its neighbour (e.g. Can-
ada’s economy and labour market developments are intricately linked to developments in the 
United States). Countries of similar income levels are also likely to have more similar labour 
market institutions (e.g. social protection measures) and similar capacities to implement fiscal 
stimulus and other policies to counter the crisis impact. Finally, as the decline in exports 
was the primary crisis transmission channel from developed to developing economies, coun-
tries were grouped according to their level of exposure to this channel, as measured by their 
exports as a percentage of GDP. The impact of the crisis on labour markets through the export 
channel also depends on the type of exports (the affected sectors of the economy), the share 
of domestic value added in exports and the relative importance of domestic consumption (for 
instance, countries such as India and Indonesia with a large domestic market were less vulner-
able than countries such as Singapore and Thailand). These characteristics are controlled for 
by using fixed-effects in the regressions.
In addition to the panel regressions, country-level regressions were run for countries with 
sufficient data. The ordinary least squares country-level regressions included the same variables 
as the panel regressions.
In this GET Model run, to take into account the uncertainty around GDP prospects as 
well as the complexity of capturing the relationship between GDP and unemployment rate 
32 The crisis period comprises the span between the year in which a country experienced the largest drop in GDP growth, 
and the “turning point year” when growth reached its lowest level following the crisis, before starting to climb back to 
its pre-crisis level. The recovery period comprises the years between the “turning point year” and the year when growth 
has returned to its pre-crisis level.
33 In order to project unemployment during the current recovery period, the crisis-year and recovery-year dummies were 
adjusted based on the following definition: a country was considered “currently in crisis” if the drop in GDP growth after 
2007 was larger than 75 per cent of the absolute value of the standard deviation of GDP growth over the 1991–2008 
period and/or larger than 3 percentage points.
34 The income groups correspond to the World Bank income group classification of four income categories, based on 
countries’ 2008 GNI per capita (calculated using the Atlas method): low-income countries, US$ 975 or less; lower 
middle-income countries, US$ 976–US$ 3,855; upper middle-income countries, US$ 3,856–US$ 11,905; and high-
income countries, US$ 11,906 or more.
35 The export dependence-based groups are: highest exports (exports ≥70 per cent of GDP); high exports (exports 
< 70 per cent but ≥50 per cent of GDP); medium exports (exports <50 per cent but ≥20 per cent of GDP); and low ex-
ports (exports <20 per cent of GDP).
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for all the countries, a variety of 10 (similar) multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions (var-
ying-intercept and varying-coefficient models) are utilized. The main component that changes 
across these 10 versions is the lag structure of the independent variables. The potential supe-
riority of these models lies in the fact that not only is the panel structure is fully exploited 
(e.g. increased degrees of freedom), but also it is possible to estimate the coefficients specifically 
for each unit (country), taking into account unobserved heterogeneity at the cluster-level and 
correcting for the random effects’ approach caveat that the independent variables are not cor-
related with the random effects term.
Overall, the final projection was generated as a simple average of the estimates obtained 
from the three group panel regressions and also, for countries with sufficient data, the country-
level regressions. For a selection of countries (44 out of 178), an average of another set of fore-
cast combination was made according to judgemental examination in order to represent more 
realistically the recent trends observed in each country’s economic forecast.
Refinement of the global and regional projections
At the beginning of Q4 2013, at the time of production of this Global Employment 
Trends report, 61 out of a total sample of 178 countries had released monthly or quarterly 
unemployment estimates for a portion of 2013. In one country, estimates were available 
through October; in 25 countries, estimates were available through September; in nine coun-
tries, estimates were available through August; in three countries, estimates were available 
through July; in 21 countries, estimates were available through June (Q2); and in two coun-
tries, estimates were available through March (Q1). These monthly/quarterly data are uti-
lized in order to generate an estimate of the 2013 annual unemployment rate. The 2013 
projection for the rest of the sample (countries without any data for 2013), as well as pro-
jections for 2014 onwards are produced by the extension of the GET Model using the rela-
tionship between economic growth and unemployment during countries’ previous recovery 
periods, as described above.
In generating the 2013 point estimate for the 61 countries for which 2013 data are avail-
able, the first step is to take an unweighted average of the (seasonally adjusted) unemployment 
rate over the available months or quarters of 2013, which is defined as the point estimate. 
Around this point estimate a confidence interval is generated, based on the standard devia-
tion of the monthly or quarterly unemployment rate since the beginning of 2008, multiplied 
by the ratio of the remaining months or quarters to 12 (for monthly estimates) or 4 (for quar-
terly estimates).36 Thus, all else being equal, the more months of data that are available for a 
country, the more certain is the estimate of the annual unemployment rate, with uncertainty 
declining in proportion to the months of available data. 
In order to integrate the short-term and medium-term trends in the movement of un-
employment rates, the above point estimate is adjusted according to whether the two trends 
are in agreement.37 Specifically,
yy if both trends are positive (negative), then the above point estimate is recalculated as a 
weighted average of 60 (40) per cent of the upper bound and 40 (60) per cent of the lower 
bound;
36 In cases where the ratio of the point estimate and the standard deviation is less than or equal to 5, the standard de-
viation is instead constructed since the beginning of 2009. The rationale is that the exceptionally high volatility of un-
employment rates during the early period of the global financial crisis is unlikely to persist over the short-to-medium 
term. Rather, the most recent level of volatility can be expected to persist.
37 The short-term and the longer-term trend are defined, respectively, as the percentage point differences between the 
unemployment rate of the latest month M (or quarter Q) available and the unemployment rate of the month M3 (or 
quarter Q1), and of the month M6 (or quarter Q2), respectively.
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yy if the two trends are in opposite directions, the unemployment rate of the latest month 
or quarter available is assigned to the remaining months or quarters of the 2012, and the 
above point estimate is recalculated as an unweighted average over the 12 months or four 
quarters of 2012.
The underlying assumption is that in cases where there is a clear upward (downward) trend 
over two consecutive periods, the tendency will be for somewhat higher (lower) unemployment 
rates than in the latest month of available data. In cases in which there is no discernible 
trend over the past two periods, unemployment is expected to remain at the most recent rate, 
and therefore more weight is given to the latest information available. The final 2013 un-
employment rate estimate for these countries is equal to the adjusted point estimate.
The same procedure is followed for the unemployment rate of the youth subcomponents 
for the countries with at least two quarters available in 2013 (46 out of 61  countries). The 
projections for the unemployment rate of the rest of the subcomponents for 2013 onwards 
are produced with the extension of the GET Model, using separately for each subcompo-
nent the same model specifications as for the total unemployment rate. The nominal un-
employment for the various subcomponents estimated with the extension of the GET Model 
is aggregated to produce a nominal total unemployment, which may differ from what the 
above procedure estimates for total nominal unemployment. The difference between the total 
nominal unemployment produced as the sum of the subcomponents and the total nominal 
unemployment estimated separately is distributed among the subcomponents in proportion 
to each subcomponent’s share of total unemployment.38 These adjusted point estimates are the 
final point estimates for the subcomponents.
For the 61 countries for which 2013 data are available, the confidence interval remains 
as described above. For the rest of the countries and for the projections for 2014 onwards, the 
confidence intervals around the projections are generated with one standard deviation across 
the projections of the various models’ projections, as described above. In order to construct the 
confidence interval for each sub-component, the ratio of the subcomponent unemployment 
rate to total unemployment rate is applied to the upper- and lower-bound estimates of the 
total unemployment rate.
Projections based on the downside scenario
In its latest World Economic Outlook (WEO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
takes into account that the high uncertainty around the global economy produces a downside 
scenario (IMF, 2013). This scenario uses the Euro Area Model (EUROMOD). The downside 
scenario assumes four main drivers, among others: higher interest rates and slower product-
ivity growth in the United States; rising risk premia and additional ﬁscal tightening in the 
euro area; slow recovery in emerging market economies due to weak investment, mild capital 
outﬂows and tightening in ﬁnancial conditions; and, for Japan, a scenario of less than suc-
cessful implementation of its three-pronged recovery strategy.39 In this scenario, GDP glob-
ally would fall by 0.8 percentage points in 2014 relative to the baseline projection and by 0.9 
points in 2015. The ILO has produced a downside scenario for global unemployment based 
on GDP growth estimates from the IMF downside scenario. This scenario is implemented in 
the GET Model by introducing the corresponding changes to the annual GDP growth rates 
and running the extension of the GET Model as described above.
38 The underlying assumption is that the relationship between the total unemployment rate and GDP growth is better 
understood than the relationship between unemployment rates of sub-groups of workers and GDP growth.
39 For more details on assumptions underlining the scenario, see figures 1.17 of the IMF World Economic Outlook 
October 2013 report (IMF, 2013).
126 Global Employment Trends 2014 | Risk of a jobless recovery?











































Central and South-Eastern 
Europe (non-EU) and CIS










































































































































































Annex 6. Global employment trends – Regional groupings
GLOBAL EMPLOYMENT 
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0.807987          +1.987523  0.887983          +1.987523006.62        
-0.883988          +1.987523006.63        -006.65        0.894989          
+1.987523006.65        0.887990  
ILO























isk of a jobless recovery?
Global Employment Trends 2014
The annual Global Employment Trends (GET) reports provide the latest 
global and regional estimates of employment and unemployment, employ-
ment by sector, vulnerable employment, labour productivity, informal em-
ployment and working poverty, while also analysing country-level issues and 
trends in the labour market. 
Based on the most recently available data and taking into account macro-
economic trends and forecasts, the GET reports seek to shed light on cur-
rent labour market trends and challenges. The reports build on the ILO’s 
Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) and include a consistent set 
of tables with regional and global estimates of labour market indicators. 
Each report contains a medium-term labour market outlook, assessing likely 
trends and drivers of labour market developments around the world.
The Global Employment Trends 2014 report highlights the risks of a job-
less recovery. Economic activity is starting to recover in most developed and 
emerging economies. However, labour markets have not yet recovered from 
previous weaknesses and global unemployment remains at 6 per cent or al-
most 202 million jobseekers. As joblessness persists, ever more unemployed 
workers are becoming discouraged and quit the labour market, further widen-
ing the crisis-related jobs gap in comparison to pre-crisis trends. Insufficient 
private and public consumption as well as low investment prevent faster job 
creation and a quicker fall in the unemployment rate. Historically low inter-
est rates, especially in advanced economies, have so far triggered a surge in 
financial rather than in real investment, with little effect on job creation. 
The report argues that policy-makers need to tackle weak aggregate demand 
growth through more pro-active policies that help boost private and public 
consumption. In addition, hiring uncertainty needs to be brought down in 
order to increase investment and job creation. This can be achieved, in 
particular, by providing better coordination of different policy instruments. 
Also, in countries with high and persistent unemployment, active labour 
market policies can help address emerging mismatch problems that hamper 
a faster labour market recovery. Finally, rising labour market discourage-
ment and structural unemployment should be tackled with new skills and 
training initiatives to help jobseekers find employment in alternative indus-
tries and to promote their employability more broadly. 
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